Content:

"The Word became flesh:" in this is the ultimate joy of the Christian faith. In this is the fullness of Revelation. The Same Incarnate Lord is both perfect God and perfect man. The full significance and the ultimate purpose of human existence is revealed and realized in and through the Incarnation. He came down from Heaven to redeem the earth, to unite man with God for ever. "And became man." The new age has been initiated. We count now the "anni Domini!" As St. Irenaeus wrote: "the Son of God became the Son of Man, that man also might become the son of God."¹ Not only is the original fullness of human nature restored or re-established in the Incarnation. Not only does human nature return to its once lost communion with God. The Incarnation is also the new Revelation, the new and further step. The first Adam was a living soul. But the last Adam is the Lord from Heaven (1 Cor. 15:47). And in the Incarnation of the Word human nature was not merely anointed with a superabundant overflowing of Grace, but was assumed into an intimate and hypostatical unity with the Divinity itself. In that lifting up of human nature into an everlasting communion with the Divine Life, the Fathers of the early Church unanimously saw the very essence of salvation, the basis of the whole redeeming work of Christ. "That is saved which is united with God," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus. And what was not united could not be saved at all. This was his chief reason for insisting, against Apollinarius,² on the fullness of human nature, assumed by the Only Begotten in the Incarnation. This was the fundamental motive in the whole of early theology, in St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, the Cappa-docian Fathers, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Maximus the Confessor. The whole history of Christological dogma was determined by this fundamental conception: the Incarnation of the Word as Redemption. In the Incarnation human history is completed. God’s eternal will is accomplished, "the mystery from eternity hidden and to angels unknown." The days of expectation are over. The Promised and the Expected has come. And from henceforth, to use the phrase of St. Paul, the life of man "is hid with Christ in God" (Colossians 3:3).

The Incarnation of the Word was an absolute manifestation of God. And above all it was a revelation of Life. Christ is the Word of Life, ο λόγος της ζωής… "and the life was manifested, and we have seen, and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us" (1 John 1:1-2).³ The Incarnation is the quickening of man, as it were, the resurrection of human nature. But the climax of the Gospel is the Cross, the death of the Incarnate. Life has been revealed in full through death. This is the paradoxical mystery of the Christian faith: life through death, life from the grave and out of the grave, the mystery of the life-bearing grave. And we are born to real and eternal life only through our baptismal death and burial in Christ; we are regenerated with Christ in the baptismal font. Such is the invariable law of true life. "That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die" (I Cor. 15:36).

"Great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh" (I Timothy 3:16). But God was not manifest in order to recreate the world at once by the exercise of His omnipotent might, or to illuminate and transfigure it by the overwhelming light of His glory. It was in the uttermost humiliation that this revelation of Divinity was wrought. The Divine will does not abolish the original status of human freedom or "self-power" [το αύτεξούσιον], it does not destroy or abolish the "ancient law of human freedom."⁴ Herein is revealed a certain self-limitation or "kenosis" of the Divine might. And more than that, a certain kenosis of Divine Love itself. Divine love, as it were, restricts and limits itself in the maintenance of the freedom of the creation. Love does not impose the healing by compulsion as it might have done. There was no compelling evidence in this manifestation of God. Not all recognized the Lord of Glory under that "guise of the servant" He deliberately took upon Himself. And whosoever did recognize, did so not by any natural insight, but by the revelation of the Father (cf. Matt. 16:17). The Incarnate Word appeared on earth as man among men. This was the redeeming assumption of all human fullness, not only of human nature, but also of all the fullness of human life. The Incarnation had to be manifested in all the fullness of life, in the fullness of human ages, that all that fullness might be sanctified. This is one of the aspects of the idea of the "summing up" of all in Christ (recapitulatio, άνακεφαλαίωσις) which was taken up with such emphasis by St. Irenaeus from St. Paul.⁵ This was the "humiliation" of the Word (cf. Phil. 2:7). But this "kenosis" was no reduction of His Divinity, which in the Incarnation continues unchanged, ανευ τροπής. It was, on the contrary, a lifting-up of man, the "deification" of human nature, the "theosis." As St. John Damascene says, in the Incarnation "three things were accomplished at once: the assumption, the existence, and the deification of humanity by the Word."⁶ It must be stressed that in the Incarnation the Word assumes the original human nature, innocent and free from original sin, without any stain. This does not violate the fullness of nature, nor does this affect the Savior’s likeness to us sinful people. For sin does not belong to human nature, but is a parasitic and abnormal growth. This point was vigorously stressed by St. Gregory of Nyssa and particularly by St. Maximus the Confessor in connection with their teaching of the will as the seat of sin.⁷ In the Incarnation the Word assumes the first-formed human nature, created "in the image of God," and thereby the image of God is again re-established in man.⁸ This was not yet the assumption of human suffering or of suffering humanity. It was an assumption of human life, but not yet of human death. Christ’s freedom from original sin constitutes also His freedom from death, which is the "wages of sin." Christ is unstained from corruption and mortality right from His birth. And like the First Adam before the Fall, He is able not to die at all, potens non mori, though obviously He can still die, potens autem mori. He was exempt from the necessity of death, because His humanity was pure and innocent. Therefore Christ’s death was and could not but be voluntary, not by the necessity of fallen nature, but by free choice and acceptance.⁹

A distinction must be made between the assumption of human nature and the taking up of sin by Christ. Christ is "the Lamb of God that taketh the sin of the world" (John I:29).¹⁰ But He does not take the sin of the world in the Incarnation. That is an act of the will, not a necessity of nature. The Savior bears the sin of the world (rather than assumes it) by the free choice of love. He bears it in such a way that it does not become His own sin, or violate the purity of His nature and will. He carries it freely; hence this "taking up" of sin has a redeeming power, as a free act of compassion and love.¹¹ This taking up of sin is not merely a compassion. In this world, which "lies in sin," even purity itself is suffering, it is a fount or cause of suffering. Hence it is that the righteous heart grieves and aches over unrighteousness, and suffers from the unrighteousness of this world. The Savior’s life, as the life of a righteous and pure being, as a life pure and sinless, must inevitably have been in this world the life of one who suffered. The good is oppressive to this world, and this world is oppressive to the good. This world resists good and does not regard light. And it does not accept Christ, it rejects both Him and His Father (John 15:23-24). The Savior submits Himself to the order of this world, forbears, and the very opposition of this world is covered by His all-forgiving love: "They know not what they do" (Luke 23:34). The whole life of Our Lord is one Cross. But suffering is not yet the whole Cross. The Cross is more than merely suffering Good. The sacrifice of Christ is not yet exhausted by His obedience and endurance, forbearance, compassion, all-forgivingness. The one redeeming work of Christ cannot be separated into parts. Our Lord’s earthly life is one organic whole, and His redeeming action cannot be exclusively connected with any one particular moment in that life. However, the climax of this life was its death. And the Lord plainly bore witness to the hour of death: "For this cause came I unto this hour" (John 12:27). The redeeming death is the ultimate purpose of the Incarnation."

The mystery of the Cross is beyond our rational comprehension. This "terrible sight" seems strange and startling. The whole life of Our Blessed Lord was one great act of forbearance, mercy and love. And the whole of it is illuminated by the eternal radiance of Divinity, though that radiance is invisible to the world of flesh and sin. But salvation is completed on Golgotha, not on Tabor, and the Cross of Jesus was foretold even on Tabor (cf. Luke 9:31). Christ came not only that He might teach with authority and tell people the name of the Father, not only that He might accomplish works of mercy. He came to suffer and to die, and to rise again. He Himself more than once witnessed to this before the perplexed and startled disciples. He not only prophesied the coming Passion and death, but plainly stated that He must, that He had to, suffer and be killed. He plainly said that "must," not simply "was about to." "And He began to teach them that the Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders, and the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again" (Mark 8:31, Matthew 16:21, Luke 9:22, 24:26). "Must" [δει] not just according to the law of this world, in which good and truth is persecuted and rejected, not just according to the law of hatred and evil. The death of Our Lord was in full freedom. No one takes His life away. He Himself offers His soul by His own supreme will and authority. "I have authority," — έξουσίαν εχω — (John 10:18). He suffered and died, "not because He could not escape suffering, but because He chose to suffer," as it is stated in the Russian Catechism. Chose, not merely in the sense of voluntary endurance or non-resistance, not merely in the sense that He permitted the rage of sin and unrighteousness to be vented on Himself. He not only permitted but willed it. He "must have died according to the law of truth and love. In no way was the Crucifixion a passive suicide or simply murder. It was a Sacrifice and an oblation. He had to die. This was not the necessity of this world. This was the necessity of Divine Love. The mystery of the Cross begins in eternity, "in the sanctuary of the Holy Trinity, unapproachable for creatures." And the transcendent mystery of God’s wisdom and love is revealed and fulfilled in history. Hence Christ is spoken of as the Lamb, "who was foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world" (Peter 1:19), and even "that hath been slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. 13:8). "The Cross of Jesus, composed of the enmity of the Jews and the violence of the Gentiles, is indeed but the earthly image and shadow of this heavenly Cross of love."¹⁴ This "Divine necessity" of the death on the Cross passes all understanding indeed. And the Church has never attempted any rational definition of this supreme mystery. Scriptural terms have appeared, and do still appear, to be the most adequate ones. In any case, no merely ethical categories will do. The moral, and still more the legal or juridical conceptions, can never be more than colorless anthropomorphism. This is true even of the idea of sacrifice. The sacrifice of Christ cannot be considered as a mere offering or surrender. That would not explain the necessity of the death. For the whole life of the Incarnate One was one continuous sacrifice. Why then was this purest life yet insufficient for victory over death? Why was death vanquished only by death? And was death really a terrifying prospect for the Righteous One, for the Incarnate One, especially in the supreme foreknowledge of the coming Resurrection on the third day? But even ordinary Christian martyrs have accepted all their torments and sufferings, and death itself, in full calm and joy, as a crown and a triumph. The Chief of martyrs, the Protomartyr Christ Himself, was not less than they. And, by the same "Divine decree," by the same "Divine necessity," He "must" not only have been executed and reviled, and have died, but also have been raised on the third day. Whatever may be our interpretation of the Agony in the Garden, one point is perfectly clear. Christ was not a passive victim, but the Conqueror, even in His uttermost humiliation. He knew that this humiliation was no mere endurance or obedience, but the very path of Glory and of the ultimate victory. Nor does the idea of Divine justice alone, justitia vindicativa, reveal the ultimate meaning of the sacrifice of the Cross. The mystery of the Cross cannot be adequately presented in terms of the transaction, the requital, or the ransom.¹⁵ If the value of the death of Christ was infinitely enhanced by His Divine Personality, the same also applies to the whole of His life. All His deeds have an infinite value and significance as the deeds of the Incarnate Word of God. And they cover indeed superabundantly both all misdeeds and sinful shortcomings of the fallen human race. Finally, there could hardly be any retributive justice in the Passion and death of the Lord, which might possibly have been in the death of even a righteous man. For this was not the suffering and death of a mere man, graciously supported by the Divine help because of his faithfulness and endurance. This death was the suffering of the Incarnate Son of God Himself, the suffering of unstained human nature already deified by its assumption into the hypostasis of the Word. Nor is this to be explained by the idea of a substitutional satisfaction, the satisfactio vicaria of the scholastics. Not because substitution is not possible. Christ did indeed take upon Himself the sin of the world. But because God does not seek the sufferings of anyone, He grieves over them. How could the penal death of the Incarnate, most pure and undefiled, be the abolition of sin, if death itself is the wages of sin, and if death exists only in the sinful world? Does Justice really restrain Love and Mercy, and was the Crucifixion needed to disclose the pardoning love of God, otherwise precluded from manifesting itself by the restraint of vindicatory justice? If there was any restraint at all, it was rather a restraint of love. And justice was accomplished, in that Salvation was wrought by condescension, by a "kenosis," and not by omnipotent might. Probably a recreation of fallen mankind by the mighty intervention of the Divine omnipotence would have seemed to us simpler and more merciful. Strangely enough, the fullness of the Divine Love, which is intent to preserve our human freedom, appears to us rather as a severe request of transcendent justice, simply because it implies an appeal to the cooperation of the human will. Thus Salvation becomes a task for man himself also, and can be consummated only in freedom, with the response of man. The "image of God" is manifested in freedom. And freedom itself is all too often a burden for man. And in a certain sense it is indeed a superhuman gift and request, a supernatural path, the path of "deification," theosis. Is not this very theosis a burden for a self-imprisoned, selfish, and self-sufficient being? And yet this burdensome gift of freedom is the ultimate mark of the Divine love and benevolence towards man. The Cross is not a symbol of Justice, but the symbol of Love Divine. St. Gregory of Nazianzus utters all these doubts with great emphasis in his remarkable Easter Sermon:

By all these questions St. Gregory tries to make clear the inexplicability of the Cross in terms of vindicatory justice. And he concludes: "From this it is evident that the Father accepted [the sacrifice], not because He demanded or had need, but by economy and because man had to be sanctified by the humanity of God."¹⁶

Redemption is not just the forgiveness of sins, it is not just man’s reconciliation with God. Redemption is the abolition of sin altogether, the deliverance from sin and death. And Redemption was accomplished on the Cross, "by the blood of His Cross" (Col. 1:20; cf. Acts 20:28; Rom. 5:9; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14; Heb. 9:22; I John 1:7; Rev. 1:5-6, 5:9). Not by the suffering of the Cross only, but precisely by the death on the Cross. And the ultimate victory is wrought, not by sufferings or endurance, but by death and resurrection. We enter here into the ontological depth of human existence. The death of Our Lord was the victory over death and mortality, not just the remission of sins, nor merely a justification of man, nor again a satisfaction of an abstract justice. And the very key to the Mystery can be given only by a coherent doctrine of human death.

In separation from God human nature becomes unsettled, goes out of tune, as it were, is decomposed. The very structure of man becomes unstable. The unity of the soul and the body becomes insecure. The soul loses its vital power, is no more able to quicken the body. The body is turned into the tomb and prison of the soul. And physical death becomes inevitable. The body and the soul are no longer, as it were, secured or adjusted to each other. The transgression of the commandment "reinstated man in the state of nature," says St. Athanasius, εις το κατά φύσιν έπέστρεφεν "that as he was made out of nothing, so also in his very existence he suffered in due time corruption according to all justice." For, being made out of nothing, the creature also exists over an abyss of nothingness, ever ready to fall into it. The created nature, St. Athanasius says, is mortal and infirm, "flowing and liable to decomposition," φύσις ρευστή και διαλυομένη. And it is only saved from this "natural corruption" by the power of heavenly Grace, "by the indwelling of the Word." Thus separation from God leads the creature to decomposition and disintegration." "For we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground which cannot be gathered up again" (2 Samuel 14:14).

In Christian experience death is first revealed as a deep tragedy, as a painful metaphysical catastrophe, as a mysterious failure of human destiny. For death is not a normal end of human existence. Just the contrary. Man’s death is abnormal, is a failure. God did not create death; He created man for incorruption and true being, that we "might have being," εις το είναι (cf. Wisdom 6:18 and 2:23). The death of man is the "wages of sin" (Romans 6:23). It is a loss and corruption. And since the Fall the mystery of life is displaced by the mystery of death. What does it mean for a man to die? What is actually dying is obviously the body, for only the body is mortal and we speak of the "immortal" soul. In current philosophies nowadays, the "immortality of the soul" is emphasized to such an extent that the "mortality of man" is almost overlooked. In death this external, visible, and earthly bodily existence ceases. But yet, by some prophetic instinct, we say that it is "the man" who dies. For death surely breaks up human existence, although, admittedly, the human soul is "immortal," and personality is indestructible. Thus the question of death is first the question of the human body, of the corporeality of man. And Christianity proclaims not only the after-life of the immortal soul, but also the resurrection of the body. Man became mortal in the Fall, and actually dies. And the death of man becomes a cosmic catastrophe. For in the dying man, nature loses its immortal center, and itself, as it were, dies in man. Man was taken from nature, being made of the dust of the earth. But in a way he was taken out of nature, because God breathed into him the breath of life. St. Gregory of Nyssa comments on the narrative of Genesis in this way. "For God, it says, taking dust from the earth, fashioned man and by His own breath planted life in the creature which He formed, in order that the earthly element might be raised by union with the Divine, and so the Divine grace in one even course might uniformly extend through all creation, the lower nature being mingled with that which is above the world."¹⁸ … Man is a sort of "microcosm," every kind of life is combined in him, and in him only the whole world comes into contact with God.¹⁹ Consequently man’s apostasy estranges the whole creation from God, devastates it, and, as it were, deprives it of God. The Fall of man shatters the cosmic harmony. Sin is disorder, discord, lawlessness. Strictly speaking it is only man that dies. Death indeed is a law of nature, a law of organic life. But man’s death means just his fall or entanglement into this cyclical motion of nature, just what ought not to have happened at all. As St. Gregory says, "from the nature of dumb animals mortality is transferred to a nature created for immortality." Only for man is death contrary to nature and mortality is evil.²⁰ Only man is wounded and mutilated by death. In the generic life of dumb animals, death is rather a natural moment in the development of the species; it is the expression rather of the generating power of life than of infirmity. However, with the fall of man, mortality, even in nature, assumes an evil and tragic significance. Nature itself, as it were, is poisoned by the fatal venom of human decomposition. With dumb animals, death is but the discontinuation of individual existence. In the human world, death strikes at personality, and personality is much greater than mere individuality. It is the body that becomes corruptible and liable to death through sin. Only the body can disintegrate. Yet it is not the body that dies, but the whole man. For man is organically composed of body and soul. Neither soul nor body separately represents man. A body without a soul is but a corpse, and a soul without body is a ghost. Man is not a ghost sans-corpse, and corpse is not a part of man. Man is not a "bodiless demon," simply confined in the prison of the body. Mysterious as the union of soul and body indeed is, the immediate consciousness of man witnesses to the organic wholeness of his psycho-physical structure. This organic wholeness of human composition was from the very beginning strongly emphasized by all Christian teachers.²¹ That is why the separation of soul and body is the death of the man himself, the discontinuation of his existence, of wholeness, i.e. of his existence as a man. Consequently death and the corruption of the body are a sort of fading away of the "image of God" in man. St. John Damascene, in one of his glorious anthems in the Burial Service, says of this: "I weep and I lament, when I contemplate death, and see our beauty, fashioned after the image of God, lying in the tomb disfigured, dishonored, bereft of form."²² St. John speaks not of man’s body, but of man himself. "Our beauty in the image of God," ή κατ’ εικόνα θεου πτλασθεισα ώραιότης, this is not the body, but man. He is indeed an "image of the unfathomable glory" of God, even when wounded by sin, εικών άρρητου δόξης.²³ And in death it is disclosed that man, this "reasonable statue" fashioned by God, to use the phrase of St. Methodius,²⁴ is but a corpse. "Man is but dry bones, a stench and the food of worms." This is the riddle and the mystery of death. "Death is a mystery indeed: for the soul by violence is severed from the body, is separated, by the Divine will, from the natural connection and composition… Ο marvel! Why have we been given over unto corruption, and why have we been wedded unto death?" In the fear of death, often so petty and faint-hearted, there is revealed a profound metaphysical alarm, not merely a sinful attachment to the earthly flesh. In the fear of death the pathos of human wholeness is manifested. The Fathers used to see in the unity of soul and body in man an analogy of the indivisible unity of two natures in the unique hypostasis of Christ. Analogy may be misleading. But still by analogy one may speak of man as being just "one hypostasis in two natures," and not only of, but precisely in two natures. And in death this one human hypostasis is broken up. Hence the justification for the mourning and weeping. The terror of death is only warded off by the hope of the resurrection and life eternal.

However, death is not just the self-revelation of sin. Death itself is already, as it were, the anticipation of the resurrection. By death God not only punishes but also heals fallen and ruined human nature. And this not merely in the sense that He cuts the sinful life short by death and thereby prevents the propagation of sin and evil. God turns the very mortality of man into a means of healing. In death human nature is purified, pre-resurrected as it were. Such was the common opinion of the Fathers. With greatest emphasis this conception was put forward by St. Gregory of Nyssa. "Divine providence introduced death into human nature with a specific design," he says, "so that by the dissolution of body and soul, vice may be drawn off and man may be refashioned again through the resurrection, sound, free from passions, pure, and without any admixture of evil." This is particularly a healing of the body. In St. Gregory’s opinion, man’s journey beyond the grave is a means of cleansing. Man’s bodily structure is purified and renewed. In death, as it were, God refines the vessel of our body as in a refining furnace. By the free exercise of his sinful will man entered into communion with evil, and our structure became alloyed with the poison of vice. In death man falls to pieces, like an earthenware vessel, and his body is decomposed again in the earth, so that by purification from the accrued filth he may be restored to his normal form, through the resurrection. Consequently death is not an evil, but a benefit (ευεργεσία). Death is the wages of sin, yet at the same time it is also a healing process, a medicine, a sort of fiery tempering of the impaired structure of man. The earth is, as it were, sown with human ashes, that they may shoot forth in the last day, by the power of God; this was the Pauline analogy. The mortal remains are committed to the earth unto the resurrection. Death implies within itself a potentiality of resurrection. The destiny of man can be realized only in the resurrection, and in the general resurrection. But only the Resurrection of Our Lord resuscitates human nature and makes the general resurrection possible. The potentiality of resurrection inherent in every death was realized only in Christ, the "first-fruits of them that are asleep" (1 Cor. 15:20).²⁵

Redemption is above all an escape from death and corruption, the liberation of man from the "bondage of corruption" (Romans 8:21), the restoration of the original wholeness and stability of human nature. The fulfilment of redemption is in the resurrection. It will be fulfilled in the general "quickening" when "the last enemy shall be abolished, death" (1 Cor. 15:26: έσχατος εχθρός). But the restoration of unity within human nature is possible only through a restoration of the union of man with God. The resurrection is possible only in God. Christ is the Resurrection and the Life. "Unless man had been joined to God, he could never have become a partaker of incorruptibility," says St. Irenaeus. The way and the hope of the resurrection is revealed only through the Incarnation of the Word.²⁶ St. Athanasius expresses this point even more emphatically. The mercy of God could not permit "that creatures once made rational, and having partaken of the Word, should go to ruin and turn again to non-existence by the way of corruption." The violation of the law and disobedience did not abolish the original purpose of God. The abolition of that purpose would have violated the truth of God. But human repentance was insufficient. "Penitence does not deliver from the state of nature [into which man has relapsed through sin], it only discontinues the sin." For man not only sinned but fell into corruption. Consequently the Word of God descended and became man, assumed our body, "that, whereas man turned towards corruption, he might turn them again towards incorruption, and quicken them from death by appropriation of his body and by the grace of the Resurrection, banishing death from them like a straw from the fire."²⁷ Death was grafted on to the body, then life must be grafted on to the body again, that the body may throw off corruption and be clothed in life. Otherwise the body would not be raised. "If death had been kept away from the body by a mere command, it would nonetheless have been mortal and corruptible, according to the nature of our bodies. But that this should not be, it put on the incorporeal Word of God, and thus no longer fears either death or corruption, for it has life as a garment, and corruption is done away in it."²⁸ Thus, according to St. Athanasius, the Word became flesh in order to abolish corruption in human nature. However, death is vanquished, not by the appearance of Life in the mortal body, but rather by the voluntary death of the Incarnate Life. The Word became incarnate on account of death in the flesh, St. Athanasius emphasizes. "In order to accept death He had a body," and only through His death was the resurrection possible.²⁹

The ultimate reason for Christ’s death must be seen in the mortality of man. Christ suffered death, but passed through it and overcame mortality and corruption. He quickened death itself. By His death He abolishes the power of death. "The dominion of death is cancelled by Thy death, Ο Strong One." And the grave becomes the life-giving "source of our resurrection." And every grave becomes rather a "bed of hope" for believers. In the death of Christ, death itself is given a new meaning and significance. "By death He destroyed death."

Death is a catastrophe for man; this is the basic principle of the whole Christian anthropology. Man is an "amphibious" being, both spiritual and corporeal, and so he was intended and created by God. Body belongs organically to the unity of human existence. And this was perhaps the most striking novelty in the original Christian message. The preaching of the Resurrection as well as the preaching of the Cross was foolishness and a stumbling-block to the Gentiles. The Greek mind was always rather disgusted by the body. The attitude of an average Greek in early Christian times was strongly influenced by Platonic or Orphic ideas, and it was a common opinion that the body was a kind of a "prison," in which the fallen soul was incarcerated and confined. The Greeks dreamt rather of a complete and final disincarnation. The famous Orphic slogan was: σώμα-σήμα.³⁰ And the Christian belief in a coming Resurrection could only confuse and frighten the Gentile mind. It meant simply that the prison will be everlasting, that the imprisonment will be renewed again and for ever. The expectation of a bodily resurrection would befit rather an earthworm, suggested Celsus, and he jeered in the name of common sense. This nonsense about a future resurrection seemed to him altogether irreverent and irreligious. God would never do things so stupid, would never accomplish desires so criminal and capricious, which are inspired by an impure and fantastic love of the flesh. Celsus nicknames Christians a "φιλοσώματον γένος," "a flesh-loving crew," and he refers to the Docetists with far greater sympathy and understanding.³¹ Such was the general attitude to the Resurrection.

St. Paul had already been called a "babbler" by the Athenian philosophers just because he had preached to them "Jesus and the Resurrection" (Acts 17:18, 32). In the current opinion of those heathen days, an almost physical disgust of the body was frequently expressed. There was also a wide-spread influence from the farther East; one thinks at once of the later Manichean inundation which spread so rapidly all over the Mediterranean. St. Augustine, once a fervent Manichean himself, has intimated in his Confessiones that this abhorrence of the body was the chief reason for him to hesitate so long in embracing the faith of the Church, the faith in the Incarnation.³²

Porphyry, in his Life of Plotinus, tells that Plotinus, it seemed, "was ashamed to be in the flesh," and from this Porphyry starts his biography. "And in such a frame of mind he refused to speak either of his ancestors or parents, or of his fatherland. He would not sit for a sculptor or painter to make a permanent image of this perishable frame." It is already enough that we bear it now (Life of Plotinus, 1). This philosophical asceticism of Plotinus, of course, must be distinguished from Oriental asceticism, Gnostic or Manichean. Plotinus himself wrote very strongly "against Gnostics." Here, however, there was only a difference of motives and methods. The practical issue in both cases was one and the same, a "retreat" from this corporeal world, an escape from the body. Plotinus suggested the following analogy: Two men live in the same house. One of them blames the builder and his handiwork, because it is made of inanimate wood and stone. The other praises the wisdom of the architect, because the building is so skillfully erected. For Plotinus this world is not evil, it is the "image" or reflection of the world above, and is perhaps even the best of images. Still, one has to aspire beyond all images, from the image to the prototype, from the lower to the higher world. And Plotinus praises not the copy, but the pattern.³³ "He knows that when the time comes, he will go out and will no longer have need of a house." This phrase is very characteristic. The soul is to be liberated from the ties of the body, to be disrobed, and then it will ascend to its proper sphere.³⁴ "The true awakening is the true resurrection from the body, not with the body. For the resurrection with the body would be simply a passage from one sleep to another, to some other dwelling. The only true awakening is an escape from all bodies, since they are by nature opposite to the nature of the soul. Both the origin, and the life and the decay of bodies show that they do not correspond to the nature of the souls."³⁵ With all Greek philosophers the fear of impurity was much stronger than the dread of sin. Indeed, sin to them just meant impurity. This "lower nature," body and flesh, a corporeal and gross substance, was usually presented as the source and seat of evil. Evil comes from pollution, not from the perversion of the will. One must be liberated and cleansed from this filth.

And at this point Christianity brings a new conception of the body as well. From the beginning Docetism was rejected as the most destructive of temptations, a sort of dark anti-gospel, proceeding from Anti-Christ, "from the spirit of falsehood" (I John 4:2-3). This was strongly emphasized in St. Ignatius, St. Irenaeus, and Tertullian. "Not that we would be unclothed, but that we would be further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life" (2 Cor. 5:4). This is precisely the antithesis to Plotinus’ thought.³⁶ "He deals a death-blow here to those who depreciate the physical nature and revile our flesh," commented St. John Chrysostom. "It is not flesh, as he would say, that we put off from ourselves, but corruption; the body is one thing, corruption is another. Nor is the body corruption, nor corruption the body. True, the body is corrupt, but it is not corruption. The body dies, but it is not death. The body is the work of God, but death and corruption entered by sin. Therefore, he says, I would put off from myself that strange thing which is not proper to me. And that strange thing is not the body, but corruption. The future life shatters and abolishes not the body, but that which clings to it, corruption and death."³⁷ Chrysostom, no doubt, gives here the common feeling of the Church. "We must also wait for the spring of the body," as a Latin apologist of the second century put it — "expec-tandum nobis etiam et corporis ver est."³⁸ A Russian scholar, V. F. Ern, speaking of the catacombs, happily recalls these words in his letters from Rome. "There are no words which could better render the impression of jubilant serenity, the feeling of rest and unbounded peacefulness of the early Christian burial places. Here the body lies, like wheat under the winter shroud, awaiting, anticipating and foretelling the other-worldly eternal Spring."³⁹ This was the simile used by St. Paul. "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption: it is raised in incorruption" (I Cor. 15:42). The earth, as it were, is sown with human ashes in order that it may bring forth fruit, by the power of God, on the Great Day. "Like seed cast on the earth, we do not perish when we die, but having been sown, we rise."⁴⁰ Each grave is already the shrine of incorruption. Death itself is, as it were, illuminated by the light of triumphant hope.⁴¹

There is a deep distinction between Christian asceticism and the pessimistic asceticism of the non-Christian world. Father P. Florenskii describes this contrast in the following way: "One is based on the bad news of evil dominating the world, the other on the good news of victory, of the conquest of evil in the world. The former offers superiority, the latter holiness. The former type of ascetic goes out in order to escape, to conceal himself; the latter goes out in order to become pure, to conquer." Continence can be inspired by different motives and different purposes. There was, certainly, some real truth in the Orphic or Platonic conceptions as well. And indeed only too often the soul lives in the bondage of the flesh. Platonism was right in its endeavor to set free the reasonable soul from the bondage of fleshly desires, in its struggle against sensuality. And some elements of this Platonic asceticism were absorbed into the Christian synthesis. And yet the ultimate goal was quite different in the two cases. Platonism longs for the purification of the soul only. Christianity insists on the purification of the body as well. Platonism preaches the ultimate disincarnation. Christianity proclaims the ultimate cosmic transfiguration. Bodily existence itself is to be spiritualized. There is the same antithesis of eschatological expectation and aspiration: "to be unclothed" and "to be clothed upon," again and for ever. And strange enough, in this respect Aristotle was much closer to Christianity than Plato.

In the philosophical interpretation of its eschatological hope, Christian theology from the very beginning clings to Aristotle.⁴³ On this point he, the writer of prose amid the throng of poets, sober among the inspired, points higher than the "divine" Plato. Such a biased preference must appear altogether unexpected and strange. For, strictly speaking, in Aristotle there is not and cannot be any "after-death" destiny of man. Man in his interpretation is entirely an earthly being. Nothing really human passes beyond the grave. Man is mortal through and through like everything else earthly; he dies never to return. Aristotle simply denies personal immortality. His singular being is not a person. And what does actually survive is not properly human and does not belong to individuals; it is a "divine" element, immortal and eternal.⁴⁴ But yet in this weakness of Aristotle is his strength. Aristotle had a real understanding of the unity of human existence. Man is to Aristotle, first of all, an individual being, an organism, a living unit. And man is one just in his duality, as an "animated body" (τό εμψυχον); both of the elements in him exist only together, in a concrete and indivisible correlation. Into the "body" the matter is "formed" by the soul, and the soul realizes itself only in its body. "Hence there is no need to inquire whether soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and the imprint (τό σχήμα) are one, or, in general, whether the matter of a thing is the same with that of which it is the matter" [De anima, 417b 6]. The soul is just the "form" of the body (εΐδος και μορφή, 407b 23; λόγος τις και ειδος, 4lla 12), its "principle" and "term" (αρχή and τέλος), its very being and "actuality."⁴⁵ And Aristotle coins a new term to describe this peculiar correlation: the soul is εντελέχεια "the first actuality of a natural body" (εντελέχεια ή πρώτη σώματος φυσικού, 412a 27). Soul and body, for Aristotle they are not even two elements, combined or connected with each other, but rather simply two aspects of the same concrete reality.⁴⁶ "Soul and body together constitute the animal. Now it needs no proof that the soul cannot be separated from the body" (4l3a 4). Soul is but the functional reality of the corresponding body. "Soul and body cannot be defined out of relation to each other; a dead body is properly only matter; for the soul is the essence, the true being of what we call body."⁴⁷ Once this functional unity of the soul and body has been broken by death, no organism is there any more, the corpse is no more a body, and a dead man can hardly be called man at all.⁴⁸ Aristotle insisted on a complete unity of each concrete existence, as it is given hie et nunc. The soul "is not the body, but something belonging to the body (σώματος δέτι), and therefore resides in the body and, what is more, in a specific body (και έν σώματι τοιούτω). Our predecessors were wrong in endeavoring to fit the soul into a body without further determination of the nature and qualities of that body, although we do not even find that of any two things taken at random the one will admit the other (του τυχόντος ... το τυχόν). For the actuality of each thing comes naturally to be developed in the potentiality of each thing; in other words, in the appropriate matter" (4l4a 20: τη οικεία ΰλη).

The idea of the "transmigration" of souls was thus to Aristotle altogether excluded. Each soul abides in its "own" body, which it creates and forms, and each body has its "own" soul, as its vital principle, "eidos" or form. This anthropology was ambiguous and liable to a dangerous interpretation. It easily lends itself to a biological simplification and transformation into a crude naturalism, in which man is almost completely equated with other animals. Such indeed were the conclusions of certain followers of the Stagirite, of Aristoxenus and Dikaearchus, for whom the soul was but a "harmony" or a disposition of the body (αρμονία or τόνος, "tension") and of Strata etc.⁴⁹ "There is no more talk about the immaterial soul, the separate reason, or pure thought. The object of science is the corporate soul, the united soul and body."⁵⁰ Immortality was openly denied. The soul disappears just as the body dies; they have a common destiny. And even Theophrastes and Eudemus did not believe in immortality.⁵¹ For Alexander of Aphrodisias the soul was just an "είδος ενυλον."⁵² Aristotle himself has hardly escaped these inherent dangers of his conception. Certainly, man is to him an "intelligent being," and the faculty of thinking is his distinctive mark.⁵³ Yet, the doctrine of Nous does not fit very well into the general frame of the Aristotelian psychology. It is obviously the most obscure and complicated part of his system. Whatever the explanation of this incoherence may be, the stumbling-block is still there. "The fact is that the position of νους in the system is anomalous."⁵⁴ The "intellect" does not belong to the concrete unity of the individual organism, and it is not an εντελέχεια of any natural body. It is rather an alien and "divine" element, that comes in somehow "from outside." It is a "distinct species of soul" (ψυχής γένος έτερον), which is separable from the body, "unmixed" with the matter. It is impassive, immortal and eternal, and therefore separable from the body, "as that which is eternal from that which is perishable."⁵⁵ This impassive or active intellect does survive all individual existences indeed, but it does not properly belong to individuals and does not convey any immortality to the particular beings.⁵⁶ Alexander of Aphrodisias seems to have grasped the main idea of the Master. He invented the term itself: νους ποιητικός. In no sense is it a part or power of the human soul. It supervenes as something really coming in from outside. It is a common and eternal source of all intellectual activities in individuals, but it does not belong to any one of them. Rather is it an eternal, imperishable, self-existing substance, an immaterial energy, devoid of all matter and potentiality. And, obviously, there can be but one such substance. The νους ποιητικός is not only "divine," it must be rather identified with the deity itself, the first cause of all energy and motion."

The real failure of Aristotle was not in his "naturalism," but in that he could not see any permanence of the individual. But this was rather a common failure of the whole of ancient philosophy. Plato has the same short sight. Beyond time, Greek thought visualizes only the "typical," and nothing truly personal. Personality itself was hardly known in pre-Christian times. Hegel suggested, in his Aesthetics, that Sculpture gives the true key to the whole of Greek mentality.⁵⁸ Recently a Russian scholar, A. F. Lossev, pointed out that the whole of Greek philosophy was a "sculptural symbolism." He was thinking especially of Platonism. "Against a dark background, as a result of an interplay and conflict of light and shadow, there stands out a blind, colorless, cold, marble and divinely beautiful, proud and majestic body, a statue. And the world is such a statue, and gods are statues; the city-state also, and the heroes, and the myths, and ideas, all conceal underneath them this original sculptural intuition… There is no personality, no eyes, no spiritual individuality. There is a "something," but not a "someone," an individualized "it," but no living person with his proper name… There is no one at all. There are bodies, and there are ideas. The spiritual character of the ideas is killed by the body, but the warmth of the body is restrained by the abstract idea. There are here beautiful, but cold and blissfully indifferent statues."⁵⁹ And yet, in the general frame of such an impersonalist mentality, Aristotle did feel and understand the individual more than anyone else. He got closer than anybody else to the true conception of human personality. He provided Christian philosophers with all the elements out of which an adequate conception of personality could be built up. His strength was just in his understanding of the empirical wholeness of human existence.⁶⁰

Aristotle’s conception was radically transformed in its Christian adaptation, for new perspectives were opened, and all the terms were given a new significance. And yet one cannot fail to acknowledge the Aristotelian origin of the main eschatological ideas in early Christian theology. Such a christening of Aristotelianism we find in Origen, to a certain extent in St. Methodius of Olympus as well, and later in St. Gregory of Nyssa. The idea of εντελέχεια itself now receives new depth in the new experience of spiritual life. The term itself was never used by the Fathers, but there can be no doubt about the Aristotelian roots of their conceptions.⁶¹ The break between intellect, impersonal and eternal, and the soul, individual but mortal, was healed and overcome in the new self-consciousness of a spiritual personality. The idea of personality itself was a great Christian contribution to philosophy. And again, there was here a sharp understanding of the tragedy of death also.

The first theological essay on the Resurrection was written in the middle of the second century by Athenagoras of Athens. Of the many arguments he puts forward, his reference to the unity and integrity of man is of particular interest. Athenagoras proceeds from the fact of this unity to the future resurrection. "God gave independent being and life neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, but rather to men, composed of soul and body, so that with these same parts of which they are composed, when they are born and live, they should attain after the termination of this life their common end; soul and body compose in man one living entity." There would no longer be a man, Athenagoras emphasizes, if the completeness of this structure were broken, for then the identity of the individual would be broken also. The stability of the body, its continuity in its proper nature, must correspond to the immortality of the soul. "The entity which receives intellect and reason is man, and not the soul alone. Consequently man must for ever remain composed of soul and body. And this is impossible, if there is no resurrection. For if there is no resurrection, human nature is no longer human.⁶²

Aristotle concluded from the mortality of the body that the individual soul, which is but the vital power of the body, is also mortal. Both go down together. Athenagoras, on the contrary, infers the resurrection of the body from the immortality of the reasonable soul. Both are kept together.⁶³ The resurrection, however, is no mere simple return or repetition. The Christian dogma of the General Resurrection is not that "eternal return" which was professed by the Stoics. The resurrection is the true renewal, the transfiguration, the reformation of the whole creation. Not just a return of what has passed away, but a heightening, a fulfillment of something better and more perfect. "And what you sow is not the body which is to be, but a bare kernel... It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body" (I Cor. 15:37, 44). A very considerable change is implied. And there is here a very real philosophical difficulty. How are we to think of this "change" so that "identity" shall not be lost? We find in the early writers merely an assertion of this identity, without any attempt at a philosophical explanation. St. Paul’s distinction between the "natural" body (σώμα φυσικόν) and the "spiritual" body (σώμα πνευματικόν) obviously needs some further interpretation (cf. the contrast of the body "of our humiliation," της ταπεινώσεως ημών, and the body "of His glory," της δόξης αύτοΰ, in Phil. 3:21).

In the period of the early controversies with the Docetists and Gnostics, a careful and precise answer became urgent. Origen was probably the first who attempted to give one. Origen’s eschatology was from the very beginning vigorously denounced by many, indeed with good reason, and his doctrine of the Resurrection was perhaps the chief reason why his orthodoxy was challenged. Origen himself never claimed any formal authority for his doctrine. He offered merely some explanation, to be tested and checked by the mind of the Church. For him it was not enough to refer simply to Divine omnipotence, as the earlier writers sometimes did, or to quote certain appropriate passages of Holy Scripture. One had rather to show how the doctrine of the Resurrection fitted into the general conception of human destiny and purpose. Origen was exploring a via media between the fleshly conception of the simpliciores and the denial of the Docetists: "fugere se et nostrorum carries, et haereticorum phantasmata," as St. Jerome puts it.⁶⁴ And both were dissatisfied and even offended.⁶⁵

The General Resurrection is an article of faith indeed. The same individuals will rise, and the individual identity of the bodies will be preserved. But this does not imply for Origen any identity of material substance, or identity of status. The bodies indeed will be transfigured or transformed in the Resurrection. In any case, the risen body will be a "spiritual" body, and not a fleshly one. Origen takes up the simile of St. Paul. This fleshly body, the body of this earthly life, is buried in the earth, like a seed that is sown, and disintegrates. And one thing is sown, and another rises. The germinating power is not extinguished in the dead body, and in due season, by the word of God, the new body will be raised, like the ear that shoots forth from the seed. Some corporeal principle remains undestroyed and unaffected by the death. The term Origen used was obviously Aristotelian: "το είδος," "species," or "form." But it is not the soul that Origen regards as the form of the body. It is rather a certain potential corporeality, pertaining to each soul and to each person. It is the forming and the quickening principle of the body, just a seed capable of germination. Origen also uses the term λόγος σπερματικός, ratio seminalis.⁶⁶ It is impossible to expect that the whole body should be restored in the resurrection, since the material substance changes so quickly and is not the same in the body even for two days, and surely it can never be reintegrated again. The material substance in the risen bodies will be not the same as in the bodies of this life (το ύλικόν ύποκείμενον ουδέποτε έχει ταυτόν). Yet the body will be the same, just as our body is the same throughout this life in spite of all changes of its material composition. And again, a body must be adapted to the environment, to the conditions of life, and obviously in the Kingdom of Heaven the bodies cannot be just the same as here on earth. The individual identity is not compromised, because the "eidos" of each body is not destroyed (το εΐδος το χαράκτηριζον το σώμα). It is the very principium individuationis. To Origen the "body itself" is just this vital principle. His είδος closely corresponds to Aristotle’s εντελέχεια. But with Origen this "form" or germinative power is indestructible; that makes the construction of a doctrine of the resurrection possible. This "principle of individuation" is also principium surgendi. In this definite body the material particles are composed or arranged just by this individual "form" or λόγος. Therefore, of whatever particles the risen body is composed, the strict identity of the psycho-physical individuality is not impaired, since the germinative power remains unchangeable.⁶⁷ Origen presumes that the continuity of individual existence is sufficiently secured by the identity of the reanimating principle. This view was more than once repeated later, especially under the renewed influence of Aristotle. And in modern Roman theology the question is still rather open: to what extent the recognition of the material identity of the risen bodies with the mortal ones belongs to the essence of the dogma.⁶⁸ The whole question is rather that of metaphysical interpretation, not a problem of faith. It may even be suggested that on this occasion Origen expresses not so much his own, as rather a current opinion. There is very much that is questionable in Origen’s eschatological opinions. They cannot be regarded as a coherent whole. And it is not easy to reconcile his "Aristotelian" conception of the resurrection with a theory of the pre-existence of souls, or with a conception of the periodical recurrent cycles of worlds and final annihilation of matter. There is no complete agreement between this theory of the Resurrection and the doctrine of a "General apokatastasis" either. Many of Origen’s eschatological ideas may be misleading. Yet his speculation on the relation between the fleshly body of this life and the permanent body of the resurrection was an important step towards the synthetic conception of the Resurrection. His chief opponent, St. Methodius of Olympus, does not seem to have understood him well. St. Methodius’ criticisms amounted to the complete rejection of the whole conception of the είδος. Is not the form of the body changeable as well as the material substance? Can the form really survive the body itself, or rather is it dissolved and decomposed, when the body of which it is the form dies and ceases to exist as a whole? In any case the identity of the form is no guarantee of personal identity, if the whole material substratum is to be entirely different. For St. Methodius the "form" meant rather merely the external shape of the body, and not the internal vital power, as for Origen. And most of his arguments simply miss the point. But his emphasis on the wholeness of the human composition was a real complement to Origen’s rather excessive formalism.⁶⁹

St. Gregory of Nyssa in his eschatological doctrine endeavored to bring together the two conceptions, to reconcile the truth of Origen with the truth of Methodius. And this attempt at a synthesis is of exceptional importance.⁷⁰ St. Gregory starts with the empirical unity of body and soul, its dissolution in death. And the body severed from the soul, deprived of its "vital power" (ζωτική δύναμις),⁷¹ by which the corporeal elements are held and knit together during life, disintegrates and is involved into the general circulation of matter. The material substance itself, however, is not destroyed, only the body dies, not its elements. Moreover, in the very disintegration the particles of the decaying body preserve in themselves certain "signs" or "marks" of their former connection with their own soul (τα σημεία του ημετέρου συγκρίματος). And again, in each soul also certain "bodily marks" are preserved, as on a piece of wax — certain signs of union. By a "power of recognition" (γνωστική τη δυνάμει), even in the separation of death, the soul somehow remains nevertheless near the elements of its own decomposed body (του οικείου εφαπτομένη). In the day of resurrection each soul will be able by these double marks to "recognize" the familiar elements. This is the "είδος" of the body, its "inward image," or "type." St. Gregory compares this process of the restoration of the body with the germination of a seed, with the development of the human foetus. He differs sharply from Origen on the question as to what substance will constitute the bodies of the resurrection, and he joins here St. Methodius. If the risen bodies were constructed entirely from the new elements, that "would not be a resurrection, but rather the creation of a new man," και ούκέτι αν είη το τοιούτον άνάστασις, άλλα καινοΰ ανθρώπου δημιουργία.⁷² The resurrected body will be reconstructed from its former elements, signed or sealed by the soul in the days of its incarnation, otherwise it would simply be another man. Nevertheless, the resurrection is not just a return, nor is it in any way a repetition of present existence. Such a repetition would be really an "endless misery." In the resurrection human nature will be restored not to its present, but to its normal or "original" condition. Strictly speaking, it will be for the first time brought into that state, in which it ought to have been, had not sin and the Fall entered the world, but which was never realized in the past. And everything in human existence, which is connected with instability, is not so much a return as a consummation. This is the new mode of man’s existence. Man is to be raised to eternity, the form of time falls away. And in the risen corporeality all succession and change will be abolished and condensed. This will be not only an άποκατάστασις, but rather a "recapitulatio." The evil surplus, that which is of sin, falls away. But in no sense is this a loss. The fullness of personality will not be damaged by this subtraction, for this surplus does not belong to the personality at all. In any case, not everything is to be restored in human composition. And to St. Gregory the material identity of the body of the resurrection with the mortal body means, rather, the ultimate reality of the life once lived, which must be transferred into the future age. Here again he differs from Origen, to whom this empirical and earthly life was only a transient episode to be ultimately forgotten. For St. Gregory the identity of the form, i.e. the unity and continuity of individual existence, was the only point of importance. He holds the same "Aristotelian" conception of the unique and intimate connection of the individual soul and body.

The very idea of uniqueness is radically modified in Christian philosophy as compared with the pre-Christian Greek. In Greek philosophy it was a "sculptural" uniqueness, an invariable crystallization of a frozen image. In Christian experience it is the uniqueness of the life once experienced and lived. In the one case it was a timeless identity, in the other it is a uniqueness in time. The whole conception of time is different in the two cases.

Greek philosophy did not know and was in no way prepared to admit any passage from time into eternity, the temporal seemed to be eo ipso transitory. That which is happening can never become everlasting. What is born must inevitably die. Only what is unborn or unoriginated can persist. Everything that had a beginning will have an end. Only that which had no beginning can be permanent, or "eternal." Therefore, for a Greek philosopher to admit future immortality meant at once to presuppose an eternal pre-existence. Thus the whole meaning of the historical process is a kind of descent from eternity into time. The destiny of man depends upon his innate germs rather than upon his creative achievements. For a Greek, time was simply a lower or reduced mode of existence. Strictly speaking, in time nothing is produced or achieved nor is there anything to be produced or achieved. The "eternal" and invariable realities are merely, as it were, "projected" into a lower sphere. In this sense Plato called time a "mobile image of eternity" (Timaeus 37d: είκών κινητόν τινά αιώνος ποιησαι). Plato had in view astronomical time, i.e. the rotation of the heavens. No real progress is visualized. On the contrary, time "imitates" eternity and "rolls on according to the laws of number" (38a, b), just in order to become like the eternal as much as possible. Time is just this permanent reiteration of itself. The basic idea is reflection, not accomplishment.⁷³ For everything which is worth existing really does exist in the most perfect manner before all time, in a static invariability of the timeless, and there is nothing to add to this perfected fullness.⁷⁴ Consequently, all that is happening is to be utterly transient. All is perfect and complete, and nothing to be perfected or completed. And therefore the burden of time, this rotation of beginnings and ends, is meaningless and tiresome. There is no sense of creative duty in the Greek, mind. The impassibility or even indifference of the sage seem to be the climax of perfection. The sage is not concerned with or disturbed by all these vicissitudes of the temporal order. He knows that everything is happening according to eternal and inviolable laws or measures. He learns amid the tumult of events to contemplate the invariable and eternal harmony of the Cosmos. The ancient philosopher out of time dreams of eternity. He dreams of the escape from this world to another, immovable, impassive, and permanent. Hence the sense of fate which was so typical before Christ. It was a climax and a limit of ancient philosophy. The temporal perspective of ancient philosophy is for ever closed and limited. Yet the Cosmos is eternal, there will be no end of cosmic "revolutions." The Cosmos is a periodical being, like a clock. The highest symbol of life is a recurrent circle. As Aristotle put it, "the circle is a perfect thing," and the circle only, not any straight line.⁷⁵ "This also explains the common saying that human affairs form a circle, and that there is a circle in all other things that have a natural movement, both coming into being and passing away. This is because all other things are discriminated by time, and end and begin as though conforming to a cycle; for even time itself is thought to be a circle."⁷⁶ The whole conception is obviously based on astronomical experience. Indeed, celestial movements are periodical and recurrent. The whole course of rotation is accomplished in a certain period [the "Great Year," μέγας ένιαυτός]. And then comes a repetition, a new circle or cycle. There is no continuous progress in time, but rather "eternal returns," a cyclophoria.⁷⁷ The Pythagoreans seem to have been the first to profess clearly an exact repetition. Eudemus refers to this Pythagorean conception. "If we are to believe the Pythagoreans, then in a certain time I shall again be reading to you, with the same rod in my hands, and all of you, even as at this moment, will be sitting in front of me, and in the same way everything else will come again."⁷⁸ With Aristotle this periodical conception of the Universe took a strict scientific shape and was elaborated into a coherent system of Physics.⁷⁹ Later this idea of periodical returns was again taken up by the Stoics.

The early Stoics professed a periodical dissolution (έκ-πύρωσις) and palingenesis of all things, and then every minute detail will be exactly reproduced. There will be again a Socrates, the son of Sophroniscos and Phenareti, and he will be married to a Xanthippe, and will be again betrayed by an Anytus and a Meletes.⁸⁰ The same idea we find in Cleanthes and Chrysippus, in Poseidonius and Marcus Aurelius and all the others. This return was what the Stoics called the "universal restoration," an άπτοκατάστασις των πάντων. And it was obviously an astronomical term.⁸¹ There will be certainly some difference, but obviously no progress whatever. And on a circle all positions are indeed relative. It is a kind of a cosmic perpetuum mobile. All individual existences are hopelessly involved in this perpetual cosmic rotation, in these cosmic rhythms and "astral courses" [this was precisely what the Greeks used to call "destiny" and "fate," ή ειμαρμένη; vis positionis astroruni]. It is to be kept in mind that this exact repetition of worlds does not imply necessarily any continuity of individual existences, any survival or perseverance of the individuals, any individual immortality. The Universe itself is always numerically the same, and its laws are immutable and invariable, and each next world will exactly resemble the previous one in all particulars. But, strictly speaking, no individual survival is required for that. The same causes will inevitably produce the same effects. Nothing really new can ever happen. There is a continuity in the Cosmos, but hardly any true continuity of individuals.

Such was at least the view of Aristotle and the Aristotelians, and of some Stoics.⁸² This periodical idea was kept by the Neoplatonists as well.⁸³ It was a miserable caricature of the resurrection. The permanence of these rotations, this nightmare of invariable cosmic predestination, a real imprisonment of every being, make this theory dull and frightening. There is no real history. "Cyclic motion and the transmigration of souls is not history," remarks Lossev wittily. "It was a history built up on the pattern of astronomy, it was indeed itself a kind of astronomy."⁸⁴ The very feeling or apprehension of time is radically changed in Christianity. Time begins and ends, but in time human destiny is accomplished. Time itself is essentially unique, and never comes back. And the General Resurrection is the final limit of this unique time, of this unique destiny of the whole creation. In Greek philosophy a cycle was the symbol of time, or rotation. In Christian philosophy time is symbolized rather by a line, a beam, or an arrow. But the difference is deeper still. From a Christian point of view, time is neither an infinite rotation, nor an infinite progression, which never reaches its goal ["die schlechte Unend-lichkeit" in Hegelian terminology, or άπειρον of the Greek philosophers]. Time is not merely a sequence of moments, nor is it an abstract form of multiplicity. Time is vectorial and finite. The temporal order is organized from within. The concreteness of purpose binds, from within, the stream of events into an organic whole. Events are precisely events, and not merely passing happenings. The temporal order is not the realm of privation, as it was for the Greek mind. It is more than just a stream. It is a creative process, in which what was brought to existence from nothingness, by the Divine will, is ascending towards its ultimate consummation, when the Divine purpose will be fulfilled, on the last day.⁸⁵ And the center of history is the Incarnation and the victory of the Incarnate Lord over death and sin. St. Augustine pointed out this change, which has been brought about by Christianity, in this admirable phrase: "viam rectam sequentes, quae nobis est Christus, eo duce it Salvatore, a vano etinepto imporium circuitu iter fidem mentemque avertamus."⁸⁶ St. Gregory of Nyssa describes the vectoriality of history in this way. "When mankind attains to its fullness, then, without fail, this flowing motion of nature will cease, having reached its necessary end; and this life will be replaced by another mode of existence, distinct from the present, which consists in birth and destruction. When our nature, in due order, fulfils the course of time, then, without fail, this flowing motion, created by the succession of generations, will come to an end. The filling of the Universe will make any further advance or increase impossible, and then the whole plenitude of souls will return from the dispersed and formless state to an assembled one, and the very elements will be reunited in the self-same combination."⁸⁹ This end and this goal is the General Resurrection. St. Gregory speaks of inner fulfillment of history. Time will come to an end. For sooner or later things will be accomplished. Seeds will mature and shoot forth. The resurrection of the dead is the one and unique destiny of the whole world, of the whole Cosmos, One for all and each, an universal and catholic balance. There is nothing naturalistic about this conception. The power of God will raise the dead. It will be the new and final revelation of God, of the Divine might and glory. The General Resurrection is the consummation of the Resurrection of Our Lord, the consummation of His victory over death and corruption. And beyond historical time there will be the future Kingdom, "the life of the age to come." We are still in via, in the age of hope and expectation. Even the Saints in heaven still "await the resurrection of the dead." The ultimate consummation will come for the whole human race at once.⁹⁰ Then, at the close, for the whole creation the "Blessed Sabbath," that very "day of rest," the mysterious "Seventh day of creation," will be inaugurated for ever. The expected is as yet inconceivable. "It is not yet made manifest what we shall be" (1 John 3:2). But the pledge is given. Christ is risen.

In the Epistle to the Hebrews the redeeming work of Our Lord is depicted as the ministry of the High Priest. Christ comes into the world to accomplish the Will of God. Through the eternal Spirit He offers His own self to God, offers His blood for the remission of human sins, and this He accomplishes through the Passion. By His blood, as the blood of the New Testament, of the New Covenant, He enters heaven and enters within the very Holy of Holies, behind the veil. After the suffering of death He is crowned with glory and honor, and sits on the right hand of God the Father for ever. The sacrificial offering begins on earth and is consummated in heaven, where Christ presented and is still presenting us to God, as the eternal High Priest — "High Priest of the good things to come" (άρχιερευς των μελλόντων αγαθών) as the Apostle and High Priest of our confession, as the minister of the true tabernacle and sanctuary of God. In brief, as the Mediator of the New Covenant. Through the death of Christ is revealed Life Everlasting, "the powers of the age to come" are disclosed and shown forth (δυνάμεις τε μέλλοντος αιώνος). In the blood of Jesus is revealed the new and living way, the way into that eternal Sabbath, when God rests from His mighty deeds.

Thus the death of the Cross is a sacrificial offering. And to offer a sacrifice does not mean only to surrender. Even from a merely moral point of view, the whole significance of sacrifice is not the denial itself, but the sacrificial power of love. The sacrifice is not merely an offering, but rather a dedication, a consecration to God. The effective power of sacrifice is love (I Cor. 13:3). But the offering of the sacrifice is more than the evidence of love, it is also a sacramental action, a liturgical office, or even a mystery. The offering of the sacrifice of the Cross is the sacrifice of love indeed, "as Christ also hath loved us, and given Himself for us, an offering and sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour" (Ephes. 5:2). But this love was not only sympathy or compassion and mercy towards the fallen and heavy-laden. Christ gives Himself not only "for the remission of sins," but also for our glorification. He gives Himself not only for sinful humanity, but also for the Church: to cleanse and to hallow her, to make her holy, glorious and spotless (Ephes. 5:25). The power of a sacrificial offering is in its cleansing and hallowing effect. And the power of the sacrifice of the Cross is that the Cross is the path of glory. On the Cross the Son of Man is glorified and God is glorified in Him (John 13:31) Here is the fullness of the sacrifice. "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?" (Luke 24:26). The death of the Cross was effective, not as a death of an Innocent One, but as the death of the Incarnate Lord. "We needed an Incarnate God; God put to death, that we might live" — to use a bold phrase of St. Gregory of Nazianzus.⁹¹ This is the "dreadful and most glorious mystery" of the Cross. On Golgotha the Incarnate Lord celebrates the Holy Service, in ara crucis, and offers in sacrifice His own human nature, which from its conception "in the Virgin’s womb" was assumed into the indivisible unity of His Hypostasis, and in this assumption was restored to all its original sinlessness and purity. In Christ there is no human hypostasis. His personality is Divine, yet incarnate. There is the all-complete fullness of human nature, "the whole human nature," and therefore Christ is the "perfect man," as the Council of Chalcedon said. But there was no human hypostasis. And consequently on the Cross it was not a man that died. "For He who suffered was not common man, but God made man, fighting the contest of endurance," says St. Cyril of Jerusalem.⁹² It may be properly said that God dies on the Cross, but in His own humanity. "He who dwelleth in the highest is reckoned among the dead, and in the little grave findeth lodging."⁹³ This is the voluntary death of One who is Himself Life Eternal, who is in very truth the Resurrection and the Life. A human death indeed but obviously death within the hypostasis of the Word, the Incarnate Word. And thence a resurrecting death.

"I came to cast fire upon the earth; and would that it were already kindled! I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how I am constrained until it is accomplished!" (Luke 12:49-50). Fire — the Holy Spirit — descending from on high in fiery tongues in the "dreadful and unsearchable mystery of Pentecost." This was baptism by the Spirit. And Baptism, this is the death on the Cross itself and the shedding of blood, "the baptism of martyrdom and blood, with which Christ Himself also was baptized," as St. Gregory of Nazianzus suggested.⁹⁴ The death on the Cross as a baptism by blood is the very essence of the redeeming mystery of the Cross. Baptism is a cleansing. And the Baptism of the Cross is, as it were, the cleansing of human nature, which is travelling the path of restoration in the Hypostasis of the Incarnate Word. This is a washing of human nature in the outpoured sacrificial blood of the Divine Lamb. And first of all, a washing of the body: not only a washing away of sins, but a washing away of human infirmities and of mortality itself. It is the cleansing in preparation for the coming resurrection: a cleansing of all human nature, of all humanity in the person of its new and mystical First-born, in the "Second Adam." This is the baptism by blood of the whole Church. "Thou hast purchased Thy Church by the power of Thy Cross." And the whole Body ought to be and must be baptized with the baptism of the Cross. "The cup that I drink, you will drink; and with the baptism with which I am baptized, you will be baptized" (Mark 10:39; Matthew 20:23).⁹⁵

Further, the death of the Cross is the cleansing of the whole world. It is the baptism by blood of all creation, the cleansing of the Cosmos through the cleansing of the Microcosm. "A purification not for a small part of man’s world, not for a short time, but for the whole Universe and through eternity," to quote St. Gregory of Nazianzus again.⁹⁶ Therefore all creation mysteriously partakes in the mortal Passion of the Incarnate Master and Lord. "All creation changed its face in terror when it beheld Thee hanging on the Cross, Ο Christ… The sun was darkened and of earth the foundations were shaken: All things suffered in sympathy with Thee, Who hadst created all things."⁹⁷ This was not co-suffering of compassion or pity, but rather co-suffering of awe and trembling. "The foundations of the earth were set in trembling by the terror of Thy might," co-suffering in the joyous apprehension of the great mystery of the resurrecting death. "For by the blood of Thy Son is the earth blessed." "Many indeed are the miracles of that time," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus, "God crucified, the sun darkened and rekindled again; for it was fitting that with the Creator the creatures should co-suffer. The veil rent in twain. Blood and water shed from His side, blood because He was man, and water because He was higher than man. The earth quaked, rocks were rent for the sake of the Rock. The dead rose up for a pledge of the final and general resurrection. The miracles before the grave and at the grave — who will worthily sing? But none is like the miracle of my salvation. A few drops of blood recreate the whole world and become to us what rennet is to milk, binding us together and compressing us in unity."⁹⁸

The death of the Cross is a sacrament, it has not only a moral, but also a sacramental and liturgical meaning. It is the Passover of the New Testament. And its sacramental significance is revealed at the Last Supper. It may seem rather strange that the Eucharist should precede Calvary, and that in the Upper Room the Savior Himself should give His Body and His Blood to the disciples. "This cup is the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you" (Luke 22:20). However, the Last Supper was not merely a prophetic rite, just as the Eucharist is no mere symbolic remembrance. It is a true sacrament. For Christ who performs both is the High Priest of the New Testament. The Eucharist is the sacrament of the Crucifixion, the broken Body and the Blood outpoured. And along with this it is also the sacrament of the transfiguration, the mysterious and sacramental "conversion" of the flesh into the glorious spiritual food (μεταβολή). The broken Body, dying, yet, in death itself, rising again. For the Lord went voluntarily to the Cross, the Cross of shame and glory. St. Gregory of Nyssa gives the following explanation. "Christ does not wait for the constraint of treachery, nor does He await the thieving attack of the Jews, or the lawless judgment of Pilate, that their evil might be the fount and source of the general salvation of men. Of His own economy He anticipates their transgressions by means of a hierurgic rite, ineffable and unusual. He brings His own Self as an offering and sacrifice for us, being at once the Priest and the Lamb of God, that ‘taketh’ the sins of the world. By offering His Body as food, He clearly showed that the sacrificial offering of the Lamb had already been accomplished. For the sacrificial body would not have been suitable for food if it were still animated. And so, when He gave the disciples the Body to eat and the Blood to drink, then by free will and the power of the sacrament His Body had already ineffably and invisibly been offered in sacrifice, and His soul, together with the Divine power united with it, was in those places whither the power of Him who so ordained transported it."⁹⁹ In other words, the voluntary separation of the soul from the body, the sacramental agony, so to say, of the Incarnate, was, as it were, already begun. And the Blood, freely shed in the salvation of all, becomes a "medicine of incorruption," a medicine of immortality and life.¹⁰⁰

The Lord died on the Cross. This was a true death. Yet not wholly like ours, simply because this was the death of the Lord, the death of the Incarnate Word, death within the indivisible Hypostasis of the Word made man. And again, it was a voluntary death, since in the undefiled human nature, free from original sin, which was assumed by the Word in the Incarnation, there was no inherent necessity of death. And the free "taking up" by the Lord of the sin of the world did not constitute for Him any ultimate necessity to die. Death was accepted only by the desire of the redeeming Love. His death was not the "wages of sin."¹⁰¹ And the main point is that this was a death within the Hypostasis of the Word, the death of the "enhypostasized" humanity. Death in general is a separation, and in the death of the Lord His most precious body and soul were separated indeed. But the one hypostasis of the Word Incarnate was not divided, the "Hypostatic union" was not broken or destroyed. In other words, though separated in death, the soul and the body remained still united through the Divinity of the Word, from which neither was ever estranged. This does not alter the ontological character of death, but changes its meaning. This was an "incorrupt death," and therefore corruption and death were overcome in it, and in it begins the resurrection. The very death of the Incarnate reveals the resurrection of human nature. And the Cross is manifested to be life-giving, the new tree of life, "by which the lamentation of death has been consumed."¹⁰² The Church bears witness to this on Good Saturday with special emphasis. "Although Christ died as man, and His holy soul was separated from His most pure body," says St. John Damascene, "His Divinity remained both with the soul and the body, continued inseparable from either. And thus the one hypostasis was not divided into two hypostases, for from the beginning both body and soul had their being with the hypostasis of the Word. Although at the hour of death body and soul were separated from each other, yet each of them was preserved, having the one hypostasis of the Word.

Therefore the one hypostasis of the Word was also the hypostasis of the body and of the soul. For neither the body nor the soul ever received any proper hypostasis, other than that of the Word. The Hypostasis then of the Word is ever one, and there were never two hypostases of the Word. Accordingly the Hypostasis of Christ is ever one. And though the soul is separated from the body in space, yet they remain hypostatically united through the Word."¹⁰³

There are two aspects of the mystery of the Cross. It is at once a mystery of sorrow and a mystery of joy, a mystery of shame and of glory. It is a mystery of sorrow and mortal anguish, a mystery of desertion, of humiliation and shame. "Today the Master of Creation and the Lord of Glory is nailed upon the Cross, is beaten upon the shoulders, and receives spittings and wounds, indignities and bufferings in the face."¹⁰⁴ The God-man languishes and suffers at Gethsemane and on Calvary until the mystery of death is accomplished. Before Him are revealed all the hatred and blindness of the world, all the obstinacy and foolishness of evil, the coldness of hearts, all the helplessness and pettiness of the disciples, all the "righteousness" of human pseudo-freedom. And He covers everything with His all-forgiving, sorrowful, compassionate and co-suffering love, and prays for those who crucify Him, for verily they do not know what they are doing. "O my people, what have I done unto thee? and wherein have I wearied thee?" (Micah 6:3) - paraphrased and applied to Our Lord in the Office of Good Friday, Matins, Antiphon XII, Troparion). The salvation of the world is accomplished in these sufferings and sorrows, "by His stripes we are healed (Is. 53:5). And the Church guards us against every docetic underestimate of the reality and fullness of these sufferings ίνα μη κενωθη ό σταυρός του Χρίστου" (I Cor. 1:17). Yet the Church guards us also against the opposite exaggeration, against all kenotic overemphasis. For the day of the shameful Crucifixion, when Our Lord was numbered among the thieves, is the day of glory. "Today we keep the feast, for Our Lord is nailed upon the Cross," in the sharp phrase of St. John Chrysostom.¹⁰⁵ And the tree of the Cross is an "ever-glorious tree," the very Tree of Life, "by which corruption is destroyed," "by which the lamentation of death is abolished." The Cross is the "seal of salvation," a sign of power and victory. Not just a symbol, but the very power of salvation, "the foundation of salvation," as Chrysostom says — ύπόθεσος της σωτηρίας. The Cross is the sign of the Kingdom. "I call Him King, because I see Him crucified, for it is appropriate for a King to die for His subjects." This again is St. John Chrysostom. The Church keeps the days of the Cross and cherishes them as solemnities — not only as a triumph of humility and love, but also as a victory of immortality and life. "As the life of the creation does the Church greet Thy Cross, Ο Lord."¹⁰⁶ For the death of Christ is itself the victory over death, the destruction of death, the abolition of mortality and corruption, "Thou diest and quickenest me." And the death of the Cross is a victory over death not only because it was followed or crowned by the Resurrection. The Resurrection only reveals and sets forth the victory achieved on the Cross. The Resurrection is accomplished in the very falling asleep of the God-man. And the power of the Resurrection is precisely the "power of the Cross," "the unconquerable and indestructible and Divine power of the honorable and life-giving Cross,"¹⁰⁷ the power of the voluntary Passion and death of the God-man. As St. Gregory of Nazianzus puts it: "He lays down His life, but He has power to take it again; and the veil is rent, for the mysterious doors of Heaven are opened; the rocks are cleft, the dead rise… He dies, but He gives life, and by His death destroys death. He is buried, but He rises again. He goes down into Hell, but He brings up the souls."¹⁰⁸ On the Cross the Lord "restores us to original blessedness," and "by the Cross comes joy to the whole world." On the Cross the Lord not only suffers and languishes, but rests, "having fallen asleep, as Thou wert dead."¹⁰⁹ And He gives rest to man too, restores and renews him, "and resting on the tree, Thou hast given me rest, one who was overburdened with the burden of sins." From the Cross Christ sheds immortality upon men. By his burial in the grave He opens the gates of death, and renews corrupted human nature. "Every action and every miracle of Christ are most divine and marvellous," says St. John Damascene, "but the most marvellous of all is His honorable Cross. For no other thing has subdued death, expiated the sin of the first parents, despoiled Hades, bestowed the resurrection, granted power to us of condemning death itself, prepared the return to original blessedness, opened the gates of Paradise, given our nature a seat at the right hand of God, and made us the children of God, save the Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ. The death of Christ on the Cross clothed us with the hypostatic Wisdom and Power of God."¹¹⁰ The mystery of the resurrecting Cross is commemorated especially on Good Saturday. As it is explained in the Synaxarion of that day, "on Great and Holy Saturday do we celebrate the divine-bodily burial of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ and His descent into Hell, by which being called from corruption, our race passed to life eternal." This is not only the eve of salvation. It is the very day of our salvation. "This is the blessed Sabbath, this is the day of rest, whereon the Only Begotten Son of God has rested from all His deeds."¹¹¹ This is the day of the Descent into Hell. And the Descent into Hell is already the Resurrection.¹¹²

The great "three days of death" (triduum mortis) are the mysterious sacramental days of the Resurrection. In His flesh the Lord is resting in the grave, and His flesh is not abandoned by His Divinity. "Though Thy Temple was destroyed in the hour of the Passion, yet even then one was the Hypostasis of Thy Divinity and Thy flesh."¹¹³ The Lord’s flesh does not suffer corruption, it remains incorruptible even in death itself, i.e. alive, as though it had never died, for it abides in the very bosom of Life, in the Hypostasis of the Word. As it is phrased in one of the hymns, "Thou hast tasted of death, but hast not known corruption.¹¹⁴ St. John Damascene suggested that the word "corruption" (φθορά) has a double meaning. First, it means "all passive states of man" (τά πάθη) such as hunger, thirst, weariness, the nailing, death itself — that is, the separation of soul and body. In this sense we say that the Lord’s body was liable to corruption (φθαρτόν) until the Resurrection. But corruption also means the complete decomposition of the body and its destruction. This is corruption in the proper sense — or rather "destruction" (διαφθορά) — but the body of the Lord did not experience this mode of corruption at all, it remained even in death "incorrupt." That is to say, it never became a corpse.¹¹⁵ And in this incorruption the Body has been transfigured into a state of glory. The soul of Christ descends into Hell, also unseparated from the Divinity, "even in Hell in the soul, as God," — the "deified soul" of Christ, as St. John of Damascus suggests, ψυχή τεθεωμένη.¹¹⁶

This descent into Hell means first of all the entry or penetration into the realm of death, into the realm of mortality and corruption. And in this sense it is simply a synonym of death itself.¹¹⁷ It is hardly possible to identify that Hell, or Hades, or the "subterranean abodes" to which the Lord descended, with the "hell" of sufferings for the sinners and the wicked. In all its objective reality the hell of sufferings and torments is certainly a spiritual mode of existence, determined by the personal character of each soul. And it is not only something to come, but to a great extent is already constituted for an obstinate sinner by the very fact of his perversion and apostasy. The wicked are actually in hell, in darkness and desolation. In any case one cannot imagine that the souls of the unrepentant sinners, and the Prophets of the Old Dispensation, who spake by the Holy Spirit and preached the coming Messiah, and St. John the Baptist himself, were in the same "hell." Our Lord descended into the darkness of death. Hell, or Hades, is just the darkness and shadow of death, rather a place of mortal anguish than a place of penal torments, a dark "sheol," a place of hopeless disembodiment and disincarnation, which was only scantily and dimly fore-illuminated by the slanting rays of the not-yet-risen Sun, by the hope and expectation yet unfulfilled. Because of the Fall and Original Sin, all mankind fell into mortality and corruption. And even the highest righteousness under the Law could save man neither from the inevitability of empirical death, nor that helplessness and powerlessness beyond the grave, which depended upon the impossibility of a natural resurrection, upon the lack of power to restore the broken wholeness of human existence. That was, as it were, a kind of ontological infirmity of the soul, which, in the separation of death, had lost the faculty of being the true "entelechia" of its own body, the helplessness of fallen and wounded nature. And in this sense, all descended "into hell," into infernal darkness, as it were, into the very Kingdom of Satan, the prince of death and the spirit of negation; and they were all under his power, though the righteous ones did not partake of evil or demoniac perversion, since they were confined in death by the grip of ontological powerlessness, not because of their personal perversion. They were really the "spirits in prison."¹¹⁸ And it was into this prison, into this Hell, that the Lord and Savior descended. Amid the darkness of pale death shines the unquenchable light of Life, and Life Divine. This destroys Hell and destroys mortality. "Though Thou didst descend into the grave, Ο Merciful One, yet didst Thou destroy the power of Hell."¹¹⁹ In this sense Hell has been simply abolished, "and there is not one dead in the grave." For "he received earth, and yet met heaven." Death is overcome by Life. "When Thou didst descend into death, Ο Life Eternal, then Thou didst slay Hell by the flash of Thy Divinity."¹²⁰

The descent of Christ into Hell is the manifestation of Life amid the hopelessness of death, it is victory over death. And by no means is it the "taking upon" Himself by Christ of the "hellish torments of God-forsakenness."¹²¹ The Lord descended into Hell as the Victor, Christus Victor, as the Master of Life. He descended in His glory, not in humiliation, although through humiliation. But even death He assumed voluntarily and with authority. "It was not from any natural weakness of the Word that dwelt in it that the body had died, but in order that in it death might be done away by the power of the Savior," says St. Athanasius.¹²² The Lord descended into Hell to announce the good tidings and to preach to those souls who were held and imprisoned there (I Peter 3:19: έν ω και τοις έν φυλακή πνεύμασιν πορευθείς έκήρυξεν and 4:6: νεκροις εύηγγελίσθη), by the power of His appearance and preaching, to set them free, to show them their deliverance.¹²³ In other words, the descent into Hell is the resurrection of the "whole Adam." Since "Hell groans below" and "is afflicted," by His descent Christ "shatters the bonds eternal," and raises the whole human race.¹²⁴ He destroys death itself, "the hold of death is broken and the power of Satan is destroyed."¹²⁵ This is the triumph of the Resurrection. "And the iron gates didst Thou crush, and Thou didst lead us out of darkness and the shadow of death, and our chains didst Thou break."¹²⁶ "And Thou hast laid waste the abode of death by Thy death today and illuminated everything by Thy light of the Resurrection." Thus Death itself is transmuted into Resurrection. "I am the first and the last: I am He that liveth, and was dead; and behold, I am alive for evermore, Amen. And I have the keys of death and of Hades" (Rev. 1:17-18).

In the death of the Savior the powerlessness of death over Him was revealed. In the fullness of His human nature Our Lord was mortal, since even in the original and spotless human nature a "potentia mortis" was inherent. The Lord was killed and died. But death did not hold Him. "It was not possible for him to be held by it" (Acts 2:24). St. John Chrysostom commented: "He Himself permitted it. ... Death itself in holding Him had pangs as in travail, and was sore bested … and He so rose as never to die.¹²⁷ He is Life Everlasting, and by the very fact of His death He destroys death. His very descent into Hell, into the realm of death, is the mighty manifestation of Life. By the descent into Hell He quickens death itself. By the Resurrection the powerlessness of death is manifested. The soul of Christ, separated in death, filled with Divine power, is again united with its body, which remained incorruptible throughout the mortal separation, in which it did not suffer any physical decomposition. In the death of the Lord it is manifest that His most pure body was not susceptible to corruption, that it was free from that mortality into which the original human nature had been involved through sin and Fall.

In the first Adam the inherent potentiality of death by disobedience was disclosed and actualized. In the second Adam the potentiality of immortality by purity and obedience was sublimated and actualized into the impossibility of death. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (I Cor. 15:22). The whole fabric of human nature in Christ proved to be stable and strong. The disembodiment of the soul was not consummated into a rupture. Even in the common death of man, as St. Gregory of Nyssa pointed out, the separation of soul and body is never absolute; a certain connection is still there. In the death of Christ this connection proved to be not only a "connection of knowledge"; His soul never ceased to be the "vital power" of the body. Thus His death in all its reality, as a true separation and disembodiment, was like a sleep. "Then was man’s death shown to be but a sleep," as St. John Damascene says.¹²⁸ The reality of death is not yet abolished, but its powerlessness is revealed. The Lord really and truly died. But in His death in an eminent measure the "dynamis of the resurrection" was manifest, which is latent but inherent in every death. To His death the glorious simile of the kernel of wheat can be applied to its full extent. (John 12:24). And in His death the glory of God is manifest. "I have both glorified it and will glorify again" (v.28). In the body of the Incarnate One this interim between death and resurrection is fore-shortened. "It is sown in dishonor: it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness: it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body: it is raised a spiritual body" (7 Cor. 15:43-44). In the death of the Incarnate One this mysterious growth of the seed was accomplished in three days — "triduum mortis."

"He suffered not the temple of His body to remain long dead, but just having shown it dead by the contact of death, straightway raised it on the third day, and raised with it also the sign of victory over death, that is, the incorruption and impassibility manifested in the body." In these words St. Athanasius brings forward the victorious and resurrecting character of the death of Christ.¹²⁹ In this mysterious "triduum mortis," the body of Our Lord has been transfigured into a body of glory, and has been clothed in power and light. The seed matures. The Lord rises from the dead, as a Bridegroom comes forth from the chamber. This was accomplished by the power of God, as the general resurrection will, in the last day, be accomplished by the power of God. And in the Resurrection the Incarnation is completed, a victorious manifestation of Life within human nature, a grafting of immortality into the human composition.

The Resurrection of Christ was a victory, not over his death only, but over death in general. "We celebrate the death of Death, the downfall of Hell, and the beginning of a life new and everlasting."¹³⁰ In His Resurrection the whole of humanity, all human nature, is co-resurrected with Christ, "the human race is clothed in incorruption."¹³¹ Co-resurrected not indeed in the sense that all are raised from the grave. Men do still die; but the hopelessness of dying is abolished. Death is rendered powerless, and to all human nature is given the power or "potentia" of resurrection. St. Paul made this quite clear: "But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen… For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised" (I Cor. 15:13, 16). St. Paul meant to say that the Resurrection of Christ would become meaningless if it were not a universal accomplishment, if the whole Body were not implicitly "pre-resurrected" with the Head. And faith in Christ itself would lose any sense and become empty and vain; there would be nothing to believe in. "And if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain" (v. 17). Apart from the hope of the General Resurrection, belief in Christ would be in vain and to no purpose; it would only be vainglory. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that slept" (7 Cor. 15:20). And in this lies the victory of life.¹³² "It is true, we still die as before," says St. John Chrysostom, "but we do not remain in death; and this is not to die… The power and very reality of death is just this, that a dead man has no possibility of returning to life… But if after death he is to be quickened and moreover to be given a better life, then this is no longer death, but a falling asleep."¹³³ The same conception is found in St. Athanasius. The "condemnation of death" is abolished. "Corruption ceasing and being put away by the grace of Resurrection, we are henceforth dissolved for a time only, according to our bodies’ mortal nature; like seeds cast into the earth, we do not perish, but sown in the earth we shall rise again, death being brought to nought by the grace of the Savior."¹³⁴ This was a healing and a renewing of nature, and therefore there is here a certain compulsion; all will rise, and all will be restored to the fullness of their natural being, yet transformed. From henceforth every disembodiment is but temporary. The dark vale of Hades is abolished by the power of the life-giving Cross.

St. Gregory of Nyssa strongly emphasizes the organic interdependence between the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. The Resurrection is not only a consequence, but a fruit of the death on the Cross. St. Gregory stresses two points especially: the unity of the Divine Hypostasis, in which the soul and body of Christ are linked together even in their mortal separation; and the utter sinlessness of the Lord. And he proceeds: "When our nature, following its proper course, had even in Him been advanced to the separation of soul and body, He knitted together again the disconnected elements, cementing them together, as it were, with a cement of His Divine power, and recombining what was severed in a union never to be broken. And this is the Resurrection, namely the return, after they have been dissolved, of those elements that have been before linked together, into an indissoluble union through a mutual incorporation; in order that thus the primal grace which invested humanity might be recalled, and we restored to everlasting life, when the vice that had been mixed up with our kind has evaporated through our dissolution… For as the principle of death took its rise in one person and passed on in succession through the whole of human kind, in like manner the principle of the Resurrection extends from one person to the whole of humanity… For when, in that concrete humanity which He had taken to Himself, the soul after the dissolution returned to the body, then this uniting of the several portions passes, as by a new principle, in equal force upon the whole human race. This then is the mystery of God’s plan with regard to His death and His resurrection from the dead."¹³⁵ In another place St. Gregory explains his meaning by the analogy of the broken reed, cloven in twain. Whoever puts the broken parts together, starting from any one end, then also, of necessity, puts together the other end, "and the whole broken reed is completely rejointed." Thus then in Christ the union of soul and body, again restored, brings to reunion "the whole human nature, divided by death into two parts," since the hope of resurrection establishes the connection between the separated parts. In Adam our nature was split or dissected into two through sin. Yet in Christ this split is healed completely. This then is the abolition of death, or rather of mortality. In other words, it is the potential and dynamic restoration of the fullness and wholeness of human existence. It is a recreation of the whole human race, a "new creation" (ή καινή κτίσις),¹³⁶ a new revelation of Divine love and Divine power, the consummation of creation.

One has to distinguish most carefully between the healing of nature and the healing of the will. Nature is healed and restored with a certain compulsion, by the mighty power of God’s omnipotent and invincible grace. One may even say, by some "violence of grace." The wholeness is in a way forced upon human nature. For in Christ all human nature (the "seed of Adam") is fully and completely cured from unwholeness and mortality. This restoration will be actualized and revealed to its full extent in the General Resurrection, the resurrection of all, both of the righteous and of the wicked. No one, so far as nature is concerned, can escape Christ’s kingly rule, can alienate himself from the invincible power of the resurrection. But the will of man cannot be cured in the same invincible manner; for the whole meaning of the healing of the will is in its free conversion. The will of man must turn itself to God; there must be a free and spontaneous response of love and adoration. The will of man can be healed only in freedom, in the "mystery of freedom." Only by this spontaneous and free effort does man enter into that new and eternal life which is revealed in Christ Jesus. A spiritual regeneration can be wrought only in perfect freedom, in an obedience of love, by a self-consecration and self-dedication to God. This distinction was stressed with great insistence in the remarkable treatise by Nicolas Cabasilas on The Life in Christ. Resurrection is a "rectification of nature" (ή άνάστασις φύσεως έστιν έπανόρθωσις) and this God grants freely. But the Kingdom of Heaven, and the beatific vision, and union with Christ, presume the desire (τρυψή έστιν της θελήσεως), and therefore are available only for those who have longed for them, and loved, and desired. Immortality will be given to all, just as all can enjoy the Divine providence. It does not depend upon our will whether we shall rise after death or not, just as it is not by our will that we are born. Christ’s death and resurrection brings immortality and incorruption to all in the same manner, because all have the same nature as the Man Christ Jesus. But nobody can be compelled to desire. Thus Resurrection is a gift common to all, but blessedness will be given only to some.¹³⁷ And again, the path of life is the path of renunciation, of mortification, of self-sacrifice and self-oblation. One has to die to oneself in order to live in Christ. Each one must personally and freely associate himself with Christ, the Lord, the Savior, and the Redeemer, in the confession of faith, in the choice of love, in the mystical oath of allegiance. Each one has to renounce himself, to "lose his soul" for Christ’s sake, to take up his cross, and to follow after Him. The Christian struggle is the "following" after Christ, following the path of His Passion and Cross, even unto death, but first of all, following in love. "Hereby perceive we the love of God, because He laid down His life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren… Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins" (7 John 3:16; 4:10). He who does not die with Christ cannot live with Him. "Unless of our own free choice we accept to die unto His passion, His life is not in us," says St. Ignatius.¹³⁸ This is no mere ascetical or moral rule, not merely a discipline. This is the ontological law of spiritual existence, even the law of life itself.

The Christian life is initiated with a new birth, by water and the Spirit. First, repentance is required, "ή μετάνοια," an inner change, intimate and resolute.

The symbolism of Holy Baptism is complex and manifold. Baptism must be performed in the name of the Holy Trinity; and the Trinitarian invocation is unanimously regarded as the most necessary condition of the validity and efficacy of the sacrament. Yet above all, baptism is the putting on of Christ (Gal. 3:27), and an incorporation into His Body (I Cor. 12:13). The Trinitarian invocation is required because outside the Trinitarian faith it is impossible to know Christ, to recognize in Jesus the Incarnate Lord, "One of the Holy Trinity." The symbolism of baptism is above all a symbolism of death and resurrection, of Christ’s death and resurrection. "Know ye not, that as many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into His death? Therefore we are buried with Him by baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life" (Rom. 6:3-4). It can be said that baptism is a sacramental resurrection in Christ, a rising up with Him and in Him to a new and eternal life: "Buried with Him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with Him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised Him from the dead" (Col. 2:12) — συνταφέντες αύτώ έν τω βαπτίσματι, έν ω και συνηγέρθητε δια της πίστεως της ενεργείας του θεού του έγείραντος αυτόν έκ νεκρών. Co-resurrected with Him precisely through burial: "for if we be dead with Him, we shall also live with Him" (2 Tim. 2:11). For in baptism the believer becomes a member of Christ, grafted into His Body, "rooted and built up in Him" (Col. 2:7). Thereby the grace of the Resurrection is shed abroad on all. Before it is consummated in the General Resurrection, Life Eternal is manifested in the spiritual rebirth of believers, granted and accomplished in baptism, and the union with the Risen Lord is the initiation of the resurrection and of the Life to come. "But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord… Always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life of Jesus might also be made manifest in our body… Knowing that He which raised up the Lord Jesus shall also raise us by Jesus, and shall present us with you… For we know, that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven … not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up by life" (2 Cor. 3:18; 4:10, 14; 5:1, 2). We are changed, not only will be changed. Baptismal regeneration and ascesis are joined together: the Death with Christ and resurrection are already operative within believers. The resurrection is operative not only as a return to life, but also as a lifting up or sublimation into the glory. This is not only a manifestation of the power and glory of God, but also a transfiguration of man, in so far as he is dying with Christ. In dying with Him, man also lives. All will rise, but only to the faithful believer is the resurrection to be a true "resurrection unto life." He comes not into judgment, but passes from death to life [John 5:24-29; 8:51~}. Only in communion with God and through life in Christ does the restoration of human wholeness gain meaning. To those in total darkness, who have deliberately confined themselves "outside God," outside the Light Divine, the Resurrection itself must seem rather unnecessary and unmotivated. But it will come, as a "resurrection to judgment" (John 5:29; εις άνάστασιν κρίσεως). And in this will be completed the mystery and the tragedy of human freedom.

Here indeed we are on the threshold of the inconceivable and incomprehensible. The "apokatastasis" of nature does not abolish free will. The will must be moved from within by love. St. Gregory of Nyssa had a clear understanding of this. He anticipated a kind of universal "conversio" of souls in the after-life, when the Truth of God will be revealed and manifested with some compelling and ultimate evidence. Just at that point the limitations of the Hellenistic mind are obvious. Evidence to it seemed to be the decisive reason or motive for the will, as if "sin" were merely "ignorance."¹³⁹ The Hellenistic mind had to pass through the long and hard experience of asceticism, of ascetic self-examination and self-control, in order to free itself from this intellectualistic naivete and illusion, and discover a dark abyss in the fallen soul. Only in St. Maximus the Confessor, after some centuries of ascetic preparation, do we find a new, remodelled and deepened interpretation of the "apokatastasis." All nature, the whole Cosmos, will be restituted. But the dead souls will still be insensitive to the very revelation of Light.

The Light Divine will shine to all, but those who have deliberately spent their lives here on earth in fleshly desires, "against nature," will be unable to apprehend or enjoy this eternal bliss. The Light is the Word which illuminates the natural minds of the faithful; but to others it is a burning fire of the judgment (τη καύσει της κρίσεως). He punishes those who, through love of the flesh, cling to the nocturnal darkness of this life. St. Maximus admitted an "apokatastasis" in the sense of a restitution of all beings to an integrity of nature, of a universal manifestation of the Divine Life, which will be apprehended by every one; but it does not mean that all will equally participate in this revelation of the Good. St. Maximus draws a clear distinction between an έπίγνωσις and a μέθεξις. The divine gifts are dispensed in proportion to the capacities of men. The fullness of natural powers will be restored in all, and God will be in all, indeed; but only in the Saints will He be present with grace δια την χάριν. In the wicked He will be present without grace, νεκράν την χάριν. No grace will be bestowed upon the wicked, because the ultimate union with God requires the determination of the will. The wicked will be separated from God by their lack of a resolute purpose of good. We have here the same duality of nature and will. In the resurrection the whole of creation will be restored. But sin and evil are rooted in the will. The Hellenistic mind concluded therefrom that evil is unstable and by itself must disappear inevitably. For nothing can be perpetual, unless it be rooted in a Divine decree. Evil cannot be but transitory. The Christian inference is the opposite indeed. There is some strange inertia and obstinacy of the will, and this obstinacy may remain uncured even in the universal restoration. God never does any violence to man, and the communion with God cannot be forced upon or imposed upon the obstinate. As St. Maximus puts it, "the Spirit does not produce an undesired resolve, but it transforms a chosen purpose into theosis."¹⁴⁰ For sin and evil come not from an external impurity, but from an internal failure, from the perversion of the will. Consequently, sin is overcome only by inner conversion and change, and repentance is sealed by grace in the sacraments.¹⁴¹

Physical death among mankind is not abrogated by the Resurrection of Christ. Death is rendered powerless, indeed; mortality is overcome by the hope and pledge of the coming resurrection. And yet each must justify that resurrection for himself. This can be done only in a free communion with the Lord. The immortality of nature, the permanence of existence, must be actualized into the life in the Spirit. The fullness of life is not merely an endless existence. In baptism we are initiated into this very resurrection of life, which will be consummated in the last day.

St. Paul speaks of a "likeness" unto the death of Christ, τω όμοιώματι του θανάτου αύτου (Rom. 6:3), but this "likeness" means more than a resemblance. It is more than a mere sign or recollection. The meaning of this "likeness" for St. Paul himself was that in each of us Christ can and must be "formed" (Gal. 4:19). Christ is the Head, all believers are His members, and His life is actualized in them. All are called and every one is capable of believing, and of being quickened by faith and baptism to live in Him. Baptism is a regeneration, άναγέννησις, a new, spiritual, and charismatic birth. As Cabasilas says, Baptism is the cause of a beatific life in Christ, not merely of life.¹⁴² St. Cyril of Jerusalem lucidly explains the true reality of all baptismal symbolism. It is true, he says, that in the baptismal font we die and are buried only "in imitation," only "symbolically" (δια συμβόλου). We do not rise from a real grave (ούδ’ αληθώς έτάφημεν) and yet, "if the imitation is in an image, the salvation is in very truth," έν άληθεία δε ή σωτηρία. Christ was really crucified and buried, and actually rose from the grave. The Greek word used is οντως. It is more and stronger than simply αληθώς — "in very truth"; it emphasizes the supernatural character of the death and resurrection of Our Lord. Hence He gave us this chance, by "imitative" sharing of His Passion to acquire "salvation in reality" (τη μιμήσει των παθημάτων αυτού κοινά χήσαντες). It is not only an "imitation," but rather a participation, or a similitude. "Christ was crucified and buried in reality, but to you it is given to be crucified, buried, and raised with Him in similitude" (έν ομοιώματι).¹⁴³ It should be kept in mind that St. Cyril mentions not only the death, but also the burial. This means that in baptism man descends "sacra-mentally" into the darkness of death, and yet with the Risen Lord rises again and crosses over from death to life. "And the image is completed all upon you, for you are the image of Christ," concludes St. Cyril. In other words, all are held together by and in Christ, hence the very possibility of a sacramental "resemblance."¹⁴⁴

St. Gregory of Nyssa dwells on the same point. There are two aspects in baptism. Baptism is a birth and a death. Natural birth is the beginning of a mortal existence, which begins and ends in corruption. Another, a new birth, had to be discovered, which would initiate into eternal life. In baptism "the presence of a Divine power transforms what is born with a corruptible nature into a state of incorrup-tion."¹⁴⁵ It is transformed through following and imitating; and thus what was foreshown by the Lord is realized. Only by following after Christ can one pass through the labyrinth of life and come out of it. "For I call the inescapable guard of death, in which sorrowing mankind is imprisoned, a labyrinth" (την άδιέξοδον του θανάτου φρουράν). Christ escaped from this after the three days of death. In the baptismal font "the imitation of all that He has done is accomplished." Death is "represented" in the element of water, and as Christ rose again to life, so also the newly-baptized, united with Him in bodily nature, "doth imitate the resurrection on the third day." This is just an "imitation," and not "identity." In baptism man is not actually raised, but only freed from natural evil and the inescapability of death. In him the "continuity of vice" is cut off. He is not resurrected, for he does not die, he remains in this life. Baptism only foreshadows the resurrection. In baptism we anticipate the grace of the final resurrection. Baptism is a "homiomatic resurrection" to use the phrase of one Russian scholar. Yet in baptism the resurrection is in a way already initiated. Baptism is the start, αρχή, and the resurrection is the end and consummation, πέρας ... and all that will take place in the great Resurrection already has its beginnings and causes in baptism. St. Gregory does not mean that resurrection which consists only in a remolding of our composition. Human nature advances towards that goal by a kind of necessity. He speaks of the fullness of the resurrection, of a "restoration to a blessed and divine state, set free from all shame and sorrow." It is an apokatastasis, a true "resurrection unto life."¹⁴⁶

It must be pointed out that St. Gregory specially emphasized the need of keeping and holding fast the baptismal grace, for in baptism it is not only nature but also the will that is transformed and transfigured, remaining free throughout. If the soul is not cleansed and purified in the free exercise of will, baptism proves to be fruitless; the transfiguration is not actualized; the new life is not yet consummated. This does not subordinate baptismal grace to human license. Grace does indeed descend. But it can never be forced upon any one who is free and made in the image of God, it must be responded to and corroborated by the synergism of love and will. Grace does not quicken and enliven the closed and obstinate souls, the really "dead souls." Response and co-operation are required.¹⁴⁷ That is just because baptism is a sacramental dying with Christ, a participation in His voluntary death, in His sacrificial Love and this can be accomplished only in freedom. Thus in baptism the death of Christ on the Cross is reflected or portrayed as in a living and sacramental image. Baptism is at once a death and a birth, a burial and a "bath of regeneration," "a time of death and a time of birth," to quote St. Cyril of Jerusalem.¹⁴⁸

In the Early Church the rite of Christian initiation was not divided. Three of the sacraments belong together: Baptism, the Holy Chrism (Confirmation), and the Eucharist. The Initiation described by St. Cyril, and later on by Cabasilas, included all three.

Sacraments are instituted in order to enable man to participate in Christ’s redeeming death and thereby to gain the grace of His resurrection. This was Cabasilas’ main idea. "We are baptized in order to die by His death and to rise by His resurrection. We are anointed with the chrism that we may partake of His kingly anointment of the deification. And when we are fed with the most sacred Bread and do drink the most Divine Cup, we do partake of the same flesh and the same blood Our Lord has assumed, and so we are united with Him, Who was for us incarnate, and died, and rose again… Baptism is a birth, and Chrism is the cause of acts and movements, and the Bread of life and Cup of thanksgiving are the true food and the true drink.¹⁴⁹ In the whole sacramental and devotional life of the Church, the Cross and the Resurrection are "imitated" and reflected in manifold symbols and rites. All the symbolism is realistic. These symbols do not merely remind us of something in the past. Through these sacred symbols, the ultimate Reality is in very truth disclosed and conveyed. All this hieratic symbolism culminates in the august mystery of the Holy Altar. The Eucharist is the heart of the Church, the Sacrament of Redemption in an eminent sense. It is more than an "imitatio." It is Reality itself, veiled and disclosed in the Sacrament.

It is "the perfect and final Sacrament," says Cabasilas, "and one cannot go further, and there is nothing to be added." It is the "limit of life" — ζωής τό πέρας. "After the Eucharist there is nothing more to long for, but we have to stay here and learn how we can preserve this treasure to the end."¹⁵⁰

The Eucharist is the Last Supper itself, again and again enacted, but not repeated for every new celebration does not only represent, but truly is the same "Mystical Supper" which was celebrated for the first time by the Divine High Priest Himself, "in the night in which He was given up or rather gave Himself for the life of the world."

The true Celebrant of each Liturgy is Our Lord Himself. This was stressed with great power by St. John Chrysostom on various occasions. "Believe, therefore, that even now it is that Supper, at which He Himself sat down. For this one is in no respect different from that one. For neither doth man make this one and Himself that one, but both this and that are His own work. When therefore thou seest the priest delivering it unto thee, account not that it is the priest that does so, but that it is Christ’s hand that is stretched out."¹⁵¹ And again in hom. 82, 5, Col. F.44: "He that then did these things at that Supper, this same now also works them. We hold the rank of ministers. He who sanctifieth and changeth them is the Same. This table is the same as that, and hath nothing less. For it is not that Christ wrought that, and man this, but He doth this too. This is that Upper Chamber, where they were then."¹⁵² And "Christ now also is present, He who adorned that table is He who now also adorns this… The priest stands fulfilling a figure, but the power and grace are of God."¹⁵³

All this is of primary importance. The Last Supper was an offering of the sacrifice of the Cross. The offering is still continued. Christ is still acting as the High Priest in His Church. The Mystery is all the same. The Sacrifice is one. The Table is one. The priest is the same. And not one Lamb is slain, or offered this day, and another of old; not one here, and another somewhere else. But the same always and everywhere. One very Lamb of God, "who ‘taketh’ the sins of the world," even the Lord Jesus.

The Eucharist is a sacrifice, not because Jesus is slain again, but because the same Body and the same sacrificial Blood are actually here on the Altar, offered and presented. And the Altar is actually the Holy Grave, in which the Heavenly Master is falling asleep. Nicolas Cabasilas put this in these words: "In offering and sacrificing Himself once for all, He did not cease from His priesthood, but He exercises this perpetual ministry for us, in which He is our advocate with God for ever, for which reason it is said of Him, Thou art a priest for ever."¹⁵⁴

The resurrecting power and significance of Christ’s death are made manifest in full in the Eucharist. The Lamb is slain, the Body broken, the Blood shed, and yet it is a celestial food, and "the medicine of immortality and the antidote that we should not die but live forever in Jesus Christ," to use the famous phrase of St. Ignatius.¹⁵⁵ It is "the heavenly Bread and the Cup of life." This tremendous Sacrament is for the faithful the very "Betrothal of the Life Eternal." Because Christ’s Death itself was the Victory and the Resurrection, this Victory and this Triumph do we observe and celebrate in the Sacrament of the Altar. Eucharist means thanksgiving. It is a hymn rather than a prayer. It is the service of triumphant joy, the continuous Easter, the kingly feast of the Lord of Life and glory. "And so the whole celebration of the Mystery is one image of the whole economy of our Lord," says Cabasilas.¹⁵⁶

The Holy Eucharist is the climax of our aspirations. The beginning and the end are here linked together: the reminiscences of the Gospels and the prophecies of the Revelation, i.e. the fullness of the New Testament. The Eucharist is a sacramental anticipation, a foretaste of the Resurrection, an "image of the Resurrection" (ό τύπος της αναπαύσεως; the phrase is from the consecration prayer of St. Basil). The sacramental life of believers is the building up of the Church. Through the sacraments, and in them, the new life of Christ is extended to and bestowed upon the members of His Body. Through the sacraments the Redemption is appropriated and disclosed. One may add: In the sacraments is consummated the Incarnation, the true reunion of man with God in Christ.

Ο Christ, Passover great and most Holy! Ο Wisdom, Word, and Power of God! Vouchsafe that we may more perfectly partake of Thee in the days of Thine everlasting Kingdom. (Easter Hymn, recited by the priest at every celebration.)

"I am the Alpha and the Omega." (Rev. 1:8)

The Christian message was from the very beginning the message of Salvation, and accordingly our Lord was depicted primarily as the Savior, Who has redeemed His people from bondage of sin and corruption. The very fact of the Incarnation was usually interpreted in early Christian theology in the perspective of Redemption. Erroneous conceptions of the Person of Christ with which the early Church had to wrestle were criticized and refuted precisely when they tended to undermine the reality of human Redemption. It was generally assumed that the very meaning of Salvation was that the intimate union between God and man had been restored, and it was inferred that the Redeemed had to belong Himself to both sides, i.e. to be at once both Divine and human, for otherwise the broken communion between God and man would not have been re-established. This was the main line of reasoning of St. Athanasius in his struggle with the Arians, of St. Gregory of Nazianzus in his refutation of Apollinarianism, and of other writers of the IVth and Vth centuries. "That is saved which is united with God," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus.¹ The redeeming aspect and impact of the Incarnation were emphatically stressed by the Fathers. The purpose and the effect of the Incarnation were defined precisely as the Redemption of man and his restoration to those original conditions which were destroyed by the fall and sin. The sin of the world was abrogated and taken away by the Incarnate One, and He only, being both Divine and human, could have done it. On the other hand, it would be unfair to claim that the Fathers regarded this redeeming purpose as the only reason for the Incarnation, so that the Incarnation would not have taken place at all, had not man sinned. In this form the question was never asked by the Fathers. The question about the ultimate motive of the Incarnation was never formally discussed in the Patristic Age. The problem of the relation between the mystery of the Incarnation and the original purpose of Creation was not touched upon by the Fathers; they never elaborated this point systematically. "It may perhaps be truly said that the thought of an Incarnation independent of the Fall harmonizes with the general tenor of Greek theology. Some patristic phrases seem to imply that the thought was distinctly realized here and there, and perhaps discussed."² These ‘patristic phrases’ were not collected and examined. In fact, the same Fathers could be quoted in favor of opposite opinions. It is not enough to accumulate quotations, taking them out of their context and ignoring the purpose, very often polemical, for which particular writings were composed. Many of these ‘patristic phrases’ were just ‘occasional’ statements, and they can be used only with utter care and caution. Their proper meaning can be ascertained only when they are read in the context, Le. in the perspective of the thought of each particular writer.

Rupert of Deutz (d. 1135) seems to be the first among the medieval theologians who formally raised the question of the motive of the Incarnation, and his contention was that the Incarnation belonged to the original design of Creation and was therefore independent of the Fall. Incarnation was, in his interpretation, the consummation of the original creative purpose of God, an aim in itself, and not merely a redemptive remedy for human failure.³ Honorius of Autun (d. 1152) was of the same conviction.⁴ The great doctors of the XHIth century, such as Alexander of Hales and Albert Magnus, admitted the idea of an Incarnation independent of the Fall as a most convenient solution of the problem.⁵ Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) elaborated the whole conception with great care and logical consistency. For him the Incarnation apart from the Fall was not merely a most convenient assumption, but rather an indispensable doctrinal presupposition. The Incarnation of the Son of God was for him the very reason of the whole Creation. Otherwise, he thought, this supreme action of God would have been something merely accidental or ‘occasional’. "Again, if the Fall were the cause of the predestination of Christ, it would follow that God’s greatest work was only occasional, for the glory of all will not be so intense as that of Christ, and it seems unreasonable to think that God would have foregone such a work because of Adam’s good deed, if he had not sinned." The whole question for Duns Scotus was precisely that of the order of Divine ‘predestination’ or purpose, i.e. of the order of thoughts in the Divine counsel of Creation. Christ, the Incarnate, was the first object of the creative will of God, and it was for Christ’s sake that anything else had been created at all. "The Incarnation of Christ was not foreseen occasionally, but was viewed as an immediate end by God from eternity; thus, in speaking about things which are predestined, Christ in human nature was predestined before others, since He is nearer to an end." This order of ‘purposes’ or ‘previsions’ was, of course, just a logical one. The main emphasis of Duns Scotus was on the unconditional and primordial character of the Divine decree of the Incarnation, seen in the total perspective of Creation.⁶ Aquinas (1224-1274) also discussed the problem at considerable length. He saw the whole weight of the arguments in favor of the opinion that, even apart from the Fall, "nevertheless, God would have become incarnate," and he quoted the phrase of St. Augustine: "in the Incarnation of Christ, other things must be considered besides absolution from sin." (De Trinitate, XIII. 17). But Aquinas could not find, either in Scripture or in the Patristic writings, any definite witness to this Incarnation independent of the Fall, and therefore was inclined to believe that the Son of God would not have been incarnate if the first man did not sin: "Although God could have become incarnate without the existence of sin, it is nevertheless more appropriate to say that, if man had not sinned, God would not have become incarnate, since in Sacred Scripture the reason for the Incarnation is everywhere given as the sin of the first man." The unfathomable mystery of the Divine will can be comprehended by man only in so far as it is plainly attested in Holy Scripture, "only to the extent that [these things] are transmitted in Sacred Scripture," or, as Aquinas says in another place, "only in so far as we are informed by the authority of the saints, through whom God has revealed His will." Christ alone knows the right answer to this question: "The truth of the matter only He can know, Who was born and Who was offerred up, because He so willed."⁷ Bonaventura (1221-1274) suggested the same caution. Comparing the two opinions — one in favor of an Incarnation apart from the Fall and the other dependent on it, he concluded: "Both [opinions] excite the soul to devotion by different considerations: the first, however, more consonant with the judgment of reason; yet it appears that the second is more agreeable to the piety of faith." One should rely rather on the direct testimony of the Scriptures than on the arguments of human logic.⁸ On the whole, Duns Scotus was followed by the majority of theologians of the Franciscan order, and also by not a few outside it, as, for instance, by Dionysius Carthusianus, by Gabriel Biel, by John Wessel, and, in the time of the Council of Trent, by Giacomo Nachianti, Bishop of Chiozza (Jacobus Naclantus), and also by some of the early Reformers, for instance, by Andreas Osiander.⁹ This opinion was strongly opposed by others, and not only by the strict Thomists, and the whole problem was much discussed both by Roman Catholic and by Protestant theologians in the XVIIth century.¹⁰ Among the Roman Catholic champions of the absolute decree of the Incarnation one should mention especially Fran£ois de Sales and Malebranche. Malebranche strongly insisted on the meta-phycical necessity of the Incarnation, quite apart from the Fall, for otherwise, he contended, there would have been no adequate reason or purpose for the act of Creation itself.¹¹ The controversy is still going on among Roman Catholic theologians, sometimes with excessive heat and vigor, and the question is not settled.¹² Among the Anglicans, in the last century, Bishop Wescott strongly pleaded for the ‘absolute motive’, in his admirable essay on "The Gospel of Creation."¹³ The late Father Sergii Bulgakov was strongly in favor of the opinion that the Incarnation should be regarded as an absolute decree of God, prior to the catastrophe of the Fall.¹⁴

In the course of this age-long discussion a constant appeal has been made to the testimony of the Fathers. Strangely enough, the most important item has been overlooked in this anthology of quotations. Since the question of the motive of the Incarnation was never formally raised in the Patristic age, most of the texts used in the later discussions could not provide any direct guidance.¹⁵ St. Maximus the Confessor (580-662) seems to be the only Father who was directly concerned with the problem, although not in the same setting as the later theologians in the West. He stated plainly that the Incarnation should be regarded as an absolute and primary purpose of God in the act of Creation. The nature of the Incarnation, of this union of the Divine majesty with human frailty, is indeed an unfathomable mystery, but we can at least grasp the reason and the purpose of this supreme mystery, its logos and skopos. And this original reason, or the ultimate purpose, was, in the opinion of St. Maximus, precisely the Incarnation itself and then our own incorporation into the Body of the Incarnate One. The phrasing of St. Maximus is straight and clear. The 60th questio ad Thalassium, is a commentary on I Peter, 1:19-20: "[Christ was] like a blameless and spotless lamb, who was foreordained from the foundation of the world." Now the question is: St. Maximus first briefly summarizes the true teaching about the Person of Christ, and then proceeds: "This is the blessed end, on account of which everything was created. This is the Divine purpose, which was thought of before the beginning of Creation, and which we call an intended fulfillment. All creation exists on account of this fulfillment and yet the fulfillment itself exists because of nothing that was created. Since God had this end in full view, he produced the natures of things. This is truly the fulfillment of Providence and of planning. Through this there is a recapitulation to God of those created by Him. This is the mystery circumscribing all ages, the awesome plan of God, super-infinite and infinitely pre-existing the ages. The Messenger, who is in essence Himself the Word of God, became man on account of this fulfillment. And it may be said that it was He Himself Who restored the manifest innermost depths of the goodness handed down by the Father; and He revealed the fulfillment in Himself, by which creation has won the beginning of true existence. For on account of Christ, that is to say the mystery concerning Christ, all time and that which is in time have found the beginning and the end of their existence in Christ. For before time there was secretly purposed a union of the ages, of the determined and the Indeterminate, of the measurable and the Immeasurable, of the finite and Infinity, of the creation and the Creator, of motion and rest — a union which was made manifest in Christ during these last times." (M., P.G., XC, 621, A-B.) One has to distinguish most carefully between the eternal being of the Logos, in the bosom of the Holy Trinity, and the ‘economy’ of His Incarnation. ‘Prevision’ is related precisely to the Incarnation: "Therefore Christ was foreknown, not as He was according to His own nature, but as he later appeared incarnate for our sake in accordance with the final economy." (M., P.G., XC, 624D). The ‘absolute predestination’ of Christ is alluded to with full clarity.¹⁶ This conviction was in full agreement with the general tenor of the theological system of St. Maximus, and he returns to the problem on many occasions, both in his answers to Thalassius and in his Ambigua. For instance, in connection with Ephesians 1:9, St. Maximus says: "[By this Incarnation and by our age] he has shown us for what purpose we were made and the greatest good will be of God towards us before the ages." (M., P.G., 1097C). By his very constitution man anticipates in himself "the great mystery of the Divine purpose," the ultimate consummation of all things in God. The whole history of Divine Providence is for St. Maximus divided into two great periods: the first culminates in the Incarnation of the Logos and is the story of Divine condescension ("through the Incarnation"); the second is the story of human ascension into the glory of deification, an extension, as it were, of the Incarnation to the whole creation. "Therefore we may divide time into two parts according to its design, and we may distinguish both the ages pertaining to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine, and the ages concerning the deification of the human by grace… and to say it concisely: both those ages which concern the descent of God to men, and those which have begun the ascent of men to God… Or, to say it even better, the beginning, the middle, and the end of all the ages, those which have gone by, those of the present time, and those which are yet to come, is our Lord Jesus Christ." (M., P.G., XC, 320, B-C). The ultimate consummation is linked in the vision of St. Maximus with the primordial creative will and purpose of God, and therefore his whole conception is strictly ‘theocentric’, and at the same time ‘Christocentric’. In no sense, however, does this obscure the sad reality of sin, of the utter misery of sinful existence. The great stress is always laid by St. Maximus on the conversion and cleansing of the human will, on the struggle with passions and with evil. But he views the tragedy of the Fall and the apostasy of the created in the wider perspective of the original plan of Creation.¹⁷

What is the actual weight of the witness of St. Maximus ? Was it more than his ‘private opinion,’ and what is the authority of such Opinions’? It is perfectly clear that to the question of the first or ultimate ‘motive’ of the Incarnation no more than a ‘hypothetical’ (or ‘convenient’) answer can be given. But many doctrinal statements are precisely such hypothetical statements or ‘theologoumena’.¹⁸ And it seems that the ‘hypothesis’ of an Incarnation apart from the Fall is at least permissible in the system of Orthodox theology and fits well enough into the mainstream of Patristic teaching. An adequate answer to the question of the ‘motive’ of the Incarnaion can be given only in the context of the general doctrine of Creation.

1. St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, III. 10.2: ut fieret filius hominis, ad hoc ut et homo fieret filius Dei, M.G. VII, c. 875; cf. III. 19.1, coll. 939-940; IV.33.4, c. 1074; V. praef., c. 1120. See also St. Athanasius, De incarnatione, 54, M.G. XXV, c. 192: αυτός γαρ ένανθρώπησεν ίνα ήμεΐς θεοποιηθώμεν.

2. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Epist. CI, ad Cledonium, M.G. XXXVII, c. 118-181: o δε ήνωται τω θεφ τούτο και σώζεται.

3. Cf. St. Ignatius, Ephes. VII.2: "in death true life," έν θανάτφ ζωή αληθινή, Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers, Pt. II, v. II.1, p. 48.

4. The phrase is by St. Irenaeus, Adv. haeres, IV.37.1, M.G. VII, c. 1099: "veterem legem libertatis humanae manifestavit, quid liberum eum Deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam, ad utendum sententiam Dei voluntarie, et non coactum a Deo."

5. Ibid., III.18.1: sed quando incarnatus est, et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in seipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem praestans." (c. 932); 111,18.7: quapropter et per omnem venit aetatem omnibus restituens earn quae est ad Deum communionem. (c. 937); II.22.4: sed omnem aetatem sanctificans per illam, quae ad ipsum erat, similitudinem . . . ideo per omnem venit aetatem, et injantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes, in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes aetatem . . ., in juvenibus juvenis, exemplus juvenibus fiens et sanctificans Domino; sicut senior in senioribus etc., c. 784. Cf. F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock, Irenaeus of Lugdunum, A Study of his Teaching (Cambridge, 1914), p. 158 f.; A. d'Ales, La doctrine de la recapitulation en S. Irenee, Recherches de Science religieuse, VI, 1916, pp. 185-211.

6. St. John Damascene, De fide orth. 111.12, M.G. XCIV, c. 1032: τήν πρόσληψιν, τήν ϋπαρξιν, τήν θέωσιν αυτής υπό του λόγου.

7. St. Gregory of Nyssa, In Ecclesiastes, h. VII, M.G. XLIV, p. UW 725: "evil, considered by itself, does not exist apart from free choice." See on St. Gregory of Nyssa J. B. Aufhauser, Die Heilslehre des hi. Gregor von Nyssa (Miinchen, 1910); F. Hilt, Des hi. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom Mensch (Koln, 1890). In St. Maximus the distinction between "nature" and "will" was the main point in his polemics against the monotheletists. There is a "natural will" (θέλημα φυσικόν), and this is sinless; and there is a "selective will (θέλημα γνωμικόν), and this is the root of sin. This "natural will" is just what makes man a free being, and freedom belongs to man by nature, as well as reason. Without this "natural will" or freedom man simply would not be man at all, ου χωρίς εΐναι την άνθρωπίνην φύσιν αδύνατον. See St. Maximus, Ad Marynum, c. 5, M.G. XCI, c. 45: θέλημα γαρ εστί φυσικόν δύναμις του κατά ψύσιν οντος ορεκτική, και τών ουσιωδώς τη φύσει προσόντων, συνεκτικήν πάντων ίδιομάτωσις; cf. 49. This "natural will" is not any definite choice or resolve, not yet a προαίρεσις, but rather a presupposition of all choices and decisions, an innate impulse of freedom, an δρεξις, or an appetitus, as Comfebis renders the term, and not yet a γνώμη, sententia. Cf. Disputatio cum Pyrrho, c. 304: ουδείς γάρ ποτέ θέλειν διδάσκει, άρα φύσει θελητικός ό άνθρωπος, και πάλιν, ει φύσει λογικός ό άνθρωπος, το δε φύσει λογικόν και φύσει αύτεξούσιον. το γάρ αύτεξούσιον. . . θέλησις εστίν. On St. Maximus see H. Straubinger, Die Christologie des hi. Maximus Confessor (Diss. Bonn, 1906). A brief but excellent study on the whole of the theology of St. Maximus is given by S. L. Epifanovich, St. Maximus the Confessor and Byzantine Theology (Kiev, 1915) [Russian].

8. See also M. Lot Borodine, La Doctrine de la "deification" dans I'Uglise grecque jusqu'au XI siecle, Revue de Vhistoire des religions, t. CV, CVI and CVII, 1932-1933; J. Gross, La Divinisation du chretien d'apres les Veres Grecs (Paris, 1938).

9. Cf. St. Maximus, ad Marynum presb., M.G. XCI, 129: κατ' έξουσίαν άπειροδύναμον, αλλ' ουκ ανάγκη ύπεύθυνον. ου γάρ εκτισις ην ώς έφ' ημών, αλλά κένωσις υπέρ ημών του σαρκωθέντος. That was why St. Maximus categorically denied the penal character of Our Lord's death and sufferings.

10. "Taketh" seems to be a more accurate rendering of the Greek αιρων, than the "taketh away" of both the Authorized and Revised Versions, or rather, both meanings are mutually implied. See Bishop Westcott's The Gospel according to St. John, I (1908), p. 40. The word αϊρειν may mean either (1) to take upon him or (2) to take away. But the usage of the LXX and the parallel passage, 1 John 3:5, are decisive in favor of the second rendering (Vulg. qui to Hit, all. qui aufert) ; and the Evangelist seems to emphasize this meaning by substituting another word for the unambiguous word of the LXX (φέρει, beareth). It was, however, by "taking upon Himself our infirmities" that Christ took them away (Matt. 8:17); and this idea is distinctly suggested in the passage in Isaiah (53:11). The present tense marks the future result as assured in the beginning of the work, and also as continuous (cf. 1 John 1:7). The singular άμαρτίαν "is important, in so far as it declares the victory of Christ over sin regarded in its unity, as the common corruption of humanity, which is personally realized in the sins of the separate men." Cf. A. Plummer's Commentary (1913), p. 80: "taketh away rather than beareth is right, Christ took away the burden of sin by bearing it; but this is not expressed here, although it may be implied"; την άμαρτίαν, "regarded as one great burden or plague." Archbp. J. H. Bernard, Gospel according to St. John (1928), I, 46-47, describes the present tense "taketh" as juturum praesens, "not only an event in time, but an eternal process." "See St. Maximus, ad Marynum, M.G. XCI, c. 220-221: οίκείωσιν δέ ποίαν φασεί; την ουσιώδη, καθ' ην τα προσόντα φυσικώς εκαστον έχοντα οικειοϋται δια την φύσιν ή την σχετικήν καθ' ην τα αλλήλων φυσικώς στέργομεν τε καΐ οικειούμεθα, μηδέν τούτων αυτοί πάσχοντες η ενεργούντες. St. Maximus was concerned here with the problem of Our Lord's "ignorance." The same distinction in St. John Damascene, De fide orth. Ill, 25, M.G. XCIV, c. 1903: "It should be known, that the act of appropriation (οικείωσις) involves two things: one the natural and essential (φυσική και ουσιώδης), and the other the personal and relative (προσωπική καΐ σχετική). The natural and essential is that in which the Lord by his love to man has assumed our nature and all that belongs to it (τήν φύσιν καΐ τα φυσικά πάντα), really and truly became man and experienced the things which are of nature. The personal and relative appropriation is that in which someone for some reason (e.g. through love or compassion) takes upon himself another's person (του έτερου υποδύεται πρόσωπον) and says something having no relation at all to himself, in the other's stead and to his advantage. In this sense the Lord appropriated to Himself both the curse and our desertion, things having no relation to nature (ουκ δντα φυσικά), but it was thus that He took our person and placed Himself in line with us (μεθ’ ημών τασσόμενος)."

12. Cf. Bp. Westcott, ad locum, 11.125: "Christ came that He might suffer, that He might enter into the last conflict with sin and death, and being saved out of it win a triumph over death by dying"; Archbp. Bernard, 11.437, translates: "and yet for this very purpose," scil., that His ministry should be consummated in the Passion. . . The Glorification of the Father (5:28) is achieved not only by the obedience of the Son, but rather by the accomplishment of the ultimate purpose, the victory over death and evil."

13. Cf. P. M. J. Lagrange, Evangile selon St. Luc (1921), p. 267, ad loc. "marque le decret divin"; A. Plummer, Commentary on St. Luke, 1905, p. 247: "it expresses logical necessity rather than moral obligation (ώφειτεν, Hebr. 2:17) or natural fitness (επρεπεν, Hebr. 11.10). "It is a Divine decree, a law of the Divine nature, that the Son of Man must suffer"; Β. Ε. Easton, The Gospel according to St. Luke, Edinb. (1926), ad loc.y p. 139; δει, "by divine decree," especially as set forth in the Old Testament.

14. Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, Sermon on Good Friday (1816), Sermons and Speeches, I (1973), p. 94 [Russian].

15. The Scriptural evidence in favor of the Ransom conception is very scarce. Λύτρον does indeed mean "ransom," but the word is used in the New Testament only once, in the parallel passages Mark 10:45 and Matt. 20:28, and the main emphasis seems to be here rather on the "loosing" effect of Christ's Messianic ministry, than on ransoming in the strict sense. The primary meaning of the verb λύω is just to "loose" or to "set free." The word άντίλυτρον occurs in the New Testament also only once: 1 Tim. 2:6. The middle λυτρουσθαι, both in Luke 24:21 and in Titus 2:14, or in I Peter l:18f\, does not necessarily imply any "ransom"-motive. "Jedenfalls ware es vollig verkehrt fur Titus 11.14 und I Petri 1.18 zu hehaupten: we'll in dem Sprachgebrauch der LXX λυτρουσθαι als Gottestat nicht die Losegeld-Vorstellung enthdlt, enthdlt es sie auch an diesen Stellen nicht" [Buchsel in Kittel's Worterbuch, IV.6, s. 353]. Λύτρωσις in Luke 1.68 is no more than simply "salvation" (cf. 5:69, 71, 77). Hebr. 9:12: αίωνίαν λύτρωσιν does not imply any ransom either. "An ein Losegeld ist wohl hier kaum gedacht, wenn auch vom Blute Jesu die Rede ist. Die Vorstellung in Hebr. ist mehr kultisch als rechtlich" (Buchsel, s. 354). Άπολύτρωσις in Luke 21:28 is the same as λύτρωσις in 1:68 or 2:38, a redeeming Messianic consummation. This word is used by St. Paul with the same general meaning. See Buchsel, s. 357f. "Endlich muss gefragt iverden: wie weit ist in άπολύτρωσις die Vorstellung von einem λύτρον, einem Losegeld oder dergleichen noch lebendig? Soil man voraussetzen, dass ueberall, wo von άπολύτρωσις die Rede ist, auch an ein λύτρον gedacht ist? Ausdrucklich Bezug genommen wird auf ein Losegeld an keiner der Άπολύτρωσις—Stellen. . . Wie die Erlosung zustande kommt, sagt Paulus mit der έλαστήριον— Vorstellung, was uberflussig ware, wenn in άπολύτρωσις die Lose-geldvorstellung lebendig ware. . .Die richtige deutsche Ubersetzung von άπολύτρωσις ist deshalb nur Erlosung oder Befreiung, nicht Loskauf, ausnahmweise auch Freilassung Heb. 11:35 und Erledigung Hebr. 9:15."

16. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, orat. XLV, in S. Pascha, 22, M.G. XXXVI, 653.

17. St. Athanasius, De incarnatione, 4-5, M.G. XXV, c. 194; Robertson's translation (London, 1891, pp. 7-10): "as soon the thought came into their heads, they became corruptible, and being enthroned death ruled over them ... for being once nought by nature they were called into being by the indwelling and love of the Word; thence it followed, that, when they lost their understanding of God, they lost also their immortality; and this means: they were suffered to remain in death and corruption." Cf. Contra Gentes 41, col. 81-84.

18. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio cat., 6, Srawley p. 81: ώς αv συνεποιθαίη τω θείω το γήϊνον και μία τις κατά τό όμότιμον δια πάσης της κτίσεως ή χάρις διήκοι, της κάτω φύσεως προς τήν ύπερκό-σμιον συγκερναμένης. Srawley's translation, p. 39-40.

19. St. Gregory of Nyssa, De anima resurr., M.G. XLVI, c. 28; cf. De opific. hominis, cap. 2-5, M.G. XLIV, col. 133 ss. The idea of the central position of man in the cosmos is strongly emphasized in the theological system of St. Maximus the Confessor.

20. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. cat., cap. 8, "the potentiality of death which was the distinctive mark of the dumb creatures," τήν προς τό νεκροΰσθαι δύναμιν ή της αλόγου φύσεως εξαίρετος fjv, p. 43-44 Srawley; cf. De anima et resurr., M.G. XLVI, c. 148: "that which passed to human nature from dumb life," σχήμα τής άλογου φύσεως. De opif. hominis, 11, M.G. XLIV, c. 193: "what was bestowed upon dumb life for self-preservation, that, being transferred to human life, became passions." The interpretation of the "coats of skins" in the Biblical narrative as of the mortality of the body is connected with that; cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Onto 38, n. 12, M.G. XXXVI, c. 324. The Valentinian Gnostics seem to have been the first to suggest that the "coats of skins" in Genesis 3:21 meant the fleshly body; see St. Irenaeus, Adv. haereses, 1.5.5, M.G. VII, c. 501: ύστερον δε περιτεθεΐσθαι λέγουσιν αύτω τον δερμάτινον χιτώνα, τούτο δε το αίσθητόν σαρκίον εΐναι λέ-γουσΐ; cf. Tertullian, Adv. Valentinianos, 24, p. 201 Kroymann: carnalem superjiciam postea aiunt choico supertextam, et bane esse pelliceam tunicam obnoxiam sensui; De carnis resurr., 7, p. 34 Kroymann; ipsae erunt carnis ex limo reformation. Clement of Alexandria, a quote from Julius Cassianus, of the Valentinian school, Stromata, III, 14, p. 230 Stahlin II: χιτώνας δέ δερμάτινους ται ό Κασσιανός τά σώματα. Excerpta ex Theodoto, 55, 125 Stahlin III: τοις τρισίν άσωμάτοις έπί του Αδάμ τέταρτον επενδύεται τον χοϊκόν, τους δερμάτινους χιτώνας. Ε. R. Dodds suggested that this interpretation was in connection with old Orphic use of the word χιτών. "The word χιτών seems to have been originally an Orphic-Pythagorean term for the fleshly body. In this sense it is used by Empedocles, fragm. 126 Diels, σαρκών άλλόγνωστι περιστέλλουσα χιτών ι, with which may be compared Plato Gorg. 523c, where the fleshly body is described as an άμφίεσμα, which the soul takes off at death. The clean linen tunic of the Orphic votary perhaps symbolizes the purity of his "garment of flesh." Proclus, The Elements of Theology, a revised text with translation, introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 307. Porphyry on several occasions calls the fleshly body a "coat of skin."

21. Cf. Athenagoras, De resurr., 15, p. 65-67 Schwartz; Pseudo-Justin, De resurrectione, ap. Holl, Fragmente vornica'nischen Kirchenvdter aus den Sacra Parallela, Harnack-Gebhardt, Texte und Untersuchungen, XX.2, 1889, frg. 107, p. 45: τι γαρ έστιν ό άνθρωπος αλλ' ή το εκ ψυχής καΐ σώματος συνεστός ζώον λογικόν; μη οδν καθ' έαυτήν ψυχή άνθρωπος; δν, αλλ' ανθρώπου ψυχή* μη οδν καλεΐτο σώμα άνθρωπος; 6ν, αλλ' ανθρώπου σώμα καλείται' εΐπεν οΰν κατ' Ιδίαν μεν τούτων ούδέτερον άνθρωπος εστιν,τό δέ έκ της αμφοτέρων συμπλοκής καλείται άνθρωπος, κέκτηκε δέ ό θεός εις ζωήν και άνάστασιν τον άνθρωπον ου το μέρος, άλλα το δλον κέκτηκεν αυτόν. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haereses, V.6.1, M.G. VII, c. 1137: anima autem et spirit us pars hominis esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam; perfect us autem homo commistio et adunatio est· animae, assumentis Spiritum Patris, et admistae ei came, quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei; c. 1138: neque enim plasmatio carnis ipsa secundum se homo perfectus est, sed corpus hominis, et pars hominis. Neque enim et anima ipsa secundum se homo, sed anima hominis, et pars hominis. Neque Spiritus homo, Spiritus enim, et non homo vocatur, Commistio autem et unitio horum omnium perfectum hominem efficit; Tertullian, De carnis resurrectione, c. 40, p. 83 Kroymann III: nee anima per semet-ipsam homo, quae figmento jam homini appellato postea inserta est; nee caro sine anima homo, quae post exsilium animae cadaver inscribitur, ita vocabulum homo conseratum substantiarum duarum quodammodo fibua est etc.; St. Methodius, De resurrectione, 1.34.4, p. 272 Bonwetsch: άνθρωπος δέ αληθέστατα λέγεται κατά φύσιν οϋτε ψυχή χωρίς σώματος, οϋτ’ άν πάλιν σώμα χωρίς ψυχής, άλλα το έκ συστάσεως ψυχής και σώματος εις μίαν την του καλοϋ μορψήν συντεθέν. In later times some Fathers, however, adapted the Platonic definition of man; see for instance St. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae, 1.27.52, M.L. XXXII, c. 1332: homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali corpore atque terreno utens; In Joan. Evang. tr. XIX, 5, 15, M.L. XXXV, c. 1553: Quid est homo? anima rationalis habens corpus. Anima rationalis habens corpus non facit duas personas, sed unum hominem.

22. Hapgood, Service Book, p. 386; cf. 389-390.

23. Many of the Fathers regarded the "image of God" as being not in the soul only, but rather in the whole structure of man. Above all in his royal prerogative, in his calling to reign over the cosmos, which is connected with the fulness of his psycho-physical composition. This idea was brought forward by St. Gregory of Nyssa in his De opijicio hominis; later it was strongly emphasized by St. Maximus the Confessor. And, probably under the influence of St. Maximus, St. Gregory Palamas emphasized the fulness of the human structure, in which an earthly body is united with the reasonable soul, as the preeminent title of man to be regarded as the "image of God," Capita physica, theol. etc., 63, 66, 67, M.G. CL, col. 1147, 1152, 1165.

24. St. Methodius, De resurr., 1.34.4, Bonwetsch 275: τό άγαλμα τό λογεΐν.

25. Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio cat., 35, ed. Srawley, p. 133; Eng. transl. p. 103; c. 8, p. 46, transl. p. 47; De mortuis, M.G. XLVI, col. 520, 529; Orat. fun. de Placid., XLVI, 876-877. St. Gregory here reechoes St. Methodius, the similarity is even in the terms used; see Srawley's comparison in the introduction to his edition of the "Catechetical Oration," p. xxv-xxviii. The analogy of refinement itself is taken from St. Methodius: see De resurr. 1.43.2-4, Bonwetsch (1917), p. 291; 42.3, p. 288-289; cf. Symp. ix.2, Bonw. 116. Methodius reproduces the tradition of Asia Minor. See in Theophilus of Antioch, ad Autolicum 11.26, Otto s. 128 ss. Almost word for word St. Irenaeus, adv. haeres. III.23.6; 19.3, M.G. VII, 964, 941; 23-111; cf. frg. XII, c. 1233, 1236. The same in Hippolitus, adv. Graecos, 2, ap. Hell, TU XX.2, frg. 353, s. 140. St. Epiphanius includes large sections from Methodius in his Panarion, haeres. 64, cap. 22-29, ed. Holl II, 435-448. St. Basil also held the conception of death as a healing process, Quod Deus non est auctor malor., 1, M.G. XXXI, 345; also St. John Chrysostom, De resurr. mart. 7, M.G. L, c. 429.

26. St. Irenaeus, adv. haeres. III. 18.7: ήνωσεν οΰν τον άνθρωπον τω θεω (lot.: haerere facit et adunavit), M.G. VII, c. 937; 19.2: non enim proteramus aliter incorruptelam et immortalitatem percipere, nisi adunati fuissemus incorruptelae et immortalitati, nisi prius incorruptela et immorta-litas facta fuisset id quod et nos, ut absorberetur quod erat corruptibile ab incorruptela; c. 939; V.12.6: hoc autem et in semel totum sanum et integrum redintegravit hominem, perfectum eum sibi praeparans ad re-surrectionem, c. 1155-1156.

27. St Athanasius, De Incarnatione, 6-8; M,G. XXV. c. 105-109; Robertson's translation, p. 10-15.

28. Ibid., 44, col. 126; 28, c. 143; cf. Or. 2 in Arianos, 66, M.G. XXVI, 298.

29. De incarn., 21, c. 133; 9, c. 112; Of. 2 in Arianos, 62-68; c. 289-292. See also in St. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio cat., cap. 32, Srawley 116-117: "if one inquires further into the mystery, he will say rather, not that death happened to Him as a consequence of birth, but that birth itself was assumed on account of death, μη δια τήν γένεσιν συμβεβηκέναί τον θάνατον, άλλα το εμπαλιν του θανάτου χάριν παραληφθήναι τήν γένεσιν. For the ever-living assumed death, not as something necessary for life, but in order to restore us from death to life." See also the sharp utterance of Tertullian, De came Christi, 6, M.L. II, URY 746: Christus mori missus, nasci quoque necessario habuit, ut mori posset, . . forma moriendi causa nascendi est. However, all that does not presume that the Incarnation depends exclusively upon the Fall and would not have taken place, had not man sinned. Bp. Westcott was right in suggesting "that the thought of an Incarnation independent of the Fall harmonizes (better) with the general tenor of Greek theology"; Commentary on the Epistles of St. John (London, 1883), the excursus on "The Gospel of Creation," p. 275. Cf. Excursus I, Cur Deus homo?

30. Celsus ap. Origen., Contra Celsum, V.14: άτεχνώς σκωλήκων ή έλπίς, ποία γαρ ανθρώπου ψυχή ποθήσειεν ετι σώμα σεσηπός;

31. Koetschau 15; and VII.36 and 39, p. 186, 189.

32. St. Augustine, Confessiones, l.V, X.19-20, ed. Labriolle, p. 108 ss.: tnultumque mihi turpe videbatur credere figuram te habere humanae carnis et membrorum nostrum liniamentis corporalibus terminari... metuebam itaque credere incarnatum, ne credere cogerer ex carne inquinatum .. . It was just the "embodiment," the life in a body, that offended St. Augustine. In his Manichean period St. Augustine could not get beyond corporeal categories at all. Everything was corporeal for him, even the Intellect, even Deity itself. He emphasizes that in the same chapters where he is speaking of the shame of the Incarnation: "et quoniam cum de Deo meo cogitare vellem, cogitare nisi moles corporum non noveram .. . neque enim videbatur mihi esse quicquam, quod tale non esset. . .. quid et mentem cogitare non noveram nisi earn subtile corpus esse, quod tamen per loci spatia difjunderetur [V. 19, 20, p. 108, 110]; non te cogitabam, Deus, in figura corporis humani.. . sed quod te aliud cogitarem non occurebat. . ., corporeum tamen aliquid cogitare cogerer . . . quoniam quidquid privabam spatiis talibus, nihil mihi esse xidebatur, sed prorsus nihil [VII. 1, p. 145-146] .. . All is corporeal, but there are stages or levels, and the "bodily-existence" is the lower level. One has to get out of that. The "materialistic" presuppositions of Manicheanism did not calm this rather instinctive "abhorrence of the body."

33. Plotinus, V.8.8: παν γαρ τό κατ' άλλου ποιηθέν οταν τις θαυμάση, έπ’ έκεινο έχει τό θαυμα, καθ' ο εστι πεποιημένον.

34. Plotinus, II.9.15 to the end.

35. Plotinus, III.6.6: ή δέ αληθινή έγρήγορσις αληθινή άπό σώματος, ου μετά σώματος άνάστασις. The polemical turn of these utterances is obvious. The body is το άλλότριον, which does not properly belong to the human being [1.6.7]; it is what comes in at the earthly birth [τό προσπλασθέν έν τη γενέσει IV.7.14]. Cf. R. Arnou, Le desk de Dieu dans la Philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1924), p. 201: "Le mot est a noter Le sensible est comme un enduit, une espece de crepissage, une couche de peinture qui n'entre pas dans I'essence de I'etre, mats qui s'ajoutant du dehors, peut etre grattee sans Valterer, car elle reste toujours 'I'autre'." One has to dominate this alien element of the composition, but one can achieve that only by running away, or "thither": άλλα ού καθαρόν τό δυνάμενον κρατεΐν, ει μή φύγοι, 1.8.8. Plotinus does not suggest a suicide, like the Stoics, but rather an inner effort to overcome or dominate all lower desires and carnal affections, to concentrate on one's own self and to ascend towards the good; 1.6.7: άναβατέον έπΐ τό αγαθόν; 6.9: ανάγε έπι σαύτόν καταλειπεΐν μόνη ν και μή μετ" άλλων ή μή προς άλλο βλέπουσαν κτλ.; VI.9.4: μόνος εΐναι άποστάς πάντων. Of course, man is not soul alone, but rather soul in a certain relation, έν τοιωδε λόγω, and Plotinus clings to the Platonic definition [Alcib. 129e: τό τω σώματι χρώμενον], IV.7.5.8. But he declines the Aristotelian conception of an εντελέχεια. In any case, the body is an obstacle for the spiritual ascension (έμπόδιον), a source of sorrows and desires, IV.8.2.3. And the soul can be free and truly independent (κυριωτάτη αυτής καΐ ελευθέρα) only without the body, άνευ σώματος, III.1.8. The incarnate existence of the soul is, both for Plotinus and for Plato himself, only a transitory and abnormal, an unhappy episode in her destiny, an outcome of the "fall"; and the soul will soon forget this earthly life altogether when she has "returned" and ascended into glorious bliss, through death or ecstasy. The comparison of the incarnate and sensual life with a sleep comes from Plato [e.g. Tim. 52b], it was quite usual in Philo. The image of escape is Platonic too: "One has to endeavor to run thither from here as quickly as possible." Theaet. 176a: ένθέντε έκεΐσε φεύγειν. And the true philosopher is one who is ready and willing to die, and whose whole life is but an "exercise in dying," or even, a "rehearsal of death," μελέτη θανάτου, Phaedo 64a. See J. Burnet, in his edition of the Phaedo, 1911, Notes, p. 28 and 72: μελέτη "means the 'practising' or 'rehearsal' of death"; cf. Phaedo 67d: φύσις και χωρισμός ψυχής άπό σώματος; 81a: τεθνάναι μελετώσα ραδίως; cf. Α. Ε. Taylor, Plato, The Man and His Work, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1927), p. 178ff.; "μελέτη means the repeated practice by which we prepare ourselves for a performance," and not just a meditation of death; it is precisely a "rehearsal," p. 179, note. Cf. later in Cicero, Τ use. 1.30: "tota enim philosophorum vita ut ait idem(s) commentatio mortis est; and Seneca, Epist. 26: egregia res est mortem condiscere. Prof. Taylor stresses the Platonic phrase: "before he was man" [Memo 86a: άν μή f] άνθρωπος], and comments: "This way of speaking about our ante-natal conditions is characteristic for Phaedo too: it implies that the true self is not as is commonly thought, the embodied soul, but the soul simpliciter, the body being the instrument (όργανον) which the soul "uses," and the consequent definition of "man" as a "soul using a body as its instrument," p. 138, note 1. Cf. John Burnet, "Introduction" to his edition of the Phaedo, p. LIII: "It is sufficiently established that the use of the word ψυχή to express a living man's true personality is Orphic in its origin, and came into philosophy from mysticism. Properly speaking, the ψυχή of a man is a thing which only becomes important at the moment of death. In ordinary language it is only spoken of as something that may be lost; it is in fact 'the ghost,' which a man 'gives up'."

36. Cf. Biichsel, s.v. άπολύτρωσις, in Kittel's Wvrterbuch, IV, s. 355: "Die άπολύτρωσις του σώματος ist Rom. VIII.23 nicht die Erlosung vom Leibe, sondern die Erlosung des Leibes. Das beweist der Vergleich mit v.21 unweigerlich. Wie die Geschopfe zur Freiheit der Herrlichkeit gelangen, indem sie frei werden von der Sklaverei der Verganglichkeit, so sollen auch wir zur υιοθεσία, d.h. zur Einsetzung in die Sohnesstellung mit ihrer Herrlichkeit, gelangen, indem unser Leib, der tot ist um der Sunde willen (v.10), von dies em Τ odes lose frei wird und Unverganglichkeit bzw. Unsterblichkeit anz'teht (l Cor. XV.53, 54). Leiblosigkeit ist jiir Paulus nicht Erlosung, sondern ein schrecklicher Zustand [2 Cor. V.2-4] etc."

37. St. John Chrysostom, de resurrectione mortuorum, 6, M.G. L, c. 427-428.

38. Minutius Felix, Octavius, 34, ed. Halm, p. 49.

39. V. F. Ern, Letters on Christian Rome, 3rd letter, "The Catacombs of St. Callistus," Bogoslovskii Vestnik, 1913 (January), p. 106 [Russian].

40. St. Athanasius, De incarnatione, 21, M.G. XXV, p. 123.

41. St. Justin regarded the belief in the General Resurrection as one of the cardinal articles of the Christian faith: if one does not believe in the Resurrection of the dead, one can hardly be regarded as a Christian at all; Dial, 80, M.G. VI, 665: ot και λέγουσι μή είναι νεκρών άνάστασιν, αλλ9 άμα τω άποθανεΐν τάς ψυχάς αυτών άναλαμβανέσθαι είς ούρανόν, μή απολαμβάνετε αυτούς χριστιανούς. Cf. Ε. Gilson, UEsprit de la Philosophie Medievale, I (Paris 1932), p. 177: "On surprendrait aujourd'hui beaucoup de chretiens en leur disant que la croyance en V immortalite de I'dme chez certains des plus anciens Peres est obscure au point d'etre a peu pres inexistante. Cest pourtant un fait, et il est important de le noter parce qu'il met merveilleusement en relief Vaxe central de I'anthropologie chretienne et la raison de son evolution historique. Au fond, un Christianisme sans immortalite de I'ame n'eut pas ete absolument inconcevable et la preuve en est qu'il a ete congue. Ce qui serait, au contraire, absolument inconcevable, c'est un Christianisme sans resurrection de I'Homme." See Excursus II, Anima mortalis.

42. Paul Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, An Essay in Christian Theodicy (Moscow, 1914), p. 291-292 [Russian].

43. Cf. the most interesting remarks of E. Gilson in his Gifford lectures, L'Esprit de la Philosophie Medievale, I (Paris, 1932), the whole chapter IX, L'anthropologie chretienne, p. 173 ss. Gilson seems to have underestimated the Aristotelian elements in Early Patristics, but he gives an excellent mis au point of the whole problem.

44. In his early dialogue Eudemus, or On the Soul, composed probably ca. 354 or 353, Aristotle still clings close to Plato and plainly professes the belief in an individual survival or immortality of the soul. It was a kind of a sequel to the Phaedo, a book of personal consolation like it. There was the same intimate quest for immortality, for the after-life, "a fervor of longing for the peace and security of the heavenly plains" [W. Jaeger, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwkklung (Berlin, 1923); English translation by R. Robins, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934, p. 40]. It is worth noticing that even so early Aristotle used to describe the soul as an "eidos," although not in the same sense as in his later writings; Simpl., in De anima III.62, frg. 46 Rose; Heitz p. 51: και διά τούτο και έν τω Εύδήμω διαλόγω εΐδος τι αποφαίνεται την ψυχήν εΐναι, και έν τούτοις έπαινεΐ τους των ειδών δεκτικήν λέγοντος τήν ψυχήν, ουχ ολην, άλλα νοητική ν ως τών αληθών δευτέρως ειδών γνωστικήν. In his later works, and specially in De anima, Aristotle abandons and criticizes his earlier view. And in his Ethics, in any case, he has no "eschatological" perspective whatever. "Now death is the most terrible of all things, for it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead" [Eth. Nicom. III.6, 1115a 27]. Yet, he suggests, "we must, as far as we can, make ourselves immortal (έφ’ οσον ενδέχεται άθανατίζειν) and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us" [1177b 33]. But this means only that one has to live in accordance with reason, which reason is hardly human, but rather superhuman. "But such a life would be too high for man (κρείττω ή κατ' άνθρωπον), for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him" [1117b 26]. The very purpose of human life, and the complete happiness of man, consists in a contemplation of the things noble and divine [1177a 15]. "And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy but for a short time (μικρόν χρόνον), for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be, etc." [Metaphysics, 7, 1072b 15]. It would be a divine life, and it is beyond the human reach. "God is always in that good state in which we sometimes (ττοτέ) are" [1.25]. Even contemplation does not break the earthly circle of human existence. No after-death destiny is mentioned at all. The attempt of Thomas Aquinas and of his school to read the doctrine of human immortality into Aristotle was hardly successful. One may adapt the Aristotelian conception for Christian purposes, and this was just what was done by the Fathers. But Aristotle himself obviously "was not a Moslem mystic, nor a Christian theologian" [R. D. Hicks, in the "Introduction" to his edition of De anima, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1934, p. XVI].

45. De anima, 402a 6: εστί γαρ οΐον αρχή τών ζώων; 412b 16: τό τι ή εήναι και ο λόγος; 415b 8: του ζώντος σώματος αιτία και αρχή; 415b 17: τό τέλος; De part. anim. 64la 27: ώς ή κινούσα και ώς τό τέλος; Metaph. 7. 10, 1035b 14: ή κατά τόν λόγον ουσία κατά τό ειδος και τό τι ην ειναι τω τοιώδε σώματι.

46. Aristotle plainly rejected any speech of "communion," "composition," or "connection" of soul with body (συνουσία ή σύνθεσις ή σύνδεσμος); "the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually," εστί ο’ ή εσχάτη υλη και ή μορφή τό αυτό καΐ 'εν, τό μέν δυνάμει τό δ' ένεργόν. Metaph. Η. 6 1045b 9s. Cf. F. Ravaisson, Essai sur la metaphysique d'Aristote (Paris, 1836), I, p. 419-420: The soul is 'Ία realite derniere d'un corps" that which gives it life and proper individuality. "Elle n'est pas le corps, mais sans le corps elle ne pent pas etre. Elle est quelque chose du corps; et ce quelque chose n'est pas ni la figure, ni le mouvement, ni un accident quelconque, mais la forme meme de la vie, Vactivite specifique qui determine Vessence et tons ses accidents"; cf. O. Hamelin, Le Systeme d'Aristote, p. 374: "cette aptitude a fonctionner est precisement ce qu'Aristote appelle I'entelechie premiere du corps."

47. G. S. Brett, A History of Psychology, Ancient and Patristic (London, 1912), p. 103; cf. H. Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, 1.2 (Gotha, 1884), s. 13f. Prof. E. Caird, The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers (Glasgow, 1904), I, p. 274ff., points out the complete originality of the Aristotelian conception of the soul. "The Aristotelian idea of the soul is, indeed, a new and original conception." The soul is to Aristotle not the Intelligence, but just "the form which realizes, or brings into activity and actuality, the capacities of an organic body." And therefore, there can hardly be any inter-telauon of the soul and the body, for they are really one and the same reality: "soul and body seem to be taken by him as different, but essentially correlated aspects of the life of one individual substance." And yet this is only one of the aspects of the Aristotelian conception. And in many respects Aristotle comes back to a Platonic idea of a composite being, σύνθετον, in which the heterogeneous elements are combined, a spiritual principle and a material body, p. 282, 317.

48. De part. anim. 64la 18: απελθούσης γουν (της ψυχής) ούκέτι ζώων έστι; Meteor. IV.12, 389b 31: νεκρός άνθρωπος ομώνυμος.

49. On Aristoxenus, see Zeller, II.2, s. 888 and note: ap. Cicer. Tusc. 1.10.20, ipsius corporis intentionem quandam (animam); ap. Lactantium, Instit. VII. 13, qui negavit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum vivit in cor pore; on Dikaearchus, Zeller, s. 889f and notes: Cicer. Tusc. 1.10.21, nihil esse omnino animum et hoc esse nomen totum inane; Sext. Pyrrh. 11.31, μη εΐναι την ψυχήν; Math. VII, 349, μηδέν εΐναι αυτήν παρά τό πώς έχον σώμα; on Strato, Zeller, s. 9l6f and notes.

50. G. S. Brett, p. 159.

51. "See Zeller, s. 864ff.

52. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in De anima, 16.2 Bruns; 21.24: φθαρτού σώματος είδος; cf. Zeller, III.l, s. 712ff.

53. De anima, 129a 28: ή νοητική ψυχή; Eth. Nicom. X.7, 1178a 6: "since reason more than anything else is man," εΐπερ τουτο μάλιστα άνθρωπος.

54. R. D. Hicks, p. 326; E. Rohde, Psyche, Seelencult und Unsterb-lichkeitsglaube der Griechen, 3 Aufl. (193), B. II, s. 305, suggested that the whole doctrine of Nous was simply a survival of Aristotle's early Platonism. This idea was taken up by W. Jaeger, op. cit., p. 332: "In this connection the third book On the soul, which contains the doctrine of Nous, stands out as peculiarly Platonic and not very scientific. This idea is an old and permanent element of Aristotle's philosophy, one of the main roots of his metaphysics . .. On and around the psycho-physical theory of the soul was subsequently constructed, as it appears, without, however, bridging the gulf between two parts whose intellectual heritages were so different.. . The doctrine of Nous was a traditional element, inherited from Plato."

55. De gen. anim. II.3, 736b 27: λείπεται δέ τόν νουν μόνον θύραθεν έπεισιέναι και θειον ειναι μόνον, ούθέν γαρ αύτοϋ κοινωνεί σωματική ενέργεια; De anima, 4l3b 25: εοικε ψυχής γένος έτερον είναι, και τούτο μόνον ενδέχεται χωριζεσθαι καθάπερ το άΐδιον του φθαρτού; 430a 5: soul and body cannot be separated, ούκ έ'στιν ή ψυχή χωριστή του σώματος; "there is, however, no reason why some parts (of the soul) should not be separated, if they are not actualities of any body whatsoever," δια το μηθένος εΐναι σώματος εντελέχειας; 430a 17: καΐ ουτος ό νους χωριστός και απαθής και αμιγής, τη ουσία ών ενέργεια . . ., χωρισθείς δ' εστι, μόνον τουθ' οπερ εστιν, και τούτο μόνον άθάνατον και άΐδιον .. , ό δέ παθητικός νους φθαρτός και άνευ τούτο ουδέν.

56. De anima, 430a 25: ού μνημονεύομεν δ9 δτι τούτο μέν άλσ... , . .δέ παθητικός νους φθαρτός; cf. 408b 27: διό και τούτον φθειρομένου οϋτε μνημονεύει, οϋτε φιλεΐ; the meaning is obvious: whatever does survive in man after his physical death, the memory is lost, and therewith the individual continuity. See Zeller, II.2, p. 574, n. 3: die Continuitat des Bewusstseins zwischen dem Leben des mit der lei-dentlichen Vernunft verbundenen und des von ihr freien Nus sowohl nach ruckwdrts wie nach vorwarts aufhebt"; cf. G. Rodier, in the notes to his edition, II, p. 465 s. This was the interpretation of ancient commentators too.

57. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in De anima, 89.11 Bruns: καΐ £στΐν ό τοιούτος νους χωριστός τε και απαθής και αμιγής άλλω, δι πάντα αύτφ δια το χωρίς ϋλης είναι υπάρχει. Χωριστός τε γαρ καΐ αυτός καθ’ αυτόν ών δια τούτο. 'Απαθής δέ ων καΐ μή με-μιγμένος ϋλη τινι και άφθαρτος έστιν, ενέργεια ών καΐ εΐδος χωρίς δυνάμεως τε καΐ ϋλης' τοιούτον δέ δν δέδεικται ύπ' 'Αριστοτέλους το πρώτον αίτιον, δ καΐ κυρίως Μστι νους; 90.23-91.1: ό ουν νοούμενος άφθαρτος έν ήμΐν οδτος έστιν δτι χωριστός τε έν ήμΐν και άφθαρτος νους, δν και θύραθεν 'Αριστοτέλης λέγει, νους ό έξωθεν γινόμενος έν ήμΐν, άλλ' ούχ ή δύναμις της έν ήμΐν ψυχής, ουδέ ή έξις; Mantissa, 108, 22: θύραθεν έστι λεγόμενος νους ό ποιητικός, ούκ ών μόριον καΐ δύναμίς τις της ημετέρας ψυχής, άλλ' έξωθεν γινόμενος έν ήμΐν, δταν αυτόν νοώμεν; 113: χωριστός δέ λέγεται ό θύραθεν νους και χωρίζεται ημών, ούχ ώς μετ' ών που και αμείβων τόπον, άλλα χωριστός μέν ώς καθ' αυτόν τε ών και μή σύν ϋλη, χωριζόμενος δέ ημών τω μή νοεΐσθαι κτλ. . . . This interpretation is accepted by most modem scholars: F. Ravaisson, Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote (Paris, 1837), I, p. 587-588; Ch. Renouvier, Manuel de Philosophie anc'tenne (Paris, 1844), II, 134, note 3; E. Rohde, Psyche, II, -30Iff.; E. Zeller, II.2, s. 566f.: "gelehrt hat er nur die Fortdauer des denkenden Geistes, die Bedingungen des personlichen Daseins dagegen hat er ihm hierbei entsagen; . . . so wenig uns seine Metaphysik einen klaren und widerspruchlosen Aufschluss uber die Individualitat gab, ebensowenig gtbt uns seine Psychologie einen solchen uber die Personlichkeit"; O. Hamelin, System d'Aristote, 2ed. (Paris), p. 387; "Aristote a laisse le probleme sans solution, ou plutot peut-etre il a volontairement evite de le poser!' The mediaeval interpretation of the Aritotelian conception of the soul was very different. Thomas Aquinas and others insisted that Aristotle himself made a distinction between an animal soul and an "intelligent soul" of man, and that he regarded this human soul as an immortal and surviving individual being. One can agree that the Aristotelian conception could be remolded to such an effect, and this was precisely what was done by the Fathers. But it is hardly probable that Aristotle himself professed an individual immortality. The Thomistic thesis was presentd with great vigor by M. De Corte, La Doctrine de VIntelligence chez Aristote (Paris, J. Vrin, 1934). But the author himself had to concede that Aristotle never thought in the terms of personality, but perhaps subconsciously [p. 91ss].

58. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Aesthetik, S.W. x.2, s. 377: "In seinen Dichtern und Rednern, Geschichtsschreibern und Philosophen hat Grie-chenland noch nicht in seinem Mittelpunkte gefasst, wenn man nicht als Schliissel zu Verstdndniss die Einsicht in die Ideale der Skulptur mitbringt, und von dies em Standpunkt der Plastik aus so wo hi die Gestalten der epischen und dramatischen Helden, als auch die wirklichen Staatsmdnner und Philosophen betrachtet"; see the whole of the section on Sculpture, which was for Hegel a peculiarly "classical art," s. 353ff.

59. A. F. Lossev, Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology, t I (Moscow, 1930), p. 670, 632, 633. This book is a valuable contribution to research on Plato and Platonism, including Christian Platonism. Passed by the ordinary censorship in Soviet Russia, the book was very soon confiscated and taken out of circulation upon the insistence of anti-religious leaders, and the whole stock was apparently destroyed. Very few copies survived. The author was probably imprisoned. Cf. also Lossev's earlier book, Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science (Moscow, 1927), a fine thrilling study of Neoplatonism, particularly of Proclus, with valuable excursus on the earlier thinkers. Both are in Russian.

60. This unity of man is brought forward by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the important passage of his commentary, in De anima, 23.8: ώς γαρ ου λέγομεν βαδίζειν την ψυχήν η όραν ή άκούειν, άλλα κατά την ψυχήν τον άνθρωπον, ούτως καί, οδσας αλλάς ενεργείας τε καί κινήσεις ώς έμψυχος τε καί ώς άνθρωπος ένεργεΐ, ούχ ή ψυχή έστιν ή ενεργούσα τε και κινούμενη . . . αλλ' εστί και έν έκείναις το ζώον καί ό άνθρωπος κατά τήν ψυχήν ενεργών, καθ' ην εστίν αύτω το είναι άνθρώπω.

61. It is true that Nemesius of Emesa, in his famous treatise De natura hominis, formally rejected the Aristotelian definition of the soul, as of an εντελέχεια of the body; M.G. XL, c. 565: ου δύναμιν τοίνυν ή ψυχή, κατ’ ούδένα τρόπον εντελέχεια του σώματος είναι άλλ' ουσία αυτοτελής, ασώματος. But his position was rather exceptional, since he was inclined to admit the pre-existence of the soul.

62. Athenagoras, De resurrectione mort., 13, p. 63 Schwartz: άπλανεστάτω δέ πεπιστεύκαμεν έχεγγύω τη του δημιουργήσαντος ή μας γνώμη, καθ' ην έποίησεν ανθρωπον εκ ψυχής αθανάτου και σώματος νουν τε συγκατασκεύασεν αύτώ καΐ νόμου εμφυτον έπί σωτηρία καΐ φυλακή τών παρ5 αύτου διδυμένον: ή μεν της γενέσεως αίτια πιστουται την εις αεί διαμονή ν, ή δε διαμονή τήν άνάστασιν, ής χωρίς ουκ αν διαμείνειν άνθρωπος, εκ δέ τών είρημένων εύδήλον ώς τή της γενέσεως αιτία και τη γνώμη του ποιήσαντος δείκνυνται σαφώς σαφώς ή άνάστασις; 15, ρ. 65: ει γαρ πάσα κοινώς ή τών ανθρώπων φύσις εκ ψυχής αθανάτου και του κατά τήν γένεσιν αύτη συναρμοσθέντος σώματος έχει τήν σύστασιν και μήτε τή φύσει του σώματος χωρίς άπεκλήρωσεν θεός τήν τοιάνδε γένεσιν ή τήν ζωήν και τον σύμπαντα βίον, αλλά τοις έκ τούτων ήνωμένοις άνθρώποις, ϊν, έξ ών ήνωνται και ζώσι, διαβιώσαντα εις εν τι και κοινόν καταλήξωσιν τέλος, δει, πάντως ενός δντος έξ αμφοτέρων ζώου του και πάσχοντος όπόσα πάθη ψυχής και όπόσα του σώματος ενεργούντος τε και πράττοντος δποσα της αισθητικής ή τής λογικής δεΐται κρίσεως, προς εν τι τέλος άναφέρεσθαι πάντα τον έκ τούτων είρμόν, ίνα πάντα και διά πάντων συντρέχη προς μίαν άρμονίαν και τήν αύτήνσυμπάθειαν, ανθρώπου γένεσις, ανθρώπου φύσις, ανθρώπου ζωή, ανθρώπου πράξεις και πάθη και βίος και το τή φύσει προσήκον τέλος; ρ. 66: ταύτης γάρ χωρίς οϋτ' αν ένωθείη, τά αυτά μέρη κατά φύσιν άλλήλοις, οϋτ' αν συσταίη τών αυτών ανθρώπων ή φύσις; ό δέ και νουν και λόγον δεξάμενος έστι άνθρωπος, ου ψυχή καθ' έαυτήν, ανθρωπον άρα δει τον έξ αμφοτέρων δντα διαμένειν εις αεί, τούτον δέ διαμένειν αδύνατον μή άνιστόμενον' αναστάσεως γάρ μή γινομένης, ουκ άν ή τών ανθρώπων ώς ανθρώπων διαμένει φύσις. On the Aristotelian background of Athenagoras' conception see M. Pohlenz, Zeitsckrift fur die Wissensch. Theologie, Bd. 47, s. 241 ff.; cf. E. Schwartz, index graecus to his edition of Aihenagorus, s.v. Eldos, s. 105. See also J. Lehmann, Die Auferstehungslehre des Athenagoras, Diss. (Leipsiz, 1890).

63. Cf. E. Gilson, L'Esprit de la Philosophie Medievale, I (Paris, 1932), p. 199: "Lorsqu'on pese les expressions d'Athenagore, la profondeur de 1'influence exercee par la Bonne Nouvelle sur la pensee philosophique apparait a plein. Cree par Dieu comme une individual^ distincte, conserve par un acte de creation continuee dans l'etre qu'il a recu de lui, l'homme est desormais le personnage d'un drame qui est celui de sa propre destinee. Comme il ne dependait pas de nous d'exister, il ne depend pas de nous de ne plus exister. Le decret divin nous a condamnes a l'etre; faits par la creation, refaits par la redemption, et a quel prix! nous n'avons le croix qu'entre une misere ou une beatitude egalement eternelles. Rien de plus resistant qu'une individualite de ce genre, prevue, voulue, e’lue par Dieu, indestructible comme le decret divin lui-meme qui l'a fait naitre; mais rien aussi qui soit plus etranger a la philosophie de Platon comme a celle d'Aristote. La encore, a partir du moment ou elle visait pleine justification rationelle de son esperance, la pens£e chrotienne se trouvait contrainte a l'originalite."

64. St. Jerome, Epist. 38, alias 61, ad Pammachium.

65. Cf. Origen, De Principiis, 11.10.3, Koetschau 184: qui vel pro intellectus exiguiiate, vel explanationis inopia valde vilem et abjectum sensum de resurrectione corporis introducunt.

66. Cf. F. Prat, Origene, Le theologian et I'exeghe (Paris, 1907), p. 94: "Contre son habitude, Origene se montre disciple trop fidele du Stagirite"; E. de Faye, Origene, Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensee, v. Ill (Paris, 1928), p. 172, suggested that Origen knew Aristotle quite well and had studied directly at least De anima and the Nicomachean Ethics. "Notre theologien est beaucoup plus redevable a Aristote qu'on ne le suppose. Directement ou indirectement, il a subi son influence. Celle ci s'est fait sentir notamment dans le domaine de la science de I'homme." And de Faye insisted that one could never understand Origen's ideas on the soul without a careful and detailed confrontation with those of Aristotle. See also R. Cadiou, La Jeunesse dOrigene (Paris, 1935), p. 119.

67. Origen dealt with the doctrine of the Resurrection on several occasions: first in his early commentary on the first Psalm and in a special treatise De resurrectione, which is now available only in fragments preserved by Mehodius and in the Apology of Pamphilus; then in De Principiis; and finally in Contra Celsum. There was no noticeable development in his views. See Selecta in Ps. 1.5, M.G. XII, c. 1906: δπερ πότε έχαρακτηρίζετο έν τη σαρκι, τούτο χαράκτη ρισθήσεται έν τω πνευματικώ σώματι; c 1907: δ σπερματικός λόγος έν τω κόκκω του σίτου δραξάμενος της παρακείμενης ϋλης, και δι' δλης αυτής χωρίσας κτλ.; cf. ap. Method. De resurr. 1.223, p. 244 Bonw.: τό ύλικόν ύποκε'ιμενον ουδέποτε έχει ταύτόν διόπερ ού κακώς ποταμός ώνόμαστε τό σώμα, διότι ώς προς τό ακριβές τάχα ουδέ δύο ήμερων τό πρώτον ύποκείμενον ταυτόν έστιν έν τφ σώματι ημών .. . καν ρευστή ή ν ή φύσις του σώματος, τω τό είδος τό χαράκτηρίζον τό σώμα ταύτόν εΐναι, ώς και τους τύπους μένειν τους αυτούς τος τήν ποιότητα Πέτρου και Παύλου τήν σωματικήν παριστάνοντος . . . τούτο τό είδος, καθ' δ ειδιοποιεΐται ό Παύλος καΐ ό Πέτρος, τό σωματικόν, δ έν τη άναστάσει περι-τίθεται πάσιν τη ψυχή, επί τό κρεΐττον μεταβάλλον. The same ap. Pamphil. Apologia pro Origene, cap. 7, M.G. SVII, c. 594: nos vero post corruptionem mundi eosdem ipsos futuros esse homines dicimus, licet non in eodem statu, neque in iisdem passionibus; p. 594-5: per illam ipsam substantialem rationem, quae salva permanet; ratio ilia substantiae corporalis in ipsis corboribus permanebat\ p. 595: rationis illius virtus quae est insita in interioribus ejus medullis; De Princ. II.10.I, Koetschau: virtus resurre-ctionis; schema aliquid\ 10.3: Ita namque etiam nostra corpora velut granum cadere in terrain putanda sunt; quibus insita ratio, ea quae substantiam continet corporalem, quamvis emortua fuerint corpora et corrupta atque dispersa, verbo tamen Dei ratio ilia ipsa quae semper in substantia corporis salva est, erigat ea de terra, et restituat ac reparet, sicut ea virtus quae est in grano frumenti. ..; Dei jussu ex terreno et animali corpore corpus reparat spiritale, quod habitare possit in coelis; Sic et in ratione hamanorum corporum manent quaedam surgendi antiqua principia, et quasi έντεριώνη id est seminarium mortuorum, sinu terrae conjovetur. Cum autem judicii dies advenerit, et in voce Archangeli et in novissima tuba tremuerit terra, movebuntur statim semina, et in puncto horae mortuos germinabunt; non tamen easdem carnes, nee in his formis restituent quae fuerunt; cf. III.6.Isq., Koetschau, 280 ss.; 111.6.6., p. 288: sed hocidem (corpus), abjectis his infirmitatibus in quibus nunc est, in gloriam transmu-tabitur spiritale effectum, ut quod fuit indignitatis vas, hoc ipsum expurga-tum fiat vas honoris et beatitudinis habitaculum; Contra Celsum, IV.57, Koetschau 330: διό και την άνάστασιν των νεκρών άναδεχόμενοι μεταβολάς φάμεν γενέσθαι ποιοτήτων τών έν σώμασιν* έκεΐ σπει-ρόμενά τίνα αυτών έν φθορά εγείρεται έν αφθαρσία και σπει-ρόμενα έν ατιμία εγείρεται έν δόξη κτλ.; V.18, ρ : ου το γε-νησόμενον σώμα φήσι σπείρεσθαι, αλλ' από του σπειρομένου και γυμνού βαλλομένου έπι την γήν λέγει, δίδοντος του θεού έκά-στω τών σπερμάτων ίδιον σώμα, οιονεί άνάστασιν γίγνεσθαι' άπό του καταβεβλημένου σπέρματος έγειρομένου στάχυος έν τοις τοιοΐσδε' οιονεί έν νάπυΐ ή έπί μείζονος δένδρου έν έλαίας πυ-ρήνι f] τινι τών άκροθρύων; V.23, ρ. : ήμεΐς μεν συν ου φάμεν το διαφθαρέν σώμα έπανέρχεσθαι εις την έξ αρχής φύσιν. . . λέγομεν γαρ ώσπερ έπι του κόκκου του σίτου εγείρεται στάχυς, ούτω λόγος τις έγκειται τω σώματι, άφ1 οδ μη φθειρομένου εγείρεται το σώμα έν αφθαρσία. He contrasts himself, his xiew, with the Stoic idea on an identical repetition. See D. Huetius, Origeniana, l.II, c. II, q.9; de resurrectione mortuorum, M.G. XVII, c. 980 sq.; Redepenning, Origenes (Bonn, 1846), Bd. II, s. 118ff.; C. Ramers, Des Origenes Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches, In. Diss. (Trier, 1851); J. B. Kraus, Die Lehre das Origens iiber die Auferstehung der Toten, Programm (Regensburg, 1859), J. Denis, La Philosophie d'Origene (Paris, 1884), p. 297 ss.; Ch. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (Oxford, 1886), p. 225-227, 265f., 291; the soul has a vital assimilative "spark," or "principles," which lays hold of fitting matter, and shapes it into a habitation suited to its needs; the same process, by which it repairs the daily waste of our organism now, will enable it then to construct a wholly new tenement for itself; L. Atzberger, Geschichte der Christlichen Eschatologie innerhalb der Vornizaenischen Zeit (Freiburg i/Br., 1896), s. 366-456; N. Bonwetsch, Die Theologie des Methodius von Olympus, Abhandlungen d. K. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, N.F. VII, 1904, s. 105 ff.; F. Prat, Origene, p. 87 ss.; G. Bardy, Origene, Dictionnaire de la Theologie Cath., t.XI, 1931, c. 1545 s.; R. Cadiou, La Jeunesse d'Origene, p. 117 ss.: "virtualite physique ou Γ idee du corps/' nune idee active/' "a la fois une idee et une energie" (p. 122, note); "I'dme conserve toujours les virtualites d'une vie physique proportionnees a ses besoins." Cf. also Bp. Westcott's article on Origen in Smith and Wace Dictionary, IV, 1887.

68. Among the late scholastics, Durandus of San Porciano must be mentioned, ''doctor resolutissimus" (d. 1332 or 1334). He puts the question: "Supposito quod anima Petri fieret in mater ia quae fuit in cor pore Pauli, utrum esset idem Petrus qui prius erat? and answers positively: "cuicumque materiae uniatur anima Petri in resurrectione, ex quo est eadem forma secundum numerum per consequens erit idem Petrus secundum numerum"; quoted by Fr. Segarra, S.J., De identhate corporis mortalis et corporis re-surgenus (Madrid, 1929), p. 147. See Quaestiones de Novissimis, auctore L. Billot, S.J., Romae 1902, thesis ΧΙΠ, p. 143 sq.

69. See St. Methodius' De resurrectione in the complete edition of Bonwetsch, specially the 3rd book. Cf. Bonwetsch, opus cit., S. 119 ff.: J. Farges, Les idees morales et religieuses de Methode d'Olympe (Paris, 1929); Folke Bostrom, Studier till den Grekiska Theologins Fralsningslara (Lund, 1932), s. 135 ff. and passim.

70. Of St. Gregory of Nyssa's writings, his dialogue De anima et resurrectione, his homilies De opificio hominis and the Great Catechetical oration are of special importance. See the introductory article of Srawley in his edition of the Catechetical oration, specially on the relation of St. Gregory to St. Methodius. Cf. Hilt, Des heil. Gregors von Nyssa Lehre vom Menschen (Koln, 1890); F. Kiekamp, Die Gotteslehre des heiligen Gregor von Nyssa, I (Miinster, 1895), s. 41 ff.; K. Gronau, Poseidonius und die jiidisch-christliche Genesis-exegese (Berlin, 1974), s. 141 ff., emphasizes the influence of Poseidonius and specially of his commentary on the Timaeus \ Bostrom, op. cit., s. 159.

71. The term ζωτική δύναμις is of Stoic origin and comes probably from Poseidonius. The first instance of its use is in Diodoros of Sycilia, Hist. II, 51, and the source of Diodoros on this occasion is supposed to be just Poseidonius [on Arabia]. Cf. Cicero, De natura deorum II.9, 24; omne igitur quod vivit, she animal aive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem, ex quo intellegi debet earn caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem; comp. 88.51, 127: (genera comnium rerum) quae quidem omnia earn vim seminis habent in se ut ex uno plura generentur. Carl Reinhardt, Poseidonius (Miinchen, 1921), s. 244, points out that the Greek word, rendered by Cicero with "vis seminis," could hardly be λόγος σπερματικός, but rather δύναμις σπερματική. «Σπερματικός λόγος ist ein Begriff des alien Intellectua-lismus, eine Bezeichnung fur die Weltvernunft, die zeugtend wird, damit die Welt vernunftig werde; daher die Verbindung zwischen den λόγος und den Qualitaten. Was Cicero, d.h. Poseidonius, unter 'vis seminis' versteht, ist angeschaute, in der Natur erlebte, physikalisch demonstrierte Lebenskraft, ein Zeugen, das wohl planvoll ist, aber vor allem Zeugen ist und bleibt. Bestimmte sich die Kategorien, worein der Begriff σπερματικός λόγος gedacht war, durch die Korrelate Materie und Vernunft, υλη και λόγος, so bestimmt sich die Kategorien, worein der Begriff 'vis seminis' gedacht ist, durch die Korrelate Kraft und Wirkung." The term ζωτική δύναμις is used with a terminological precision by Philo and Clement of Alexandria.

72. St. Gregory of Nyssa, De anima et resurrectione, Ai.G. XLIV, col. 225 sq.

73. Cf. A. E. Taylor's Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928), ad locum, p. 184 ff., and the Excursus IV, "The concept of Time in the Timaeus," p. 678-691; see also A. E. Taylor, Plato, p. 446 ff. and A. Rivaud, Introduction to his Edition of the Timaeus (Paris, 1925); cf. also an interesting comparison of the two mentalities by L. Labertonniere, Le realisme Chretien et Videalisme grec (Paris, 1904), and the book by J. Guitton, Le temps et I'eternite chez Plotin et St. Augustin (Paris, 1933).

74. See Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 11.11, 337b 35: "for what is of necessity coincides with what it always, since that which 'must be' cannot possibly 'not-be'; hence a thing is eternal, if its 'being' is necessary; and if it is eternal, its 'being' is necessary; and if the 'coming-to-be' of a thing is therefore necessary, its 'coming-to-be' is eternal; and if eternal, necessary"; τό γαρ εξ ανάγκης και αεί άμα . . . και ει ή γένεσις τοίνυν έξ ανάγκης, άΐδιος ή γένεσις τούτου, και ει άΐδιος, έξ ανάγκης. The argument is quite clear. If there is really a reason for a thing, cur potius sit quam non sit, there can be no reason whatever, why this thing should have not been from eternity, since otherwise the reason for its existence would not have been sufficient, i.e., necessary or eternal. Cf. De part. anim. I.I, 639b 23; De gen. anim. II.l, 73lb 24; Physic. III.4, 203b 30; see A. Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotelienne (Louvain, 1913), p. 169 ss.

75. Aristotle, De Caelo 1.2, 269a 29: "the circle is a perfect thing (κύκλος των τελείων), which cannot be said of any straight line; not of any infinite line: for if it were perfect, it would have a limit and an end; nor of any finite line: for in every case there is something beyond it, since any finite line can be extended."

76. Aristotle, Physica IV.14, 223b 29; cf. De gen. et corr. 11.11, 338a 3: "it follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be cyclical, i.e., must return upon itself." διό ανάγκη κύκλω εΐναι; 1.14: απλώς έν τω κύκλω άρα κινήσει καΐ γενέσει εστί τό έξ ανάγκης; Probl. XVII.3, 986a 25: "Just as the course of the firmament and of each of the stars is a circle, why should not also the coming-to-be and the decay of perishable things be of such a kind that the same things again come into being and decay? This agrees with the saying that 'human life is a circle'." And so we should ourselves be "prior," and one might suppose the arrangement of the series to be such that it returns back in a circle to the point from which it began and thus secures continuity and identity of composition. If then human life is a circle, and a circle has neither beginning nor end, we should not be "prior" to those who lived in the time of Troy, nor they "prior" to us by being nearer to the beginning." On the circular movement in Aristotle see O. Hamelin, Le Systeme d'Aristote, 2 ed. (Paris, 1931), p. 366 ss.; J. Chevalier, La Notion du Necessaire chez Aristote et chez ses predecesseurs, particulihement chez Platon (Paris, 1915), p. 160 s., 180 s.; R. Mugnier, La Theorie du Premier Noteur et Vevolution de la Pensee Aristotelienee (Paris, 1930), p. 24 ss.

77. See P. Duhem, Le Systeme du Monde, Histoire des Doctrines Cosmo-logiques de Platon a Copernic, tl (Paris, 1914), p. 65 ss., La Grande Annee, La periodicite du monde selon les philosophes antiques', p. 275-296, La Grande Annee chez les Grecs et les Latins, apres Aristote; t. II (1914), p. 447 ss., Les peres de Ifiglise et la Annee. Cf. Hans Meyer, Zur Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunft oiler Dinge, in Vest gab e A. Ehrhard (Bonn, 1911), s. 359 ff.

78. Eudem. Physic. Ill, frg. 51, ap. Simplic, In Physic. IV. 12, 732.27 Diels: ει δέ τις πιστεύσεις τοΐς Πυθαγορείοις, ώστε πάλιν τά αυτά αριθμώ, καγο μυθολογήσω το ράβδουν εχω ύμΐν καθημέ-νοις, ούτω και τά άλλα πάντα ,μοίως εξει κτλ. Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, V.21, Koetschau 22: τών yap αστέρων κατά τινας περιόδους τεταγμένς τους αυτούς σχηματισμούς και σχέσεις προς αλλήλους λαμβανόντων, πάντα τά έπί γης ομοίως εχειν φασί: τοΐς δτε το αυτό σχήμα τς σχέσεως τών αστέρων περιεΐχεν ό κόσμος* ανάγκη τοίνυν κατά τούτον τον λόγον τών αστέρων έκ μακράς περιόδου έλθόντων επί την αυτήν σχέσιν προς αλλήλους, οποίαν εΐχον έπί Σωκράτους, πάλιν Σωκράτη γενέσθαι έκ τών αυτών και τά αυτά λαβείν κτλ. This idea of the periodical succession of worlds seems to have been traditional in Greek philosophy. See Eusebius of Caesa-rea, Praep. Evang. 1.8, M.G. XXI, 56, and Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokra-tiker, 1.16, on Anaximandros: εξ απείρου αιώνος ένακυκλουμένων πάντων αυτών [Eusebius' authority in this chapter is Pseudo-Plutarch's Stromata}. Simplicius, In Physic. VIII.I, 1121.13 sq. Diels, mentions also Anaximenes, Heraclitus and Diogenes, as well as the Stoics; all of them believed that the Cosmos was eternal (άε^ μεν φασιν εΐναι κόσμον), but periodically changed and renewed άλλοτε άλλον γινόμενον κατά τινάς χρόνων περιόδους; cf. Simplic, In De Caelo, 1.10, 294.4-6 Heiberg.

79. P. Duhem, I, p. 275: "alors survient Aristote, qui rattache logiquement ce croyance a son systeme rationnel de Physique. . ., la vie du Monde sublunaire est, toute entire, une vie periodique"; cf. p. 164 s.: "Les mouvements locaux des corps celestes sont periodiques; au bout d'un certain temps, ces corps reviendront aus positions qu'ils occupent aujourd-hui; or periodicita des mouvements locaux des etres incorruptibles entraine necessaire-ment la periodicite des effets dont ces mouvements sont causes, c'est-a-dire des transformations produites en la matiere corruptible; les generations, done, et les corruptions qui se produisent aujourd'hut se sont deja produites une infinite de fois dans le passe; elles se reproduiront, dans Vavenir, une infinite de fois, .. . la vie dit I'Univers entiere sera une vie periodique."

80. Tatianus, Adv. Graecos, c. 5, Arnim 1.32, 109: τον Ζήνωνα διά της έκπυρώσεως άποψαινόμενον άνίστασθαι πάλιν τους αυτούς έπί τοΐς αύτοΐς, λέγω δέ "Ανητον και μελέτη ν έπί τώ κατηγορεΐν; Stob. Ed. I, 171.2 W., Arnim II. 596, 183, on Zeno, Cleantes and Chry-sippos: τήν ούσίαν μεταβάλλειν οΐον εις σπέρμα τό πυρ, και πάλιν έκ τούτου τοιαύτην άποτελεΐσθαι τήν διακόσμησιν, οία πρότερον ήν; cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, V.20, p. 21 Koetschau: ουτοι δι’ οι άνδρες φασί τη έξης περιόδω τοιαύτα εσεσθαι, και Σωκράτη ν μέν πάλιν Σωφρονίσκου υίόν και 'Αθήναιον εσεσθαι, και τήν Φαιναρέτην γημαμένην Σωφρονίσκω πάλιν αυτόν γεννήσειν. Καν μή όνομάζωσιν οδν τό της αναστάσεως όνομα τό πράγμα γε δηλουσιν δτι Σωκράτης από σπερμάτων άρξάμενος άναστήσεται τών Σωφρονίσκου και εν τη υστέρα Φαιναρέτης διαπλασθήσεται και αναστραφείς Άθήνησι φιλοσοφήσει, κτλ.

81. Cf. Oapke, s.v. άποκατάστασις in Kittel's Worterbuchy I, s. 389: "Vor allem wird άποκατάστασις terminus technicus fur die Wie-derherstellung des kosmischen Zyklus." See Lact. Div. Instit. VII.23, Arnim 11.623, 189: Chrysippus . . . in libris yuos de providentis scripsit haec intulit: καΐ ή μας μετά το τελευτήσοα πάλιν περιόδων τινών είλημμένων χρόνου εις δ νυν εσμεν κατά στη σε σθ α ι σχήμα; Nemesius, De natura homin., cap. 38, Arnim 11.625, 190: τών αστέρων ομοίως πάλιν φερομένων, εκαστον εν τή πρότερα περιόδω γινόμενον άπαραλλάκτως άποτελεΐσθαι: εσεσθαι γαρ πάλιν Σωκράτη και Πλάτωνα κατ’ εκαστον τών ανθρώπων συν τοις αύτοΐς και ψίλοις καΐ πολίταις . . . και πασαν πόλιν και κώμην και άγρον ομοίως άποκαθίστα-σθαι κτλ.

82. Heraclitus and Empedocles did not believe in any numerical persistence of individuals. Things do perish altogether, and in the next world will be merely reproduced, but not the same, rather as similars. See Simpl. In Dt Caelo, 1.10, 307.14 Heiberg: φθειρούμενον δέ και πάλιν γινόμενον; 295, 4: Εμπεδοκλής το γινόμενον ού'τ αυτόν τω φθαρέντι φησίν, ει μή, άρα κατ’ εΐδος. For Aristotle no individual identity existed in the sublunar world, changeable and corruptible. In the successive periods there will be no numerical identity, as in the celestial sphere, but only a similarity, a continuity of species; from Aristotelian Physics this idea was inherited by the later schools. See Aristotle, De gen. et corr. II.II, 338b 16: ανάγκη τω εΐδει, αριθμώ δέ μή άνα-κάμπτειν; Probl. XVII.3, 796a 27: "to demand that those who are coming into being should be numerically identical is foolish, but one would rather accept the theory of the identity of the species," τω εΐδει; cf. also Eudemus ap. Simpl., In Physic. V.4, 886 Diels: διό τω εΐδει εν τούτο ρητέον, και ου τω αριθμώ. See Ο. Hamelin, op. cit., p. 402; Mugnier, op. cit., p. 26 ss. It is not quite clear to what extent the Stoics did admit an individual immortality. Alexander of Aphrodisias suggests a positive answer, In Analyt. prior., 180.39 Wallies, Arnim 11.624, 189: πάλιν πόντα ταύτα έν τω κόσμω γίνεσθαι κατ* αριθμόν. Cicero, Tuse. 1.32, gives another information: Stoici diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant" \ in any case they do not survive the έκπύρωσις; see L. Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa, I (Berlin, 1886), s. 144 f., and Zeller, III.I, 582 f. Scmeckel, Die Philosophie des mittleren Stoa (Berlin, 1902), s. 250 and Anm. 3 contests this view. In any case, Origen had to deal with a Stoic teaching that rejected a numerical identity of the recurrent individuals. "Not the same Socrates, but somebody fully alike," ίνα μή Σω κράτη ς πάλιν γένηται, άλλ’ απαράλλακτος τις τω Σωκράτη, γάμησων άπαράλλακτόν τίνα Ξανθίππη, και κατηγορηθησάμενος ύπό απαράλλακτων Άνήτω και Μελήτω; Contra Celsum, IV.68, Koetschau 338, and Arnim 11.626, 190. Origen objected that in this case the world itself would not have to be the same always, but also only απαράλλακτος Μτερος έτέρω. But obviously he misses the point: for the Stoics, just because the Cosmos is always the same (ή αυτή τάξις άπ' αρχής μέχρι τέλος), every particular has to be repeated in the same shape, but nothing more is required for the uniformity of the whole.

83. Plotinus, IV.6.12; V.7.1-3. Cf. Guitton, op. cit., 55: "Plotin applique a toute existence ce schema circulaire . . ., le cycle mythique est pour lui le type d'existence." See also Proclus, Institutio theologica, prop. 54, 55, 199, ed. Dodds, p. 52, 54, 174 and notes ad loca.

84. Lossev, Symbolism, p. 643. Cf. Guitton, op. cit., p. 359-360: "Les Grecs se representaient la presence de Veternal dans le temps sous la forme de retour cyclique. Inversement, Us imaginaient volontiers que le temps se poursuivait dans V eternel et que la vie presente n'etait qu'un episode du drame de I'ame: ainsi voulaient les mythes. . . ici la pensee chretienne est decisive. . . Les dmes n'ont pas d'histoire avant leur venue. Leur origine, c'est leur naissance; apres la mort la liberte est abolie avec le temps et Vhistoire cesse. Le temps mythique est condemne. Les destinies se jouent une fois peur toutes. . . . Le temps cyclique est condamne. . . ."

85. Cf. my article, "L'idee de la Creation dans la Philosophic Chretienne," Logos, Revue Internationale de la pensee orthodoxe, I (Bucharest, 1926). See the article on creation contained in this volume.

86. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII.20; cf. Nemesius, De hominis natura, c. 38, M.G. XL, c. 761: εις οπταξ γαρ τά της αναστάσεως, και ου κατά περίοδον εσεσθαι, τά του Χρίστου δοξάζει λογία.

89. St. Gregory of Nyssa, De anima et resurrectione, M.G. XLVI.

90. There is only one exception. "The grave and death were not able to hold back the Theotokos, who is ever-watchful in prayers" [Kontakion on the day of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin]. The resurrection has already been actualized in full for the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God, by virtue of her intimate and unique union with Him Whom she bore.

91. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. XLV, in 5. Pascha, 28, M.G. XXXVI, c, 661: έδεήθημεν θεού σαρκομένου καΐ νεκρουμένου.

92. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. XIII, 6, M.G. XXXIII, 780; cf. St. Basil, in Ps. 48, 4; M.G. XXIX, 440.

93. Office of Good Saturday, Canon, at Matins, Irmos IX, Hapgood, Service Book, p. 222.

94. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 39, 17, M.G. XXXVI, 356, cf. Carmina 1.1, ser. 11,4, ves.24-92, M.G. XXXVII, c. 762.

95. It is hardly possible to agree with the interpretation suggested by J. H. Bernard, "A Study of St. Mark X.38, 39" Journal of Theol. Studies, XXVIII (1927), pp. 262-274. The "cup of sufferings" does include death as well. And it is very doubtful whether we can interpret the verb βατττίζεσθαι as meaning merely "to be overwhelmed" [sc. with the floods of misfortune}, so as to reduce the meaning of the Lord's saying only to this: "You will be overwhelmed by the same flood of tribulation by which I am being overwhelmed."

96. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 45, 13; M.G. XXXVI, c. 640; cf. 24, c. 656; as well Orat. 4, 68; M.G. XXXV, c. 589.

97. Matins of the Good Friday, stikhira idiomela, Hapgood, op. cit., p. 216.

98. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 45, 29, M.G. XXXVI, c. 661, 664; cf. Carmina, 1.1, ser. 1, vs. 77-80, XXXVII, c. 462-463: "And He gave to mortals a twofold purification; one of the Eternal Spirit, and by it He cleansed in me the old stain, which comes from the flesh; and the other of our blood, for I call mine the blood Christ, My God, has poured, the redemption of the original infirmities and the salvation of the world." Cf. the interesting explanation why the Lord suffered in the open air, in St Athanasius, De incarnatione, -25, M.G. XXV, c. 170: "for being lifted up on the Cross, the Lord cleansed the air of the malignity both of the devil and of demons of all kinds." The same idea occurs in St. John Chrysostom, in Crucem et latronem, M.G. XLIX, c. 408-409: "in order to cleanse all her defilement"; the Lord suffered not in the temple but in an open place, for this was the universal sacrifice, offered for the whole world.

99. St. Gregory of Nyssa, In Resurrectionem, or. I, M.G. XLVI, col. 612.

100. The whole question of the relation between the Last Suvper and the Crucifixion was studied by M. de la Taille, Mysterium Fidei (Paris, 1921), Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist, ed. by Fr. Lattey, Cambridge Catholic Summer Schol, 1922; Esquisse du Mystere de la Foi suivi de quelques eclaircissements (Paris, 1923); The Mystery of Faith and Human Opinion contrasted and defined (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930). Fr. de la Taille insists that the Last Supper and the Crucifixion were one Sacrifice, and the Last Supper was a sacramental and sacerdotal action, a liturgy, a sacred rite, by which Christ pledged Himself to death in the sight of His Father and of men. It was a sacramental offering and presentation. The sacrifice of Redemption, the sacrifice of His Passion and Death, was offered in the Upper Room.

101. It is sometimes suggested that, death being the common law of human nature, Christ had to die simply because He was truly man. And His obedience was consummated in that He submitted Himself to the Divine decree of common human mortality. See, for instance, P. Galtier, "Obeissant jusqu'a la mort," Revue de VAscetique et de la Mystique I (1920, Toulouse), pp. 113-149 [Patristic documentation]. This argument is not at all convincing. Everything depends here upon our anthropological presuppositions.

102. Stikhira on the 3rd Sunday of Lent, Vespers.

103. St. John of Damascus, de fide orth., 111.27, M.G. XCIV, c. 1907; cf. Homil in M. Sabbat. 29, M.G. XCVI, c. 632. This is not a subtle speculation, but a logical implication of the strict Chalcedonian dogma. An established Christological terminology is presupposed, and specially the doctrine of the "enhypostasia" of the human nature in the Word, first formulated by Leontius of Byzantium and then developed by St. Maximus the Confessor. Earlier writers sometimes failed to present this idea of the preservation of both human elements in an unbroken unity with the Word with complete clearness. See K. Baehr, Die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu in den erst en drei Jahrhunderten (Sulzbach, 1834) ; G. Jouassard, L'abandon du Christ par Son Pere durant sa Passion d'apres la tradition patristique (Lyon, 1923) [thesis]; "L'abandon du Christ d'apres St. Augustin," Revue des sciences relig., IV, 1925, pp. 310-326; L'abandon du Christ au Croix dans la tradition grecque des IV et V siecles, ibid., V, 1925, pp. 609-633; J. Lebon, "Une ancienne opinion sur la condition du corps du Christ dans la mort," Revue de Vhistoire eccl. (XXIII, 1927), pp. 5-03, 209-241; E. Schiltz, Le probleme theologique du corps du Christ dans la mort, Divus Thomas [Plaisance], 1935. See Excursus III, Verba derelictionis.

104. Third Sunday in Lent, Matins, Adoration of the Cross.

105. St. John Chrysostorn, in Crucem et latronem, hi, M.G. XLIX, c. 399.

106. Tuesday of the 4th week of Lent, siedalen.

107. Prayer in Lent at Great Compline.

108. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or at. 41, ed. Mason, pp. 105-106.

109. Exapostillarion at Easter Matins.

110. St. John Damascene, de fide orth. IV, 11, M.G. XCIV, c. 1128-1129; cf. St. Ignatius, Smyrn. 5; Lightfoot, 303; St. Irenaeus, adv. haeres. 11.20.3: per passionem mortem destruxit. .. vitam autem manifestavit, et ostendit veritatem et incorruptionem donavit, Harvey 1.393; M.G. VII.778, c. 1135; V.23.2: venit ad passionem pridie ante sabbatum, quae est sexta conditionis dies, in qua homo plasmatus est, secundum plasmationem ei earn quae est a morte, per suam passionem donans, Harvey, 11.389. Earlier in St. Justin, Apol. I, 63, Otto I, 174. Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, in Hebr. II.14, M.G. LXXIV, c. 965: "the death of Christ is, as it were, the root of life." Also St. Augustine, in loann. tr. XII, 19, 11: ipsa morte liberavit nos a morte; morte occisus mortem occidit. . . mortem suscepit et mortem suspendit in cruce . . ., in morte Christi mors mortua est, quia vita mortua occidit mortem, plenitudo vitae deglutivit mortem, M.L. XXXV, c 1489-1490.

111. Vespers of Good Saturday.

112. In Byzantine iconography, from the late 7th century the Resurrection of Christ was invariably represented as the Descent into Hell, from which the Lord leads Adam and others. It meant the destruction of the bonds of death. The iconography depended directly upon liturgical texts and rites and was a pictorial interpretation of the same experience. A certain influence of the apocryphal literature is obvious, particularly that of the Evangelium Nicodemi and of Pseudo Epiphanius' Homily of Good Saturday [M.G. XLIII, 440-464]. A survey of monuments and their liturgical parallels is given by N. V. Pokrovsky, The Gospel in the Monuments of Iconography, especially Byzantine and Russian, Acts of the VHIth Archeological Congress in Moscow 1890, v.I, p. 398f; G. Rushforth, The Descent into Hell in Byzantine Art, Papers of the British School at Rome, I (1902), p. Il4f. Cf. G. Millet, Recherches sur Viconographie de Evangile aux XIV, XV et XVI siecles d'apres les monuments de Mistre, de la Macedoine et de Mont Athos (Bibliotheque des ecoles frangaises d'Athenes et de Rome, fasc. 109, Paris 1916), p. 396 ss. Millet states plainly, that nViconographie primitive du Crucifiement montrait non point Jesus souffrant sur la Croix, mats Dieu triumphant par son sacrifice volontaire. Elle s'attachait non au drame humain, mats au dogme" [396]. See also Pokrovsky, p. 314 ff. and especially J. Reil, Die altchristliche Bildzyklen des Lebens Jesu, Ficker*s Studien, N. F. Hf. 10, 1910, p. WQ ff. Reil says of the early representations on sarkophagi "Es findet sich keine Leidenszene, in der Christus als Leidender dargestellt ist. Es erscheint immer stets als einer, der fiber dem Leiden steht... Die Verspottung selbst sieht wie eine Verherrlichung, die Dornkronung wie ein Siegerkronung aus" [21-22]. The emotional and dramatic motives make their first appearance in Byzantine art not earlier than the late Xlth century, in the West still later, only after the spreading of the Franciscan ideas and ideals; see Millet, pp. 399-400, 555ss, and O. Schonewul, Die Darstellung Christi, Ficker's Studien, N. P., Hf. 9, 1909.

113. Matins of Good Saturday, 6th song, First Troparion.

114. Second Sunday after Easter, Matins, Canon, 4th Song, 1st troparion; cf. the synaxarion of Good Saturday: "For the Lord's body suffered the corruption, that is, the separation of the soul from the body. But in no wise did it undergo that sort of corruption (διαφθορά), which is the complete destruction of the flesh and decomposition."

115. St. John of Damascus, de fide orth., 111.28, M.G. XCIV, c. 1097, 11900. This distinction of the two meanings of "corruption" had a special importance after the so-called "Aphtharto-docetic" controversy. But it was clearly made even by Origen, In Ps. XV, 10, M.G. XII, c. 1216. A vindication of Julian of Halicarnassus on the charge of heresy was attempted by R. Draguet, Julien d'Halicarnasse et sa controverse avec Severe d'Antioche sur Vincorruptibilite du corps de Jesus-Christ (Louvain, 1924) ; cf., however, M. Jugie, Julien d'Halicarnasse et Severe d'Antioche, £chos dfOrient, XXIV (1925), p. 129-162, and his earlier article, La controverse galanite et la passibilite du corps de Jesus Christ, in the Dictionnaire de la theologie cath., v.VI (1920), pp. 1002-1023. The main problem is what the real meaning of the Passion and death of Our Lord is.

116. St. John Damascene, de fide orth., 111.29, M.G. XCIV, 1101. Cf. Epiphanius, Panarion, haer. XX, 2; ed. Holl, 1.230; haer. XLIX, 52, M.G. XLII, c. 287-305-308; St. Cyril of Alexandria de incarn. Unigeniti, M.G. LXXV, c. 1216: ψυχή δέ θεία; St. Augustine, de Symbolo ad catech. sermo alius, c. VII, 7, M.L. XL, c. 658: totus ergo Filius apud Patrem, totus in Cruce, totus in inferno, totus in Paradiso que et latronem introduxit.

117. It was clearly stated by Rufinus, Comm. in Symbolum Apostolorum, c. 18, M.L. XXI, col. 356. Sciendum sane est quod in Ecclesiae Romanae symbolono, habetur additum, fdescendit ad inferno": sed neque in Orientis ecclesiis habetur hie sermo; vis tamen verbi eadem videtur esse in eo, quod "sepultus" dicitur\ see St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. IV, 11, M.G. XXXIII, 469.

118. I Peter 3:19: φυλακή, Vulg. I career, i.e. a place of confinement; under guard; Calvin suggested: "rather a watch-tower," lnst. II.16.97]; Acts 2:24: τω θανάτω variant of Acts 2:31: εις αδην obviously with reference to Psalm 16:19. "Hades" means here "death," nothing more. For the whole history of this term in Christian usage see G. L. Prestige, "Hades in the Greek Fathers," Journal of Theol. Studies, XXIV (July, 1927), pp. 476-485. In liturgical texts, in any case, "Hell" or "Hades" denotes always this hopelessness of mortal dissolution.

119. Easter-kontakion, Hapgood, 230: cf. St. John Damascene, de fide orth. III.27: "for just as darkness is dissolved on the introduction of light, so is death repulsed on the assault of Life, and for all comes life and for the destroyer destruction," M.G. XCIV (1907); also 111.28, c. 1100.

110. Vespers of Good Friday, troparion. Used as well as the Sunday troparion of the 2nd tone. This is also the main idea of the "Catechetical oration," ascribed to St. John Chrysostom appointed to be read at Easter Matins. Cf. St. John Damascene, de fide orth., III.29, M.G. XCIV, c. 1101: J. N. Karmiris in his book proves quite convincingly that the whole tradition of the Church was always unanimous on the victorious and triumphant character of the Descent into Hell. See Origen, in 1 Kings, horn. 2, M.G. XII, 120: εις τά χωρία έκεΐνα ούχ ως δούλος τών έκεΐ, αλλ9 ώς XII, 1020: κατελήλυθεν εις τά χωρία έκεΐνα ούχ ώς δούλος των έκεΐ, αλλ9 ώς δεσπότης παλαίσιον; in Cant., l.II, M.G. XIII, 184: et ipse in morte fuerit voluntarie, et non ut nos necessitate peccati; solus est enim qui fuit inter moruos litber; St. John Damasc, in M. Sabbat, 31, M.G. XCVI, 633: έν νεκροΐς μεν fjv, αλλά ζών, ώς ελεύθερος.

121. This idea was brought forward with great emphasis by Calvin and shared by some other Reformed theologians, but at once was resented and vigorously repudiated by a great number of both Reformed and Catholic divines, as a "new, unheard-of heresy." Calvin put a great stress on that article of the Apostles Creed. "Mox tamen jiet, tanti interesse ad redemptionis nostrae summam, ut ea praeterita multum ex mortis Christi jructu depereat." "Nihil actum eart, si corporea tantum morte defunctus fuisset Christus: sed operae simul pretium erat, ut divinae ultionis severitate sentiret: quo ex irae ipsius intercederet, et satisjacteret just ο judicio. Unde enim eum opportuit cum inferorum copiis aeternaeque mortis horrore, quasi consertis manibus, luctari. .. sed alius majus et excellentius jretium fuisse, quod diros in anima cruciatus damnati ac perdiii hominis pertulerit. . . quantulum enim fuisset, secure et quasi per lusum prodire ad subeundam mortem .. . Et sane nisi poenae fuisset particeps anima, corporibus tantum fuisset Redemptor." loannis Calvini, Institutio christianae raligionis, ed A. Tholuck, Berolini (1834), l.II, c. 16, 8-12, pp. 332-337; English translation by Henry Beveridge, Calvin Translation Society (Edinburgh, 1845), v.88, pp. 57-62: "The omission of it greatly detracts from the benefit of Christ's death. . . . Nothing had been done if Christ had only endured corporeal death. In order to interpose between us and God's anger and satisfy His righteous judgement it was necessary that He should feel the weight of Divine vengeance. Whence also it was necessary that He should engage, as it were, at close quarters with the powers of hell and horrors of eternal death. . . . He bore in His soul the tortures of condemned and ruined man.. .. How small a matter had it been to come forth securely and, as it were, in sport to undergo death. . . . And certainly had not His soul shared in the punishment, He would have been a Redeemer of bodies only." See also the French redaction (1539), Jean Calvin, Institution de la religion chretienne, ed. Pannier, II, 107-108: "Ce n'estoit rien si Jesus Christ se fust seulement acquite d'une mort corporelle, mats il falloit aussi qui il sentist la severite du Jugement de Dieu, a fin d'interceder, et comme s'opposer que son ire ne tombast sur nous, en satisfaisant a icelle. Pour ce faire, il estoit expedient qu'il bataillast, comme main a main, a Vencontre des puyssances d'Enfer et de I'horreur de la mort eternelle. . .. Mais nous disons qu'il a soustenu la pesanteur de la vengeance de Dieu, en tant qu'il a este frappe et afflige de sa main et a experimente tous les signes que Dieu monstre aux pecheurs, en se courrouceant contre eulx et les punissant." This interpretation obviously depends upon the penal conception of Atonement, it stands and falls with it. As a matter of fact, a somewhat similar interpretation of the Descent into Hell was suggested before Calvin by Nicolas of Cusa. 122St. Athanasius, de Incarnatione, 26, M.G. XXV, col. 141.

123. Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, de recta jide ad Theodos., 22, M.G. LXXVI, c. 1165, horn, pasch. VII, M.G. LXXVII, c. 352; St. John Chrysostom, horn, in Matt. 26, 3, M.G. LVII: "How are the gates of brass wiped away and the iron doors destroyed? Through His body...." Then for the first time was an immortal body shown and it did destroy the power of death: τότε γαρ πρώτον έδείχθη σώμα άθάνατον, και διαλύον του θανάτου την τυραννίδα. It manifested that the power of death is broken, του θανάτου δείκνυσε τήν ίσχύν άνημμένην; St. John Damascene, de fide orth. Ill, 29, M.G. XCIV, c. 110. Of the Western Fathers see St. Augustine, ep. 164, ad Euodium, 12, 13, 16, 21, M.L. XXXIII, c. 714, 715, 716. An excellent presentation of Orthodox doctrine of the Descent into Hell was given by J. N. Karmiris, Ή είς "Αδου κάθοδος του Χρίστου έξ απόψεως ορθοδόξου (Athens, 1939), ρ. 156; cf. J. Dietelmair, Historia dogmatis de descensu Christi ad inferos litteraria (Altorfii, 1762); H. Quillet, s. voce, in the Diet, de la theol. cath., t. IV; K. Gschwind, Die Niederfahrt Christi in die Unterwelt, Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen (1911); F. Cabrol and A. de Meester, s. voce, in the Diet. d'Archeologie char, et de liturgie, t. IV, 1916; C. Schmidt, Gesprache Jesu mit seinen Jungern nach der Auferstehung, Texte und Untersuchungen, XLIII (1919), Excursus II, Der Descensus ad inferos in der alien Kirche, s.453-576; J. Kroll, Gott und Holle, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, XX (1932); K. Prumm, Die Darstellungen des Hadesfahrtes des Herrn in der Literatur der alien Kirche, Kritische Bemerkungen zum ersten Kapitel des Werkes von ]. Kroll, Scholastik X (1935); J. Chaine, s. voce [Vigoureux], Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplement, t. II (1934), c. 395ss. The Patristic conception of a ransom paid to the devil needs a special investigation in connection with the doctrine of the Descent into Hell. But it seems that in most cases the Devil stands simply for Death. The best dossier and analysis of Patristic texts and references is given by J. Riviere, Le dogme de la Redemption, Essai d'etude historique (Paris, 1905), the whole chapter, "La question de droit des demons," p. 373 [there is an English translation, London, 1911}; and again in his own books: Le dogme de la Redemption, Etudes critiques et documents (Louvain, 1931). Here is Riviere's conclusion. "Des lors, dire que le Christ s'est livre au demon pour prix de noire rachat ne serait-ct pas tous simplement une maniere metaphorique d'enseigner qu'Il s'est livre a la mort pour notre salut?" {Revue des sciences religieusts, X, p. 621}. See Excursus IV, Descensus ad injerna.

124. Easter Canon, 6th song, Irmos, Hapgood 230.

125. Easter Vespers.

126. Monday of Easter week, Theotokaria, 4th song.

127. St. John Chrysostom, in Acta Apost. horn. VII, M.G. LX, c. 57: και αυτό ώδινε κατέχων αυτόν ό θάνατος, και τα δεινά ένέπασχεν; Chrysostom has in view the words of Acts: τάς ώδΐνας του θανάτου [Acts 2:24}; cf. Ps. 17:5-6. Strack-Billerbeck, ad Acta 11.24: "Stricke des Todes," or "Weben des Todes" [2:617-618]. Cf. in the Liturgy of St. Basil, the Prayer of Consecration: και κατελθών δια του σταυρού εις τον "Αδην, ίνα πλήρωση έαυτου τά πάντα, ^λυσε τάς όδύνας του θανάτου' και άναστάς τη τρίτη ήμερα, καΐ όδοποιήσας πάση σαρκί την εκ νεκρών άνάστασιν, καθότι ουκ fjv δυνατόν κρατεΐ-σθαι ύπό της φθοράς τον άρχηγόν της ζως, έγένετο απαρχή των κεκοιμημένων, πρωτότοκος εκ τών νεκρών, ίνα ή αυτός τά πάντα έν πάσι πρωτεύων.

128. Office for the Burial of a Priest, Stikhira idiomela by St. John of Damascus, Hapgood, p. 415.

129. St. Athanasius, De incarn. 26, M.G. XXV, c. 141; cf. St. John Chrysostom in loann. h. 85, [al. 84], 2: "By all means He shows that this is a sort of new death, for everything was in the power of the dying One and death did not come to His body until He so desired," κοινόν τόν θάνατον τούτον δντα, M.G. LIX, c. 462.

130. Easter Canon, 2nd song, 2nd Troparion, Hapgood p. 231.

131. Sunday Matins, siedalen of the 3rd tone.

132. "Christ is first-born from the dead." Col. 1:18. Born, as it were, from the grave. Resurrection is a new mysterious birth into full immortality, into a new and perpetual, i.e. "eternal," life. And death itself issues into a birth. "The first that shall rise from the dead." Acts 26:23: "The first begotten of the dead." Rev. 1:5. Cf. J. Chaine, Diet. d.l. Bible, Suppl, t.II, p. 418: "La resurrection est comparee a un enfantement de la part du scheol. Jesus est le premier parmi les hommes qui soit sorti du sein de I'Hades."

133. St. John Chrysostom, in Hebr. h. 17, 2, M.G. LXIII, c. 129.

134. St. Athanasius, De incarn. 21, M.G. XXV, c. 132.

135. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Or at. catech., c. 16, Srawley, 70-72: πάλιν προς τήν άρρηκτον Γνώσιν το διασχισθέν συναρμόσας . . . οίον άπό τινός αρχής εις πασαν άνθρωπίνην φύσιν τη δυνάμει κατά το Ισον έκ τοΟ διακριθέντος έναντι διαβαίνει. Cf. adv. Apollinarium, cap. 17, M.G. XLV, 1153, 1156: "Death is but the separation of soul and body, but He, who has united both soul and body in Himself, did not separate Himself from either.... Being simple and uncomposed, He was not divided, when body and soul were separated; on the contrary, He rather accomplishes their union, and by His own indivisibility does bring even the separated into unity, τω γαρ καθ* εαυτόν άδιαιρέτω και τό διηρημένον εις ενωσιν άγει. The Only Begotten God Himself raises the human nature united with Him, first separating the soul from the body, and then co-uniting them again, and so the common salvation of nature is achieved."

136. St. Gregory of Nyssa, adv. Apollin, c. 55, M.G. XLV, c. 1257, 1260.

137. Nicolas Cabasilas, De vita in Christo, 11.86-96, ed. Gass, Die Mystik des Nicolaus Cabasilas (1849), pp. 46-48. Gass's edition is reproduced in M.G. CL. A French translation by S. Broussaleux has been recently published by "Irenikon."

138. St. Ignatius, Magnes 5, Lightfoot p. 117-118. The language of Ignatius is molded on that of St. Paul; comp. Rom. 6:5, 8:If, 29; 2 Cor. 4:10, Phil. 3:10, 2 Tim. 2:11 (Lightfoot, ad locum.)

139. St. Maximus, Quaest. ad Thalassium, qu. 39, Schol. 3, M.G. XC.393.

140. St. Maximus, Quaest. ad Thalass. 6, M.G. XC, c. 280; cf. St. Irenaeus, Adv. haereses, IV.31.I, M.G. VII, c. 1105: ούτω καΐ ό θεός αυτός μέν οίος τε ή ν παρασχεΐν άπ' αρχής τω άνθρώπω τό τέ-λειον, ό δέ άνθρωπος αδύνατος λαβείν αυτό' νήπιον γαρ fjv; cf. 1607: έκεΐνος δέ άρτι γεγονώς, αδύνατος fjv λαδεΐν αυτό, ή και λαδών χωρήσαι, ή καΐ χωρήσας κατασχεΐν.

141. On the whole question of "universal salvation" see E. P. Pusey's still unantiquated pamphlet: What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment? 1879, 1880. Andreas of Caesarea, in his Commentary on Revelation, gives an interesting terminological summary. (See the whole of chapter 62, ad XX.5, 6, on the "first resurrection" and the "second death," M.G. CVI, c. 412-413; cf. also ch. 59, ad XIX, 21, c. 406.) There are two kinds of life and two kinds of death, and therefore two kinds of resurrection too. The first life is that of the fallen man, "temporary and fleshly" (πρόσκαιρος και σαρκική). The second life is Life eternal, which is promised to the saints in the age to come. The first death is the separation of the soul and body, a death "of the flesh" (ό της σαρκός) and for a time only (πρόσκαιρος), up to the second resurrection. The "second death" is the "eternal" condemnation, which is prepared for the sinners in the age to come, eternal torments and confinement in Gehenna (ό της είς γεένναν εκπομπής). Again, the "first resurrection" is a spiritual regeneration, a "quickening from the deadly deeds," and the second and ultimate resurrection is that of the bodies, which are to be relieved out of corruption and transformed into incorruption. Πρώτος τοίνυν ό σωματικός θάνατος, τη ανθρωπινή παρακοή δοθείς έπιτιμίαν ό δεύτερος, ή αιώνιος κό-λασις; πρώτη δέ άνάστασις ή έκ νεκρών £ργων ζωοποίησις* δευτέρα δέ ή έκ φθοράς τών σωμάτων είς άψθαρσίαν μεταποίησις.

142. Ν. Cabasilas, De vita in Christo, 11.95, Gass 48.

143. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystag. II. 4-5, 7, M.G. XXXIII, c. 1080-1081, 1084; cf. 8II.2, c. 1089. See also St. Basil, de Spiritu S. 55, M.G. XXXII, c. 126, 129-

144. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Myst. III.l, M.G. XXXIII, c. 1088.

145. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. cat., 33, Srawley 123, 126.

146. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. catech, 35, Srawley 129-130.

147. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. cat. 40, Srawley 159-164; cf. Orat. 1 in S. Pascha, M.G. XLVI, c. 604 s.; de propos. sec. Deum, M.G. XLV, c. 289. This was the reason St. Gregory so vigorously attacked those who used to postpone baptism till the later period of life. The benefit of baptism is thereby diminished, since not enough time is left to actualize the baptismal grace by the creative effort of a godly life (M.G. XVI, c. 416-432). On the other hand, St. Gregory admits that the benefits of baptism will sooner or later be extended to and appropriated by everyone, i.e. that "baptism" in some form will be administered to all men. This idea is organically connected with the doctrine of "apokatastasis" and of the healing character of the whole after-life up to the final consummation. Hence the idea of a plurality of baptisms; and the last baptism will be that of fire, which nobody can escape. Similar ideas are to be found in St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oral. 39, 19, M.G. XXXVI, c. 357; repeated by St. John Damascene, de fide orth., IV.3, M.G. XCIV, c. 1124-1125.

148. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystag. II, 4, M.G. XXXIII, r. 1081. Cf. N. Cabasilas, De vita in Christo, II, 10.

149. N. Cabasilas, De vita in Christo, II.3, 4, 6, Gass 28-29.

150. N. Cavasilas, De vita in Christo, IV. 1, 4, 15, Gass 81, 82, 84-85.

151. St. John Chrysostom, in Matt. horn. 50, 3, M.G. LVIII, c. 50f.

152. Ibidem, horn. 82, 5, col. 744.

153. De proditione Judae, 1.6, M.G. XLIX, c. 380.

154. Nicolas Cabasilas, Explanatio dip. liturgiae, c. 23, M.G. CL, c. On the "sacramental" remembrance and representation of Christ's death in the Eucharist, see Odo Casel, Das Mysteriengeddchniss der Messliturgie im Lichte der Tradition, Jahrbucher fur die Liturgiewissenschaft, VI (1925), s. 113-204. "Das Geddchtniss selbst besteht in der nach Vorbild des letzten Abendmahles gestalteten rituellen Be ge bung des Erlosungswerkes. Dies Geddchtniss ist zugleich das Opfer. Es ist nicht subjektives Sicherinnern, sondern objektive Wirklichkeit unter dem Ritus, mit anderen Worten Symbol, Gleichnissbild, Mysterium. Die Anamnese stem pelt also die ganze heilige Handlung zum realen Geddchtniss: der Erlosungstod wird unterdem Schleier der Ritus Wirklichkeit [130]. .. .Dies Mysterium enthdlt so konkrete Wirklichkeit, dass es vollstdndig mit der Tat identifiziert wird, dies es mystisch darstellt; so sehr dass man von der symbolischen Darstellung im Mysterium auf die Geschichtlichkeit der Tat zuruckschliessen kann. Es ist also auf beiden Seiten diesselbe eine Tat; nur ist sie im zweiten Falle unter symbolen verbergen. Das Mysterium bringt genau so die Erlosung, wie jene erste Heilstat; ja es est die Erlosung [153]. . . .Nicht das historische Ereignis hebt sich wieder aus der Vergangenheit hervor; Christus stirbt nicht wieder historisch-real; aber die Heilstat wird sakramental, in mysterio, in Sacramento, gegenwdrtig und dadurch fur die Heilsuchenden zugdnglich [174]. . . . Die historisch vorgangene Passion wird sakramental gegenwdrtig [186]." Casel provides a copious Patristic documentation. One may consult his other essays as well. Cf. Darwell Stone, The Eucharistic Sacrifice (1920), and A. Vonier, A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist (1925).

155. St. Ignatius, Ephes. XX.2, Lightfoot, 8F.

156. N. Cabasilas, Expos, liturglas, c. 16, M.G. CL, 404. See Bp. Aulen's article in The Ministry and Sacraments, ed. Headlam and Dunkerley (1937). "Now, in the act of commemoration we look back to the historical events and the Sacrifice as we see them in the right light, in the light of the Resurrection. Therefore in celebrating the Lord's death we are not performing a funeral service, not yet a mere memorial of a martyrdom; the Sacrament is not only a Sacrament of suffering Love, but also of victorious Love. We praise and magnify the living 'Kyrios' who comes to us in His holy Supper."

l. Epist. 101, ad Cledoniutn (M., P.G., 37, col. 118).

2. Bishop B. F. Westcott, "The Gospel of Creation," in The Epistles of St. John, The Greek Text with notes and essays, Third Edition. (Macmillan, 1892), p. 288.

8. Rupertus Tuitensis, De Gloria et honore Filii hominis super Matthaeum, lib. 13, (M., P.L., 148, col. 1628): "Here it is first proper to ask whether or not the Son of God, Whom this discourse concerns, would have become man, even if sin, on account of which all die, had not intervened. There is no doubt that He would not have become mortal and assumed a mortal body if sin had not occurred and caused man to become mortal; only an infidel could be ignorant as to this. The question is: would this have occurred, and would it somehow have been necessary for mankind that God become man, the Head and King of all, as He now is? What will be the answer?" Rupert then quotes from St. Augustine about the eternal predestination of the saints (De Civitate Dei, 14. 23.) and continues: "Since, with regard to the saints and all the elect there is no doubt but that they will all be found, up to the number appointed in God's plan, about which He says in blessing, before sin, 'Increase and multiply,' and it is absurd to think that sin was necessary in order to obtain that number, what must be thought about the very Head and King of all the elect, angels and men, but that He had indeed no necessary cause for becoming man, but that His love's 'delights were to be with the children of men.' [Proverbs 8:31]" Cf. also De Glorificatione Trinitatis, lib. 3. 20 (M., P.L., 169, col. 72): "Therefore, we say quite probably, not so much that man [was made] to make up the number of the angels [i.e., for those who had fallen], but that both angels and men were made because of one man, Jesus Christ, so that, as He Himself was begotten God from God, and was to be found a man, He would have a family prepared on both sides. .. From the beginning, before God made anything, it was in His plan that the Word {Logos} of God, God the Word [Logos], would be made flesh, and dwell among men with great love and the deepest humility, which are His true delights." (Allusion again to Proverbs 8:31.)

4. Honorius of Autun, Libellus octo quaestionum de angelis et homine, cap. 2 (Μ., P.L., 172, col. 72): "And therefore the first man's sin was not the cause of Christ's Incarnation; rather, it was the cause of death and damnation. The cause of Christ's Incarnation was the predestination of human deification. It was indeed predestined by God from all eternity that man would be deified, for the Lord said, 'Father, Thou hast loved them* before the creation of the world,' [cf. John 17:24] those, that is, who are deified through Me... It was necessary, therefore, for Him to become incarnate, so that man could be deified, and thus it does not follow that sin was the cause of His Incarnation, but it follows all the more logically that sin could not alter God's plan for deifying man; since in fact both the authority of Sacred Scripture and clear reason declare that God would have assumed man even had man never sinned. [*S. Script., Jn. 17:24, reads 'me' for 'them'."]

5. Alexander Halensis, Summa tkeologica, ed. ad. Claras Aquas, dist. 3, qu. 3, m. 3; Albertus Magnus, In 3, 1. Sententiarum, dist. 20, art. 4, ed. Borgnet, t. 28, 361: "On this question it must be said that the solution is uncertain, but insofar as I can express an opinion, I believe that the Son of God would have been made man, even if sin had never been."

6. Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, 3, dist. 19, ed. Wadding, t. 7, p. 415. Cf. Reportata Parisiensia, lib. 3, dist. 7, qu. 4, schol. 2, ed. Wadding, t. 11. 1, p. 451. "I say, nevertheless, that the Fall is not the cause of Christ's predestination. Indeed, even if one angel had not fallen, or one man, Christ would still have been predestined thus—even if others had not been created, but only Christ. This I demonstrate thus: anyone who wills methodically first wills an end, and then more immediately, those things which are more immediate to the end. But God wills most methodically; therefore, He wills thus: first He wills Himself, and everything intrinsic to Himself; more directly, so far as concerns things extrinsic, is the soul of Christ. Therefore, in relation to whatever merit and before whatever dement was foreseen, He foresees that Christ must be united to Him in a substantial union... The disposition and predestination is first complete concerning the elect, and then something is done concerning the reprobate, as a secondary act, lest anyone rejoice as if the loss of another was a reward for himself; therefore, before the foreseen Fall, and before any demerit, the whole process concerning Christ was foreseen... Therefore, I say thus: first, God loves Himself; second, He loves Himself by others, and this love of His is pure; third, He wills that He be loved by another, one who can love Him to the highest degree (in speaking about the love of someone extrinsic); fourth, He foresees the union of that nature which ought to love Him to the highest degree, although none had fallen [i.e., even if no one had fallen] ... and, therefore, in the fifth instance, He sees a coming mediator who will suffer and redeem His people; He would not have come as a mediator, to suffer and to redeem, unless someone had first sinned, unless the glory of the flesh had become swelled with pride, unless something needed to be redeemed; otherwise, He would have immediately been the whole Christ glorified." The same reasoning is in the Opus Oxoniensey dist. 7, qu. 3, scholium 3, Wadding 202. See P. Raymond, "Duns Scot," in Dictionnaire de la Theologie Catholique, t.4, col. 1890-1891, and his article, "Le Motif de l'lncarnation: Duns Scot et l'ficole scotiste," in Etudes Franciscaines (1912); also R. ieeberg, Die Tbeologie des Johannes Duns Scotus (Leipzig, 1900), s. 250.

7. Summa theol, 3a, qu. 1, art. 3; in 3 Sentent., dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 3.

8. Bonaventura, in 3 Sentent., dist. 1, qu. 2, ed. Lugduni (1668), pp. 10-12.

9. Cf. A. Michele, "Incarnation," in Dictionnaire de la Theologie Catholique, t. 7, col. 1495 ss. John Wessel, De causis Incarnationis, lib. 2, c. 7, quoted by G. Ullman, Die Reformatoren vor der Reformation, Bd. 2 (Gotha, 1866), s. 398 ff. On Naclantus see Westcott, op. cit., p. 312 ff. Andreas Osiander, An Filius Dei fuit incarnatus, si peccatum non inter-vents set in mundum? Item de imagine Dei quid sit? Ex cert is et evidentibus S. Scripturae testimoniis et non ex philosophicis et humanae rationis cogitationibus derompta explicatio (Monte Regia Prussiae, 1550); see I. A. Dorner, Entivicklun gsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi, 2 Aufl. (1853), Bd. 2, s. 438 ff. and 584; Otto Ritschl, Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus, Bd. 2 (Leipzig, 1912), s. 462. Osiander was vigorously criticized by Calvin, Institutio, lib. 2, cap. 12, 4-7, ed. Tholuck, 1, s. 304-309.

10. See for instance the long discussion in "Dogmata Theologica" of L. Thomassin (1619-1695) in tomus 3, De Incamatione Verbi Dei, 2, cap 5 to 11, ed. nova (Parisiis, 1866), pp. 189-249. Thomassin dismisses the Scotist theory as just a "hallucination," contradicted openly by the evidence of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers. He gives a long list of Patristic passages, mainly from St. Augustine. Bellarmin (1542-1621) dismisses this idea in one phrase: "For if Adam had remained in that innocence wherein he had been created, doubtless the Son of God would not have suffered; He probably would not even have assumed human flesh, as even Calvin himself teaches"; De Christo, lib. 5, cap. 10, editio prima Romana (Romae, 1832), t. 1, p. 432. Petavius (1583-1652) was little interested in the controversy: "This question is widely and very contentiously disputed in the schools, but, being removed from the controversy, we will explain it in a few words." There is no evidence for this conception in Tradition, and Petavius gives some few quotations to the opposite effect. "Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus," tomus 4, De Incamatione, lib. 2, cap. 17, 7-12, ed. (Venetiis, 1757), pp. 95-96. On the Protestant side see a brief discussion in John Gerhard, Loci Theologici, Locus Quartus, "De Persona et Officio Christi," cap. 7, with valuable references to the earlier literature and an interesting set of Patristic quotations; ed. Sd. Preuss (Berolini, 1863), t. 1, pp. 513-514, and a longer one in J. A. Quenstedt, Theologia Didactico—Polemica, sive $y sterna Theologicum (Wittebergae, 1961), Pars 3 & 4, Pars 3, Cap. 3, Membrum 1, Sectio 1, Quaestio 1, pp. 108-116. On the other hand, Suarez (1548-1617) advocated a recon-ciliatory view in which both conflicting opinions could be kept together. See his comments on Summa, 3a, Disput. 4, sectio 12, and the whole Disp. 5a, Opera Omnia, ed. Berton (Parisiis, I860), pp. 186-266.

11. Frangois de Sales, Traite de Vamour de Dieu, Iivre 2, ch. 4 and 5, in Oeuvres, edition complete, t. 4 (Annecy, 1894), pp. 99ss. and 102ss. Malebranche, Entretiens sur la Metaphysique et sur la Religion, Edition critique par Armand Cuvillier (Paris, 1948), tome 2, Entretien 9, 6, p. 14: "Oui assurement l'lncarnation du Verbe est le premier et le principal des desseins de Dieu; c'est ce qui justifie sa conduite"; Traite de la Nature et de la Grace (Rotterdam, 1712), Discours 1, 1, p. 2. Seconde Eclaircissement, p. 3O2ss.; Reflexions sur la Promotion Physique (Paris, 1715), p. 300: "II suit evidemment, ce me semble, de ce que je viens de dire, que le premier et le principal dessein de Dieu dans la creation, est 1'Incarnation du Verbe: puisque Jesus Christ est le premier en toutes choses. . . et qu'ainsi, quand 1'homme n'aurait point peche, le Verbe se serait incarne"; cf. p. 211 and passim. See for further information: J. Vidgrain, Le Christianisme dans la philosophie de Maleranche (Paris, 1923), pp. 99ss. and 112ss; H. Gouhier, La Philosophie de Malebranche et son Experience Religieuse (Paris, 1926), p. 22ss.; J. Maydieu, "La Creation du Monde et 1'Incarnation du Verbe dans la Philosophie de Malebranche," in Bulletin de Litterature Ecclesiastique (Toulouse, 1935). It is of interest to mention that Leibniz also regarded the Incarnation as an absolute purpose in creation; see quotations from his unpublished papers in J. Baruzi, Leibniz et I Organization religieuse de la Terre (Paris, 1907), pp. 273-274.

12. The Scotist point of view has been presented by a Franciscan, Father Chrysostome, in his two books: Christus Alpha et Omega, seu de Christi universali regno (Lille, 1910, published without the name of the author) and Le Motif de 1'Incarnation et les principaux thomistes contemporains (Tours, 1921). The latter was a reply to the critics in which he assembled an impressive array of Patristic texts. The Thomist point of view was taken by Father E. Hogon, Le Mystere de Vlncarnation (Paris, 1913), p. 63ss., and Father Paul Galtier, S. J. De Incarnatione et Redemptione (Parisiis, 1926); see also Father Hilair de Paris, Cur Deus Homo? Dissertario de motivo Incarnationis (Lyons, 1867) [includes an analysis of Patristic texts from the Thomist point of view]. Cf. also the introduction in the book of Dr. Aloysius Spindler, Cur Verbum, caro factum? Das Motiv der Menschiverdung und das Verhaltnis der Erlosung zur Menschwerdung in den christologischen Glaubenskdmpfen des vierten und funten christlichen Jahrhunderts (Paderborn, 1938) ['Torschungen zur christlichen Literatur— und Dogmengeschichte," hsgg. von A. Ehrhard und Dr. J. P. Kirsch, Bd. 18, 2 Heft].

13. See note 1 above.

14. Fr. Sergii Bulgakov, Agnets Bozhii (Paris, 1933), p. 191 ff. (in Russian). French translation, Du Verbe Incarne (Paris, 1943).

15. Dr. Spindler was the only student of the problem using the proper historical method in handling the texts.

16. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Liturgie Cosmique: Maxime le Confesseur (Paris, Aubier, 1947), pp. 204-205; Father Balthasar quotes Qu. ad Talass. 60 and adds that St. Maximus would have taken the Scotist side in the scholastic controversy, yet with an important qualification: "Maxime de reste est totalement etranger au postulat de ce debat scholastique qui imagine la possibilite d'un autre ordre du monde sans pecho et totalement irreel. Pour lui la 'volonte preexistante' de Dieu est identique au monde des 'idees' et des 'possibles': l'ordre des essences et l'ordre des faits coincident en ce point supreme" (in the German edition, Kosmische Liturgie, s. 267-268). See also Dom Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B., "The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor" in Studia Anselmiana (Romae, 1955), fasc. 36, ch. 4, pp. 155ff.

17. The best exposition of the theology of St. Maximus is by S. L. Epifanovich, St. Maximus the Confessor and Byzantine Theology (Kiev, 1915; in Russian); cf. also the chapter on St. Maximus in my book, The Byzantine Fathers (Paris, 1933), pp. 200-227 (in Russian). In addition to the book of Father von Balthasar, quoted above, one may consult with profit the "Introduction" of Dom Polycarp Sherwood to his translation of The Four Centuries on Charity of St. Maximus, Ancient Christian Writers, No. 21 (London and Westminster, Md., 1955). See also Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (Lund, 1965).

18. See the definition of "theologoumena" by Bolotov, Thesen iiber das "Filioque," first published without the name of the author ("von einem russischen Theologen") in Revue Internationale de Thiologie, No. 24 (Oct.-Dec, 1898), p. 682: "Man kann fragen, was ich unter Theologou-menon verstehe? Seinem Wesen nach ist es auch eine theologische Meinung, aber eine theologische Meinung derer, welche fiir einen jeden 'Katholiken' mehr bedeuten als gewohnliche Theologen; es sind die theologische Meinungen der hi. Vater der einen ungeteilten Kirche; es sind die Meinungen der Manner, unter denen auch die mit Recht hoi didaskaloi tes oikoumenes genannten sich befinden." No "theologoumenon" can claim more than "probability," and no "theologoumenon" should be accepted if it has been clearly disavowed by an authoritative or "dogmatic" pronouncement of the Church.